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Chapter 1
Introduction
It is evident that wide areas of today’s economy are dominated by a market structure
that is characterized by intermediaries building a link between consumers and input
suppliers. As exemplary illustrated figure 1.1, for their production process interme-
diaries procure input products from one or more suppliers, refine or combine them
and offer the resulting final product or solution as the output to their customers. To
get a broad understanding of the described intermediate goods market, analyzing the
market structure’s impact on the participants’ economic behavior and interactions is
the main objective of this thesis.
Within intermediate good markets, the existence of intermediaries is obligatory for
two main reasons: a highly complex input market and the mutually non-awareness
between customers and input suppliers. The input market’s complexity results from
suppliers usually providing an extensive amount of non-homogenous products which
can be horizontally and/or vertically differentiated. Horizontal product differentiation
refers to the fact that products can have different degrees of substitutability, comple-
mentarity or can be mutually independent. Vertical product differentiation considers
different levels of product quality which can usually be increased by taking investments
that foster a product’s functionality or life period. Besides this the market may be
dynamic, i.e., new input suppliers that offer distinguished products may enter, existing
input suppliers may leave the market. As a result of the high and constantly changing
variety of input goods, customers generally do not have the expertise and time to ex-
plore the market of suppliers directly. Hence, they have to approach an intermediary
to satisfy their needs.
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Figure 1.1: Intermediate goods market - exemplary
As a second reason, the presence of intermediaries is essential due to the fact that
input suppliers are not necessarily aware of who the customers are and what they
require in order to meet their expectations. Thus, a direct contact is unlikely and/or
not promising, making suppliers dependent on a connecting instance which is the in-
termediary.
The challenges coming along with the described market structure are enormous.
They arise due to its two-sided structure and the accompanied interdependencies, its
highly dynamic nature, but also due to the presence of asymmetric information with
respect to input goods’ and final products’ qualities.
When considering the market’s two-sidedness, it can be observed that nearly any
decision taken has an impact on all market participants and their behavior. For in-
stance, when determining the sales price for the final product that is charged to the
customers, the intermediary always needs to have the prices of input goods, his costs
of procurement, in mind. Moreover, the customers’ demand for final products on the
sales side also has a direct impact on the intermediary’s demand for input goods on
the procurement side. Additional complexity arises due to the fact that intermediaries
not just compete for the customers’ demand on the sales side, but simultaneously face
competition for input goods on the procurement side. Besides competition between
intermediaries, competition may also take place between input suppliers influencing
the interaction of all market participants.
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In addition to horizontal differentiation input products can also be vertically dif-
ferentiated, i.e., have different degrees of product quality. This does not only refer to
the input goods but also to the final products. Therefore on the one hand the input
supplier might be better informed about his product’s quality and characteristics than
the intermediary. On the other hand the intermediary might have more information
about the quality and characteristics of the final good than his customer. In order to
assure the functionality of the market, overcoming information asymmetries is a key
issue.
Another challenge may arise due to the highly dynamic nature of the intermediate
goods market. This dynamic refers to the input market as well as to the market where
outputs are traded. For the input market with a permanently changing set of available
inputs, the input selection process always needs to be reconsidered by intermediaries
in a repeated game. A similar problem arises in a repeated trading scenario in which
customers are exposed to a constantly changing market of intermediaries.
The main focus of this thesis is put on investigating the challenges which arise
from the two-sided structure of the market as well as from the presence of asymmetric
information. The described issues that are related to the dynamic nature of the market
are not within scope of the current analysis. Thus, the intermediaries’ input selection
problem within a dynamic environment is left for further research. Moreover the
competition between input suppliers is not covered in this thesis, a further issue that
needs to be approached in future.
Within our analysis, methods of non-cooperative game theory are primarily ap-
plied, i.e., Nash equilibria as well as subgame perfect Nash equilibria are determined
and analyzed and compared, amongst others.
The present work consists of six chapters. After having identified the research
question of this thesis and discussed the key challenges of intermediate good markets
in Chapter 1, the literature on oligopoly theory is discussed in Chapter 2. The sub-
sequent Chapter 3 which is based on Brangewitz and Manegold (2016), Chapter 4
which is based on Manegold (2016) and Chapter 5 which is based on Brangewitz et al.
(2014a) examine different variations of intermediate goods markets with different fo-
cuses. Finally an outlook is given in Chapter 6 summarizing the established results of
this thesis as well identifying fields of further research. In the following, all chapters
and their according focal points will be briefly introduced.
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1.1 Literature on Oligopoly Theory
Chapter 2 discusses the literature on oligopoly theory which is of interest for our
analysis in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 and can be subdivided in two parts. The first
part focuses on settings in which duopolists compete simultaneously for the demand
of customers and set either prices or quantities. It will be shown that based on the
fundamental contributions of Cournot (1838) and Bertrand (1883) a huge strand of
literature developed over the years. For instance, in their seminal work, Singh and
Vives (1984) establish a setting of a differentiated duopoly and compare the outcomes
of price and quantity competition. Their approach is the basis of further extensions
introducing and analyzing the choice of process or product innovation as for example
considered by Motta (1993) or Symeonidis (2003). Discussing the impact of the pres-
ence of a strategic input supplier is another field that is for instance considered by
Ha¨ckner (2003).
The second part of Chapter 2 refers to the modeling of Von Stackelberg (1934). It
considers markets where duopolists do not compete simultaneously, but sequentially
for the demand of customers by choosing production quantities for their product. The
focus of a wide range of publications in this area is put on the analysis of duopolists’
first- and second-mover advantages when competing. A first seminal contribution in
this direction was done by Gal-Or (1985) and further extended. Those extensions go in
the direction of differentiated duopolies, comparisons of simultaneous- and sequential-
move games as well as the introduction of an input supplier amongst others. In contrast
to Gal-Or (1985) in which a player’s role, whether being the first- or second-mover was
exogenously given, another strand of literature discusses a setting in which competitors
may choose their according position. First steps in this area were taken by Hamilton
and Slutsky (1990) and extended in directions of, e.g., asymmetric information between
market participants.
Although literature covers a wide range of topics in terms of oligopoly theory,
what is has not been conducted so far is the analysis of a two-sided horizontally and
vertically differentiated market in which intermediaries simultaneously compete for
the customer’s demand and for input supplies. Especially the impact of a strategic
input supplier which plays a key role in our setting has not been analyzed so far. This
is true for both, intermediaries’ simultaneous (Cournot and Bertrand competition) as
well as sequential competition (Stackelberg competition). Hence, this contribution is
a consequent continuation of the existing literature.
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1.2 Simultaneous Competition of Intermediaries
Chapter 3 is based on Brangewitz and Manegold (2016) and considers a differentiated
intermediate goods market. Emphasis is put on the impact of simultaneous competi-
tion for resources and customers on the market outcome. Moreover, the intermediaries’
incentives to invest in product quality under Cournot and Bertrand competition is in-
vestigated.
The market’s differentiation refers to horizontal and vertical product differentia-
tion. Horizontal product differentiation describes the fact that products may have
different degrees of substitutability or complementarity. Vertical product differenti-
ation is considered by allowing for different product qualities of the intermediaries’
products. Each of the intermediaries has the chance to foster his product’s quality by
investing in product innovation and thus potentially achieves a competitive advantage
towards his competitor. Therefore, intermediaries must not necessarily be symmetric.
Asymmetries may not just be present due to different product qualities, but also by
reasons of different productivities of intermediaries. Productivities are exogenously
given in our model and describe the amount of input goods necessary to produce a
unit of output. Hence, it directly impacts the costs of procurement.
The basic setting discussed in Chapter 3 can be described as follows: two inter-
mediaries procure inputs from a monopolistic input supplier, refine them within a
production process and offer the final product to a representative customer. When
competing for the customer’s demand intermediaries both choose either sales prices or
production quantities simultaneously. Moreover the profit maximizing input supplier
is able to freely select his input price which is charged to both of the intermediaries.
Depending on the price level chosen, the supplier has the chance to exclude one or
both of the intermediaries from the market. Three different scenarios may arise: In a
first scenario, given the chosen input price is sufficiently low both intermediaries are
able to achieve non-negative profits and thus are willing to procure inputs resulting in
a duopoly intermediate market. In a second case, given intermediaries are asymmetric
with respect to their product quality and/or productivity and the input price has a
certain intermediate level, the less competitive intermediary will be driven out of the
market. In this scenario only one of the intermediaries procures inputs on the sales
side and offers products on the procurement side, resulting in a monopoly. Finally, is
the chosen input price sufficiently high, no intermediaries is willing to procure inputs
and the customer will not be served.
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Within our setting, decisions are taken within two main decision stages. Due to
its nature as a long-term strategic decision, the intermediaries’ choice of investing in
product innovation is considered in stage 1, followed by the intermediaries’ competing
for the customer’s demand in stage 2.
In stage 1 intermediaries take decisions about the level of investment which in-
creases their product quality (product innovation). In general, we investigate the
intermediaries’ incentives to invest in product quality increasing innovation. In this
context, we determine equilibrium conditions for product quality on the investment
costs and compare them for Bertrand and Cournot competition. We find that when
considering linear investment costs, in equilibrium product quality investments are
always chosen at a minimum or maximum level of product quality. It turns out that
there exist product qualities and degrees of horizontal product differentiation for com-
plements such that asymmetric investment equilibria fail to exist. Moreover, there also
exist product qualities and degrees of horizontal product differentiation for substitutes
such that existence of asymmetric equilibria can be guaranteed if the investment costs
are chosen accordingly.
In stage 2 intermediaries face simultaneous competition for resources and the de-
mand of a representative customer. In this context we analyze the impact of interme-
diaries’ asymmetries on the market outcome. Input suppliers choose their input price
first, followed by either price or quantity competition of the intermediaries. It turns
out that there exist product quality and productivity differences such that for quantity
competition only one intermediary is willing to procure inputs from the input supplier,
while for price competition both intermediaries are willing to purchase inputs. Besides
this, we identify conditions in terms of horizontal and vertical product differentia-
tion as well as productivities for which input prices within quantity competition are
higher, lower or equal than input prices within price competition. Additionally, when
comparing intermediaries’ equilibrium choices of quantities, prices and the resulting
profits we find that there exist asymmetries such that equilibrium prices and profits
(for non-substitute products) under Cournot competition are lower and equilibrium
quantities higher than under Bertrand competition. This result shows that the rela-
tions established in Singh and Vives (1984) must not necessarily be true in a model
with endogenous input market and asymmetric intermediaries.
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1.3 Sequential Competition of Intermediaries
Chapter 4 is based on Manegold (2016) and discusses a similar model as in Chap-
ter 3 but changes the rules of interactions. Two intermediaries procure inputs from
a supplier which are refined and finally offered to a representative customer. In con-
trast to Chapter 3, intermediaries compete for the customer’s demand a` la Stackelberg
and choose production quantities sequentially. The type of competition in which sales
prices are chosen is not considered. We again allow intermediaries to be asymmetric
with respect to their productivity and product quality. The degree of productivity is
exogenously given whereas product quality can be increased by taking an according
investment. The input supplier strategically selects his input price and is able to either
exclude one or both of the intermediaries from the market.
Within Chapter 4 we are interested in the impact of the two-sided market structure
on the equilibrium outcome when intermediaries choose production quantities sequen-
tially.
The contribution consists of two stages. In the first stage, we give a first outlook
on the topic of innovation in which the incentives of intermediaries to invest in product
quality is given. In this context we find that for linear costs of innovation intermediaries
always choose a level of investment which results in either a minimum or maximum
product quality. Besides this, we give a further outlook for product innovation which
suggests a similar approach as discussed in Chapter 3.
In the second stage, we discuss the simultaneous competition of intermediaries for
input supplies and the customer’s demand. For a setting in which production quantities
are selected sequentially, we are interested in the impact of simultaneous competition
for resources and customers on the market outcome. Within the analysis of our model
we determine subgame perfect Nash equilibria and compare the equilibrium choices of
an intermediary when being the first-choosing Stackelberg leader with his equilibrium
choices when being the second-choosing Stackelberg follower. Furthermore, we are
interested in the input supplier’s strategic behavior when selecting his input price and
the resulting influence on the market outcome.
From previous contributions it is known that the introduction of a sequential game
has an impact on the equilibrium production quantities which are offered to the rep-
resentative customer. Furthermore, the successive approach influences the optimal
price choice of the input supplier. Interestingly, we find that there exist asymmetries
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between intermediaries with respect to product quality and productivities such that
given the less competitive intermediary is the Stackelberg leader, he will be driven out
of the market whereas a less competitive Stackelberg follower is allowed to stay in the
market, ceteris paribus.
Besides this, a comparison of intermediaries’ equilibrium output quantities shows
that in equilibrium a more competitive Stackelberg leader produces and offers a larger
quantity than a more competitive Stackelberg follower. This relation is also true
for substitute products when comparing the equilibrium production quantities of a
less competitive leader and a less competitive follower. For complements, however,
there may exist asymmetries for which the equilibrium production quantities of a less
competitive follower are higher than the equilibrium production quantities of a less
competitive leader. This outcome shows that the result of Von Stackelberg (1934)
stating that the equilibrium production quantities of a Stackelberg leader are always
at least as high as the equilibrium production quantities of a Stackelberg follower does
not necessarily hold in a differentiated duopoly setting.
When analyzing the input supplier’s equilibrium price choice with equal produc-
tivities, we obtain that if a more competitive intermediary is in the leading position
the input price as well as the input supplier’s profit is higher than if the intermediary
was the more competitive follower.
1.4 Contract Design for Composed Services
The final Chapter 5 is based on Brangewitz et al. (2014a) and as well considers an
intermediate goods market. In contrast to the previous chapters, a slightly different
approach is used and focus is put. The market we have in mind is the market of
IT services, characterized by a tremendous number of single services, in which clients
usually search from a solution-oriented perspective.
As in previous chapters, the discussed model consists of three different types of
market participants: clients, intermediaries and service providers. We focus on the
contract design problem of one intermediary and two strategically interacting service
providers. Essentially, the intermediary procures complementary services from both
of the service providers, which can either be of high or of low quality. Producing high-
quality goods requires higher costs of production than producing low-quality goods.
The intermediary combines the procured services and offers the final product to his
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client. The quality of the service composition is directly impacted by its components
and can also either be high or low. In our setting we assume clients to have a demand
for both quality levels (usually at different prices).
By using a non-cooperative game-theoretic model, we analyze the incentives for
high- and low-quality composed services to be an equilibrium outcome of the market.
In this context we consider a one shot as well as a repeated game. Basically, the
intermediary initially offers a contract to both of his service providers specifying the
demanded product’s quantity and quality. Furthermore transfer payments are defined
which are depending on the quantity delivered and on the intermediary’s quality re-
port with respect to the composed service. In a further step, both providers take a
decision about quantity and quality they would like to produce. The received inputs
are combined by the intermediary and delivered to the clients as a final product. The
intermediary strategically reports the final product’s quality (not necessarily truthful)
and pays the service providers accordingly.
It turns out that equilibria which result in low-quality products can be obtained
in the short run and in the long run, whereas those with high quality can only be
achieved in the long run. In our analysis we explicitly determine the intermediary’s
time preferences within an infinitely repeated game that are required to establish high
quality in the market. Interestingly, it could be seen that even if selling high quality
is profitable for the intermediary, the emergence of high-quality composed services on
the market still crucially depends on the intermediary’s discount factor. Additionally,
we derive optimal contracts for implementing high- or low-quality composed services.
Thus, we could finally show that in intermediate goods markets cooperation which
leads to high quality can be established, although product qualities of input goods are
not perfectly observable.
Chapter 2
Literature on Oligopoly Theory
The following section displays a literature overview that in the first part considers the
classical approach of oligopoly theory in which actions are taken simultaneously while
in the second part scenarios in which actions are taken sequentially are discussed.
This literature overview primarily refers to the Chapters 3 and 4, in which Cournot
and Bertrand competition as well as Stackelberg competition play a major role. We
start with discussing the literature for oligopoly models in which players choose either
quantities or prices simultaneously and introduce a sequential approach thereafter.
2.1 Oligopoly Theory - Simultaneous Competition
Two fundamental contributions in oligopoly theory were done by Cournot (1838) and
Bertrand (1883), in which two firms produce a homogenous good and compete by se-
lecting output quantities in the former and prices in the latter model. Their settings
were continuously extended in different areas in the years after. Analyses of differ-
entiated duopolies under Cournot and Bertrand competition date from the late 70’s.
Referring to Dixit (1979), in their seminal work Singh and Vives (1984) consider a
linear customer demand structure with constant marginal costs allowing for comple-
ments and substitutes and compare the equilibrium outcomes of Bertrand and Cournot
competition. It is shown that in equilibrium Bertrand competition is more efficient
than Cournot competition, as it generates a lower price and a higher output level.
According to Singh and Vives (1984) this result is independent of whether goods are
substitutes or complements and regardless of demand structure’s degree of symmetry.
Thus, Bertrand competition implies a higher consumer and total welfare. Moreover
they show that due to higher profits firms prefer to select quantities (prices), if goods
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are substitutes (complements). Cheng (1985) confirms the results of Singh and Vives
(1984) within a more general environment. He uses a geometric analysis of duopoly in
which no special form of demand structure needs to be assumed.
The classical approach of duopolies with firms producing homogeneous goods was
later on extended by allowing for a number of n product varieties as for example
discussed by Vives (1985), Okuguchi (1987), Ha¨ckner (2000) and Amir and Jin (2001).
Within a differentiated oligopoly with substitute goods Vives (1985) shows that if
demand is symmetric and Cournot as well as Bertrand equilibria are unique, Bertrand
delivers smaller prices and profits, but larger quantities than Cournot. If the number
of product varieties grows, Bertrand as well as Cournot equilibria converge to the
efficient outcome in which prices equal marginal costs.
In contrast to Singh and Vives (1984), Okuguchi (1987) resigns the assumptions of
products’ substitutability and demand symmetry. For the more general setting within
differentiated oligopolies they focus on the conditions that are necessary to make a
clear-cut comparison between prices under Bertrand and Cournot competition. It is
shown that if the set of products can be divided into two subsets such that products are
substitutes within each subset and complements across subsets, the unique Bertrand
price vector is lower than any Cournot price vector in equilibrium.
A slightly different model than discussed in the previously mentioned articles is
analyzed by Ha¨ckner (2000), who not just considers horizontal (substitutes and com-
plements) but also exogenously given vertical product differentiation (product qual-
ity). He points out that the results of Singh and Vives (1984) are sensitive towards
the duopoly assumption. It is shown that in a setting with more than two firms prices
may be lower under Cournot than under Bertrand competition, namely if goods are
complements and quality differences are large. Moreover if goods are complements,
Bertrand profits are higher than Cournot profits. If goods are substitutes and qual-
ity differences are large, high-quality firms might prefer to select prices rather than
quantities.
The work of Amir and Jin (2001) goes in a similar direction and claims to provide
further insight into the scope of the previous results in the literature. They support
the view of Singh and Vives (1984) that the Bertrand equilibrium is more competitive
than the Cournot equilibrium with lower prices and higher outputs, but also illustrate
its limitations. By providing counter-examples they make clear that a consideration
of strategic complementarity is necessarily required to make a clear-cut comparison of
prices and quantities for both competition types. Two of their examples show that in
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an oligopoly with linear demand and complementarity of quantities (prices), one price
(output) can be lower (higher) in Cournot equilibrium. In a third example in which
the condition of strategic complementarity of either quantities or prices is removed,
they show that one price is lower and one output is higher in Cournot equilibrium.
Hence, is the key assumption of strategic complementarity is dropped, both the output
and the price comparisons are ambiguous.
Tremblay and Tremblay (2011) state, that in the real world there exist markets
in which some firms choose prices whereas other firms choose quantities. As claimed
in Tremblay et al. (2013) such a behavior can be observed in a market for small
cars where Saturn and Scion dealers set prices and Honda and Subaru dealers choose
quantities. For this reason, they consider a setting of differentiated duopoly in which
one firm competes in prices, the other firm in quantities. The analysis of Tremblay
and Tremblay (2011) aims to investigate the impact of the degree of differentiation on
the static Cournot-Bertrand equilibrium. They find that if on the one hand products
are sufficiently differentiated, both firms survive and the equilibrium is stable. If on
the other hand goods are homogenous, only the quantity-choosing firm survives. The
according outcome in this scenario is perfectly competitive, i.e., prices equal marginal
costs. Thus, the presence of a price-selecting firm ensures a competitive outcome in
which only one firm is producing.
The work of Zanchettin (2006) discusses a differentiated duopoly with linear cost
and demand functions. Similar to our approach within Chapter 3, he implements
an exogenously given asymmetric productivity and product quality. He finds that
when having strong asymmetries and/or products are weakly differentiated, the more
productive firm’s profit and industry profits are higher under Bertrand competition.
This outcome is contradictory to the results of Singh and Vives (1984). Moreover
with a declining degree of differentiation the productive firms’ and industry’s profits
shrinks.
Within a similar model, Ledvina and Sircar (2011) have a focus on the number of
active firms, i.e., firms producing a positive quantity in Bertrand Cournot equilibrium.
It is shown that Cournot competition always yields a higher number of active firms
compared to Bertrand competition. Moreover, a high degree of product differentiation
results in more active firms compared to a setting with homogeneous goods. This is
true for both types of competition.
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The fundamental approach of differentiated oligopolies as displayed in the former
paragraph was further extended by endogenous product as well as process innovation.
A vertically differentiated duopoly in which endogenous product innovation leads to
higher product quality is for example analyzed by Motta (1993) and Symeonidis (2003).
Both contributions consider a two-stage game where a decision about product quality
is carried out in stage one. In stage two, firms compete in either prices or quantities
when selling their product. In contrast to Symeonidis (2003) the focus of Motta (1993)
lies in the differentiation between fixed and variable innovation costs. He finds that for
any of the competition types, firms always choose distinct qualities, where in general
Bertrand competition induces more product differentiation than Cournot competition.
In the case of variable costs innovation firms’ profits are higher when competing in
quantities. However, when assuming fixed costs firms’ profits are higher under price
competition, which is contradictory to the results of Singh and Vives (1984) and others.
Finally, it is shown that total welfare is higher within price competition, supporting
the conventional wisdom.
Differently, Symeonidis (2003) considers not just a vertical, but also a horizontal
differentiation, i.e., goods that can either be substitutes to several degrees or mutually
independent in his setting. He uses a quality augmented version of Singh and Vives
(1984) customer utility function and allows for spillovers of product quality invest-
ments across firms. It is shown that under price competition, investments in product
innovation, product prices and firms’ profits are always higher, compared to quantity
competition which is again contrary to the classical results. Additionally, if on the
one hand spillovers are weak or products are sufficiently differentiated, the consumer’s
surplus as well as the total welfare is higher under Bertrand competition. If on the
other hand spillovers are strong and products are not too much differentiated, Cournot
competition delivers a higher outcome of the former mentioned.
In the previous section we have seen that firms may have the possibility to increase
the customer demand by investing into their product’s quality. Besides this, one can
think about a further investment that fosters a firm’s production technology and thus,
its productivity. Such a productivity increasing process innovation has drawn atten-
tion to another branch of literature and is for example analyzed by Bester and Petrakis
(1993) and Qiu (1997). Related to the approaches of Motta (1993) and Symeonidis
(2003), they examine the outcome of Bertrand and Cournot competition in a two-
stage game. In stage one, firms make a process innovation decision, in stage two,
Chapter 2. Literature on Oligopoly Theory 20
they compete on the market in either prices or quantities. In contrast to Qiu (1997),
Bester and Petrakis (1993) only allow one firm to make an investment into innovation
within the first stage. They show that on the one hand when goods are imperfect
substitutes the investment of process innovation is inefficiently low in both types of
competition. Furthermore Cournot competition yields a higher degree of innovation
than Bertrand competition. If on the other hand goods are close substitutes, overin-
vestment may occur and Bertrand competition leads to higher innovation. Qiu (1997)
introduces spillover effects of investments across firms. He finds, that in his model
Cournot competition generates higher incentives for process innovation than Bertrand
competition, confirming the results of Bester and Petrakis (1993) for imperfect substi-
tutes. Additionally he shows that Bertrand yields a lower price, larger output and is
more efficient.
In a setting with homogenous goods, Boone (2001) analyzes the relationship be-
tween the intensity of competition and the incentive to invest into process innovation
for firms with different cost levels. One would expect that if competition increases,
firms will improve their position by reducing costs through process innovation. In
contrast to the conventional wisdom it turns out that the relation between competi-
tion intensity and the incentive to innovate must not necessarily be monotone. The
result makes clear that the findings of Qiu (1997) may be overturned when considering
asymmetric firms. Besides this Boone (2001) finds that given competition intensity is
low, the low cost firm invests into innovations whereas if competition is high, the high
cost firm is the innovator.
In a homogenous and symmetric oligopoly, Delbono and Denicolo` (1990) compare
equilibrium R&D investments under Bertrand and Cournot competition. They discuss
a dynamic setting, in which for instance the realization of a cost-reducing technological
improvement depends on the investment in R&D. It turns out that even if Bertrand
competition yields higher R&D investments, social welfare net of R&D costs may be
greater under Cournot competition. Delbono and Denicolo` (1990) explain that in price
competition too many resources may be invested in R&D, leading to inefficiencies in
the dynamic setting.
There are several contributions in literature that consider both, product and pro-
cess innovation and discuss their relation. First steps were done by Bonanno and Ha-
worth (1998a) who analyze two major issues within a vertically differentiated duopoly,
in which either a high- or a low-quality firm is able to innovate. Their first focus is
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on the relationship between competition type and profitability of process innovation,
which was already covered by Bester and Petrakis (1993) in a horizontally differenti-
ated duopoly. It is shown that independently of the degree of differentiation, process
innovation is more profitable for firms when competing in quantities than when com-
peting in prices. In contrast to Bester and Petrakis (1993), this result also holds for
perfect substitutes. In a further step Bonanno and Haworth (1998a) not just allow
for process, but also for product innovation. In this context they discuss the influence
of competition type on the decision of whether investing in product or process inno-
vation. It turns out that given process/product innovation is profitable and on the
one hand the high-quality firm is the innovator three possible cases may arise. In a
first scenario, in Bertrand as well as Cournot competition the same type of innovation
is selected. In a second and third scenario, if the firm’s choice is dependent on the
competition type, Bertrand competition implies product innovation whereas Cournot
competition leads to process innovation. Is on the other hand the low-quality firm the
innovator the opposite is true.
A similar approach in which not just one, but both firms take decisions between
process and product innovation simultaneously is considered by Filippini and Martini
(2010), Lin and Saggi (2002) and Weiss (2003). Extending the results of Bonanno and
Haworth (1998a), for a differentiated duopoly model with a low- and a high-quality firm
in which decisions about process and product innovation are taken simultaneously, Fil-
ippini and Martini (2010) find that for both Bertrand and Cournot competition three
equilibria may arise. Two symmetric equilibria in which both firms choose the same
kind of innovation and one asymmetric equilibrium in which different innovations are
selected can be obtained. For the asymmetric equilibrium, within Bertrand competi-
tion the high-quality firm selects product whereas the low-quality firm prefers process
innovation. On the other hand Cournot competition yields the opposite effect, namely,
if a firm produces high-quality products it chooses process, if it is a low-quality firms it
prefers product innovation. Hence, the low-quality firm strives towards becoming the
quality leader. A further result states that both firms rather tend to select product
innovation under Cournot competition, showing that the result for a high-quality firm
of Bonanno and Haworth (1998a) does not hold in a setting in which more than one
firm is able to innovate.
The duopoly of Lin and Saggi (2002) do not pre-define a high- or low-quality firm.
Within a three-stage game, in stage one and two the investment decision about product
and process innovation takes place respectively. In the final stage firms compete in
Chapter 2. Literature on Oligopoly Theory 22
either prices or quantities, which is exogenously given. Their results show, that the
incentives to invest in process innovation increases in the level of product differentiation
and firms tend to invest more in product innovation, when also having the opportunity
to invest in process innovation. In addition firms competing in quantities prefer process
innovation, which supports the result of Qiu (1997).
Weiss (2003) investigates the relation between the degree of competition and the
decision of a firm to invest into product and process innovation in a stage game. Under
the assumptions that process and product innovations are strategic complements with
diminishing returns of product innovations, she finds that in case of close substitute
goods (fierce competition), firms prefer to invest in product innovation. If goods are
highly differentiated (either vertically or horizontally) and thus competition is less
serious, firms rather choose process innovation. In contrast to most of the works in
this field of research, the type of competition is also a firm’s choice variable.
Similar articles that are relevant in this area are for instance Rosenkranz (2003)
and Battaggion and Tedeschi (2006).
One issue that has been neglected in the above mentioned contributions is the
market power of an input supplier and is, with different focuses, addressed by Ha¨ckner
(2003), Lo´pez and Naylor (2004), Correa-Lo´pez (2007), Pinopoulos (2011), Mukherjee
et al. (2012) and Manasakis and Vlassis (2014), amongst others. Related to our mod-
eling within Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, but with a different objective, Ha¨ckner (2003)
considers a differentiated two-level market structure incorporating intermediaries and
input suppliers and analyzes the impact of vertical mergers with an emphasis on social
welfare. In a first step input suppliers compete in quantities and thus, by considering
the inverse demand function, verify the according prices of their input goods. Given
those input prices intermediary firms face Cournot competition thereafter. If a verti-
cal merger takes place, the merging supplier exits the input market. It is found that
the influence of vertical integration on welfare is depending on relative market shares.
If the number of competitors within the input market is relatively higher than the
number of competitors in the intermediary market and/or intermediaries’ products
are relatively close substitutes a vertical merger does not have a negative effect on
social welfare.
In a downstream differentiated duopoly in which the input price is the result of a
strategic bargaining process between downstream firm and upstream supplier Lo´pez
and Naylor (2004) compare Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. It is shown that when
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the differentiated duopoly game is played in imperfect substitutes, the standard results
that under Bertrand competition profits are lower than under Cournot competition is
reversible. Extending the approach of Lo´pez and Naylor (2004), Correa-Lo´pez (2007)
focuses on a vertically differentiated duopoly, using a simplified version of the linear
model by Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984). By introducing a more com-
plex industrial structure, Correa-Lo´pez (2007) assesses the robustness of the results
of Singh and Vives (1984). The fundamental difference between both approaches is
given by the incorporation of the market’s supply side and the resulting endogenous
costs of production. Besides this, in the contribution of Correa-Lo´pez (2007) the type
of competition is not exogenously given as in Singh and Vives (1984), but can be
chosen by the duopolists. Thus, scenarios may arise in which one duopolist chooses
prices whereas the other duopolist selects output quantities. The main question to
be answered is, whether the introduction of an input market influences the results of
Singh and Vives (1984) with respect to the duopolists’ equilibrium profits in Bertrand
and Cournot competition. Within a three-stage game, in stage one two intermediaries
choose whether to compete in prices or quantities, followed by a stage in which input
prices are bargained either centralized or decentralized with two input suppliers. In
stage three the intermediary firms compete in the market according to the competition
type selected in stage one. The analysis shows that if labor is the input factor and
wages are the result of a decentralized bargaining process, choosing quantity competi-
tion is not necessarily a dominant strategy for firms, when producing substitutes. This
indicates that the result of Singh and Vives (1984), claiming that Cournot competition
always yields higher profits does not hold in a setting with input suppliers. If the wage
bargaining process is however centrally organized, the result of Singh and Vives (1984)
applies. Additionally for the more general case of profit maximizing input suppliers
and exogenously given quality differences in the duopoly, the intermediaries may fa-
vor to compete both in quantities. Besides this, a scenario in which the high-quality
firm chooses to compete in price and the low-quality firm selects output quantities,
may also arise under certain conditions. Whether the first of second scenario arises is
dependent on the product’s degree of substitutability as well as the extent of vertical
product differentiation and distribution of bargaining power when negotiating input
prices. Welfare, nevertheless, is always higher when duopolists choose to compete in
prices.
Differently, a focus on the input supplier’s optimal price choice is put in the con-
tribution of Pinopoulos (2011). Related to our modeling of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4,
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he considers a setting with an upstream market including a monopolistic supplier who
provides an intermediate input good and an imperfectly competitive downstream mar-
ket with retailers producing differentiated products. The article analyzes the supplier’s
optimal price choice depending on the downstream market structure, i.e., whether mar-
ket entry is free or restricted. It is found that given market entry is free, the optimal
input price is depending on the number of downstream firms. Furthermore, given the
number of downstream firms is endogenously given (free entry) the supplier charges a
lower input price compared to the case in which the number of downstream firms is
determined exogenously (no-entry condition).
More recently Alipranti et al. (2014) analyze a vertically related market in which a
monopolistic input supplier trades with two competing duopolists via two-part tariffs,
i.e., a wholesale price and a fixed fee. Duopolists can either compete by setting prices
or quantities which is exogenously given. When comparing the outcome of Bertrand
and Cournot competition, it turns out that the standard results of Singh and Vives
(1984) do not apply for the introduced model. It is shown that Cournot competition
yields lower prices and higher output than Bertrand competition and therefore yields a
more competitive market. They explain that the reversal arises from the fact that the
monopolistic input supplier has stronger incentives to foster the intermediary firms’
aggressiveness when they select quantities rather than prices. This leads to lower input
prices for intermediaries and thus lower sales prices and higher outputs. Moreover
Alipranti et al. (2014) found that Cournot competitions delivers higher intermediaries’
profits as well as consumers’ and total welfare.
Closely related to our modeling in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, Mukherjee et al. (2012)
analyze an intermediate goods market in which a profit-maximizing input supplier in-
teracts with two unequally productive intermediaries who provide a homogeneous final
good. The price-setting input supplier has the possibility of either discriminating in-
termediaries in prices or choosing a uniform price. In their contribution Mukherjee
et al. (2012) emphasize the importance of the intermediaries’ productivity differences
as well as the input supplier’s pricing strategy when comparing profits under Bertrand
and Cournot competition. On the one hand, it is shown that under Bertrand com-
petition the input supplier’s profit, the aggregated profit of the input supplier and
the intermediaries and the social welfare are always higher than under Cournot com-
petition. It turns out that this outcome is regardless of whether the input supplier
discriminates in prices or not. On the other hand Mukherjee et al. (2012) make clear
that a comparison of the intermediary’s profits across competition types can only be
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done conditional on intermediaries’ productivity differences as well as on the input
supplier’s pricing strategy. Given that intermediaries are asymmetric in terms of pro-
ductivity and the supplier charges uniform prices, their profits may be higher under
price competition. Thus, the result of Singh and Vives (1984) in terms of profits does
not necessarily hold in a vertical structured setting. Moreover it is verified that the
results of Lo´pez and Naylor (2004) and Correa-Lo´pez (2007) cannot be confirmed if
the input supplier charges a uniform price and intermediaries differ in productivity.
Differently, Manasakis and Vlassis (2014) discuss an oligopoly in which each of the
two intermediaries is exclusively assigned to a supplier from whom he procures his
inputs that are needed to produce a final product. The way intermediaries compete
in the market (price or quantity competition) is endogenously determined in a first
stage and fixed within a renegotiation-proof contract between intermediary and sup-
plier. Moreover input prices are the result of a negotiation process. In the second
stage two intermediaries compete in the market according to the type of competi-
tion that they committed to in stage one. In this context it is found that if goods
are substitutes (complements) Cournot (Bertrand) competition is credibly sustained
by the intermediary-supplier pairs. This outcome confirms the results of Singh and
Vives (1984). As it holds independently of the extent of product differentiation and
irrespectively of the distribution of bargaining power between the paired intermediary
and supplier it however contradicts for instance Lo´pez and Naylor (2004) and Correa-
Lo´pez (2007).
2.2 Oligopoly Theory - Sequential Competition
A new branch of literature originated from Von Stackelberg (1934) who considers a
homogeneous product market in which identical duopolists select production quantities
not simultaneously (as in Cournot (1838)), but one after the other. He finds that in
equilibrium the first-choosing duopolist achieves higher profits than the firm taking
decisions thereafter. The approach was later extended, e.g., towards differentiated
product markets in which quantities and prices were chosen by duopolists. During
the years two main strands of research (with some overlap) that refer to Stackelberg
competition emerged.
The first strand of literature discusses the appearance of first- and second-mover
advantages and has its foundations in contributions of Gal-Or (1985) and Dowrick
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(1986). Within a sequential game in which two identical players with globally concave
profit functions choose quantities or prices, the general results of Gal-Or (1985) show
that if the player’s best reply function is downwards (upwards) sloping the leader’s
profits are higher (lower) than the follower’s profits.
Within a more general model Dowrick (1986) analyzes Nash (follower-follower)
games, Stackelberg leadership and Stackelberg warfare with a focus on the comparison
of Stackelberg leaders’ and followers’ profits. Similar to Gal-Or (1985), his analysis is
based on the properties of reaction functions. The main result yields that if reaction
functions are downward-sloping, duopolists will disagree over the choice of roles and
both will prefer to be in the leading position. When having similar profit functions
and the reaction functions are upward-sloping, duopolists will disagree about positions
and prefer the other player to be the leader. Further contributions going in a similar
direction were done by Schoonbeek (1990), Ono (1978) and Ono (1982).
As the impact of product differentiation plays a major role in their modeling, the
work of Boyer and Moreaux (1987b) has a little different focus than Gal-Or (1985)
and Dowrick (1986). When considering a differentiated duopoly in which competitors
compete in quantities or prices, they address situations in which duopolists’ decisions
are taken simultaneously as well as sequentially and compare the according equilib-
rium outcomes. The results of Boyer and Moreaux (1987b) show, that for any role of
a duopolist (Stackelberg leader, Stackelberg follower, Nash competitor), setting quan-
tities (prices) always implies higher profits if goods are substitutes (complements).
Furthermore they find that customer welfare is always maximal, if duopolists compete
in prices. When considering total surpluses, the simultaneous Bertrand competition
delivers highest outcomes in equilibrium, followed by price Stackelberg, mixed Nash,
quantity Stackelberg and Cournot equilibria for complements and substitutes.
Asymmetric cross-price effects are introduced by Banerjee and Chatterjee (2014)
who consider a horizontally differentiated duopoly in which quantities or prices are
selected sequentially. They find that given goods are complements (substitutes) and
the negative (positive) effect of the follower’s price on the leader’s quantity is larger
(smaller) than the negative (positive) effect of the leader’s price on the follower’s
quantity, the follower achieves higher profits than the leader. This is true as in the
described cases, the follower is able to sell higher quantities for a higher price. As the
negative (positive) effect of the follower’s price as well as his profit vanishes, beyond a
critical level the profit ordering reverses and the leader’s profit exceeds the follower’s
profit.
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In a slightly different direction with homogenous goods goes the work of Boyer and
Moreaux (1987a) in which the impact of production costs on the preferred duopolists’
role is discussed. In contrast to previous contributions, they extend the players’ strat-
egy space to price-quantity pairs and show that there will either be a conflict or an
agreement over the role of leader and follower. If firms have identical or similar costs
of production, both competitors would choose to be the Stackelberg follower, a result
that is totally different to the results of a pure quantity selection. Sufficiently high
cost differences between firms may result in two possible scenarios. Within a first
scenario, the less efficient firm will take the position of the Stackelberg leader and sell
a low quantity for a lower price whereas the more efficient firm serves the residual
demand for a higher price afterwards. In a second possible case the more efficient firm
will adopt the role of the Stackelberg leader and by selecting his prices accordingly,
drives the less efficient firm out of the market. Boyer and Moreaux (1987a) state that
as profits of both firms are higher in the first case, a coordination towards the role
distribution in which the less efficient firm is the leader and the more efficient firm is
the follower can be expected. This result differs from the results of Von Stackelberg
(1934) in which the role of being the leader is always preferred.
Dastidar (2004) observed that a discussion of a homogenous product market with
concave demand and strictly convex costs was neglected in previous literature. For such
a setting, it is shown that when firms choose prices, there is a unique subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium in which the leader’s price is lower than the follower’s price whereas
payoffs are equal. Hence, there is neither a first- nor a second-mover advantage, a
result that contrasts former findings for price competition. He furthermore makes clear
that games a´ la Cournot in which firms select output quantities are less competitive
than games in which prices are selected, a result that may be reversed under certain
conditions.
Similar to our approach, Lee et al. (2014) introduce a monopolistic input supplier
trading with two intermediaries through two-part tariffs and address the issue of first-
and second-mover advantages. It is shown that the standard results of Bertrand and
Cournot competition must not necessarily hold when considering markets that are
vertically related. This is due to the fact that a monopolistic input supplier is able to
control first- and second-mover advantages by selecting his input price accordingly. By
removing the first-mover (second-mover) advantage under Cournot (Bertrand) compe-
tition, he can optimize his profits. In contrast to Lee et al. (2014) within our approach
the input supplier charges a unique input price and does not discriminate in prices.
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The second literature strand addresses duopoly models in which the role of a
duopolist, i.e., whether to move first or second, is not exogenously given. First steps in
this field of research were done by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and Robson (1990a).
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) (see also Amir (1995)) make clear that the analysis of
first- and second-mover advantages are of quite interest, but do not answer the ques-
tion of endogenously determining who moves first. If both firms prefer to be in the
leading or following position, neither can achieve this alone. Within their contribution
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) discuss an extended game in which the issue of moving
simultaneously versus moving sequentially is analyzed. Their setting consists of two
stages. In the first stage a duopolist has to commit to one of two time periods in
which he takes action. In a second stage firms select their production quantity in
the time period they committed to. They find that there exist only two pure strategy
equilibria in undominated strategies, which are the Stackelberg outcomes of the under-
lying duopoly game. Hence, Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) conclude that a Stackelberg
outcome will result in equilibrium.
A similar idea is discussed in Leininger (1993). He questions the modeling of Tul-
lock’s original problem which is for instance displayed in Tullock (2001) and supposes
that rent seekers move simultaneously. The findings of Leininger (1993) show that
when deciding whether to move simultaneously or sequentially, rent seekers agree to
take actions in a specific sequential order.
By making use of the risk-dominance concept of Harsanyi et al. (1988), Van Damme
and Hurkens (1999) go a step further than Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and solve the
equilibrium selection problem when firms compete in quantities. Their results show
that the assignment of roles (Stackelberg leader or follower) may follow from risk
considerations and clarify that a commitment is less risky for a low-cost firm which is
therefore ending up in the preferred position of the Stackelberg leader. Addressing the
same questions as in Van Damme and Hurkens (1999), price competition is considered
in van Damme and Hurkens (2004). In the scenario of price selection, the role of the
follower is the most preferred of both players. Surprisingly, as waiting is more risky for
the low-cost firm, it will move first and the high-cost firm will end up in the preferred
position as the follower.
A link between the literature that discusses first- and second-mover advantages and
the literature analyzing endogenous timing is established by the article of Amir and
Stepanova (2006). They consider first- and second-mover advantages, but allow for
29 Chapter 2. Literature on Oligopoly Theory
a general demand and consider asymmetric linear costs. In a differentiated-product
Bertrand duopoly they target two objectives. At first they generalize the classic results
of literature on first- and second-mover advantages with linear costs. This generaliza-
tion is done by removing the standard assumptions of profits’ concavity in own action
as well as uniqueness of the equilibrium in Bertrand competition. The according anal-
ysis yields that given firms’ costs are sufficiently asymmetric, the low-cost firm has a
first-mover advantage. If firm’s unit costs are similar, the low-cost firm has a second-
mover advantage. Referring to the setting of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), the second
objective considers the issue of endogenous timing for the duopoly with asymmetric
linear costs and linear prices. Close to the approach of Van Damme and Hurkens
(1999) with similar results, it is shown that by using the equilibrium selection concept
of Harsanyi et al. (1988) the unique equilibrium outcome yields a sequential play with
the low-cost firm being the leader.
Further contributions in this field of research were for instance done by Amir and
Grilo (1999), who give different sets of general conditions on the structures of demand
and cost functions that yield all possible timing outcomes.
One of the first articles analyzing the impact of asymmetric information on first-
and second-mover advantages with endogenous timing was done by Mailath (1993).
He considers a duopoly in which one of the duopolists has superior information about
demand. This duopolist is able to select his production quantities either as a first-
mover or delay his choice such that decisions are taken simultaneously with the other
duopolist. Mailath (1993) shows, that regardless of its private information, the more
informed firm moves first in the unique stable outcome.
Referring to Mailath (1993), the work of Normann (2002) uses the setting of Hamil-
ton and Slutsky (1990) and hence allows for the more informed firm to be in the posi-
tion of the follower. Differently to Mailath (1993), it turns out that there is evidence
for both endogenous Cournot and Stackelberg equilibria. A closely related modeling
was for instance done by Normann (1997). In a slightly different direction goes Albaek
(1990), who considers cost uncertainty of duopolists. In their model, firms are able
to choose whether to be the leader or the follower if either quantities or prices are se-
lected. When taking this decision, firms know the distribution, but not the realization
of their own and their competitor’s costs.
Albaek (1990) finds, that even if firms at some point of time know the realization
of costs, they stick with their selection of role if competing in quantities. Hence, in
this scenario one duopolist prefers the Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous game. This
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however is not true for Bertrand competition. Furthermore, their analysis yields that
total expected welfare in a Stackelberg equilibrium is higher than in a Nash equilibrium.
A setting in which the move of the first decider reveals certain information is for
instance analyzed by Mukhopadhyay et al. (2011). They have a focus on a duopoly
market where two asymmetrically informed firms offer complementary products and
compete within a sequential game. Firms can decide whether to share their private
forecast information about the uncertain market demand. It is shown that if the fol-
lower firm shares information unconditionally, the leader firm profits from information
sharing while the follower as well as the total system is worse off. Beyond this, they
provide a “simple to implement” information sharing scheme from which both firms
and the whole system is better off.
Another approach in which asymmetric information plays a key role is done by
Rasmusen and Yoon (2012). They analyze the impact of asymmetric information
about the profitability of new markets on the existence of a first- or second-mover
advantage. They model a scenario with two firms deciding about which new market
to enter and whether to take the decision in a first or second period. It is found that
given a player has moderate superior information about the new markets’ profitability,
a first-mover advantage may arise if market foreclosing is possible. In this scenario the
less-informed firm has no incentive to imitate the more-informed firm and both end
up in different markets. If however information asymmetries are sufficiently high, a
second-mover advantage may emerge. In this case the less-informed firm will imitate
the more-informed firm and both will compete in the same market.
Other settings in which the first-mover’s action reveals something about the state
of the world is for example discussed by Bolton and Harris (1999), Hirokawa and Sasaki
(2001) and Hoppe (2000).
Besides examining the impact of asymmetric information and uncertainty on the
preferred roles of duopolists, the emergence of extensive literature with a focus on
product innovation could be observed. Lambertini (1996) criticizes that previous con-
tributions on duopoly theory do not take into account that firms are able to soften price
competition by strategically choosing product characteristics. The proposed setting
assumes firms to choose product qualities in a first stage and prices in a second stage.
In both stages actions can be taken simultaneously or sequentially. It turns out that
in case of full market coverage in which all customers are served, the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium yields a simultaneous game in the quality stage and a sequential
game in the price stage. Contrary to, e.g., Gal-Or (1985) both firms prefer to be the
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leader. A partial market however implies an optimal outcome where a simultaneous
game in both stages takes place.
By referring to the modeling of Dutta et al. (1995), the work of Hoppe and
Lehmann-Grube (2001) analyzes dynamic models with product innovation and focuses
on situations in which second-mover advantages arise. They find that firms prefer to
be a market’s pioneer firm with payoff equalization in equilibrium, if costs of R&D are
low. If however costs of R&D are high, being the second-mover delivers higher payoffs
in equilibrium. Furthermore it is shown that the second-mover advantage monoton-
ically increases in the costs of R&D. Note that in contrast to the former mentioned
articles, the model of Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2001) restricts attention to the
optimal timing of R&D. Similar discussions can be found in contributions of Aoki and
Prusa (1997), Lehmann-Grube (1997), Reinganum (1985) and Wang (2003) amongst
others.
Besides product innovation, another extension of Von Stackelberg (1934) considers
settings in which more than two firms move sequentially as for instance discussed in
Anderson and Engers (1992), Vives (1988) and Robson (1990b).
Another article that is quite interesting for our work was done by Noh and Moschini
(2006). In a differentiated market, they analyze the potential entry of a new product.
Their model supposes quality-dependent marginal costs of production where sequential
quality choices by an incumbent and an entrant are considered. Decisions that are
taken on entry-quality as well as the strategies for entry-deterrence are related to
the fixed cost that is necessary to enter and to the degree of consumers’ taste of
quality. Noh and Moschini (2006) verify the conditions under which the incumbent
firm deters entry by increasing its quality level. Due to quality-dependent marginal
costs of production there as well exists the possibility of inferior-quality entry. It is
finally made clear, that compared to deterrence, encouraging entry does not necessarily
improve welfare.
Chapter 3
Simultaneous Competition of
Intermediaries
3.1 Introduction
We consider a differentiated intermediate goods market in which two intermediaries
compete for customers on the sales side as well as for inputs on the procurement side.
Hereby, competition is on the sales side, either carried out by strategically choosing
production quantities or by setting sales prices. In our context differentiation on
the one hand refers to horizontal product differentiation, i.e., products offered at the
market can either be substitutes or complements. On the other hand we allow for
quality differences between the intermediaries’ products and therefore products may
also be vertically differentiated. In addition, asymmetries can also arise from efficiency
differences of the intermediaries’ production technologies. A simple example of such
a differentiated intermediate goods market that we have in mind are companies who
produce furniture. They need to procure identical resources such as wood in order
to produce chairs or tables and, therefore, face competition on the input market. In
addition, they sell their products on a competitive output market, on which they
compete for customers. Hereby, the companies may be differentiated horizontally and
either offer substitute products, i.e., both produce tables or both produce chairs, or
complementary products, with one company offering chairs and the other one tables.
Besides horizontal product differentiation, companies have the opportunity to invest in
product quality. Therefore they foster vertical product differentiation which may give
them a competitive advantage on the market for chairs or tables. A second example
is the market for IT services. Consider two consulting companies that on the input
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market compete for graduate students in computer science, where input prices are
represented by the entry-level salaries. Technological differences within the production
process between the consulting companies may arise from different initial on-the-job
trainings which support employees’ working speed and, hence, the output quantity.
Besides initial trainings, consulting companies may have the chance to increase their
employees’ working abilities by investing in further education, resulting in a higher
output quality. The final IT services offered by the consulting companies may on the
one hand be substitutable, if, for example, both firms offer accounting software services.
On the other hand the companies’ products are complementary, if, for instance, one
firm offers accounting and the other one salary administration services.
In the literature, two fundamental contributions in oligopoly theory are made by
Cournot and Bertrand, in which firms produce a homogenous good and select quanti-
ties in the former and prices in the latter model. In the years after, these settings were
extended in various directions. Referring to Dixit (1979), in their seminal work Singh
and Vives (1984) consider a differentiated duopoly allowing for complements and sub-
stitutes and compare the equilibrium outcomes of Bertrand and Cournot competition.
Cheng (1985) generalizes their model such that no special form of demand structure
needs to be assumed. The approach of duopolies was later on extended by allowing
for n product varieties as for example by Vives (1985), Okuguchi (1987), Ha¨ckner
(2000) and Amir and Jin (2001). Moreover, not just horizontal (substitutes vs. com-
plements) but also vertical product differentiation (product quality) finds attention
within the literature. A setting covering product differentiation in which product in-
novation leads to higher product quality is for example analyzed by Motta (1993) and
Symeonidis (2003). Both present a vertically differentiated duopoly in which product
quality can endogenously be chosen and compare equilibrium outcomes in quantity
and price competition. By doing so, Motta (1993) differentiates between two versions
of vertical product differentiation, one considering fixed and the other one variable
costs of innovation. Extending the approach of Motta (1993), Symeonidis (2003) stud-
ies not just vertical, but also horizontal differentiation, i.e., goods that can either be
substitutes or mutually independent in his setting. He uses a quality-augmented ver-
sion of Singh and Vives’ (1984) customer utility function and allows for spillovers of
product quality investments across firms. Another branch of literature analyzes the
effects of productivity-increasing process innovation as in Bester and Petrakis (1993),
Qiu (1997) and Pauwels et al. (2014). Beyond this, settings in which both, process or
product innovation, go along with each other are discussed by Bonanno and Haworth
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(1998a), Rosenkranz (2003), Weiss (2003), Zanchettin (2006), Filippini and Martini
(2010), Bacchiega et al. (2011), for instance. Closely related to our setting Zanchettin
(2006) also has exogenously given asymmetric productivities and asymmetric product
qualities. In a slightly other direction goes the analysis of Ledvina and Sircar (2011),
who focus on the number of active firms, i.e., firms producing a positive quantity
in Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium and consider homogeneous and differentiated
products.
One issue that is neglected in the above-mentioned contributions but plays a major
role in our article is the market power of an input supplier and is addressed by Ha¨ckner
(2003), Lo´pez and Naylor (2004), Correa-Lo´pez (2007), Mukherjee et al. (2012) and
Manasakis and Vlassis (2014), amongst others. Related to our model but with a dif-
ferent objective, Ha¨ckner (2003) considers a differentiated market with intermediaries
and input suppliers and analyzes the impact of vertical mergers with an emphasis
on social welfare. Correa-Lo´pez (2007) focuses on a vertically differentiated duopoly,
using a simplified version of the linear model by Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives
(1984). The fundamental difference to their approach is the incorporation of the mar-
ket’s supply side and the resulting endogenous costs of production. A vertical market
structure that is similar to the one discussed in our work and incorporates the market’s
supply side is for example considered by Mukherjee et al. (2012). They analyze an
intermediate goods market in which a profit-maximizing input supplier interacts with
two unequally productive intermediaries who provide a homogeneous final good. The
price-setting input supplier has the possibility of either discriminating intermediaries
in prices or choosing a uniform price. In their contribution, Mukherjee et al. (2012)
emphasize the importance of the intermediaries’ technology differences as well as the
input supplier’s pricing strategy when comparing profits under Bertrand and Cournot
competition. They show on the one hand that under Bertrand competition the input
supplier’s profit, the aggregated profit of the input supplier and the intermediaries
and social welfare are always higher than under Cournot competition, regardless of
the pricing strategy. On the other hand a comparison of the intermediary’s profits
across competition types can only be done conditional on technology differences be-
tween the intermediaries as well as the pricing strategy of the input supplier. Given
that intermediaries are asymmetric in terms of productivity and the supplier charges
uniform prices, their profit may be higher under price competition. Thus, the result
of Singh and Vives (1984) in terms of profits does not necessarily hold in a vertically
structured setting. Moreover it is shown that the results of Lo´pez and Naylor (2004)
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Figure 3.1: Timing of decisions
and Correa-Lo´pez (2007) cannot be confirmed if the input supplier charges a uniform
price and intermediaries differ in productivity.
While considering vertical and horizontal product differentiation, the focus of our
analysis is put on the impact of simultaneous competition for resources and customers
on the market outcome and the incentives intermediaries have to invest in product
quality under Cournot and Bertrand competition. Our setting is based on two main
decision stages: innovation and competition. The timing of decisions is illustrated in
Fig. 3.1.
In stage 1, the two intermediaries take investment decisions to increase their prod-
uct’s quality (product innovation). For this innovation stage we concentrate on the
analysis of investment equilibria with symmetric intermediaries with respect to the
input productivity. We derive equilibrium conditions for product quality investments
on the investment costs and compare them for price and quantity competition. It
turns out that there exist product qualities such that for complementary products
asymmetric investment equilibria do not exist, while existence can be guaranteed for
close substitutes if the investment costs are chosen accordingly.
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In stage 2, the intermediaries face competition for resources and customers. Within
this stage the input prices are determined first and intermediaries compete by choosing
quantities or prices afterwards. For the competition stage, we analyze the effect of
the intermediaries’ asymmetries on the market outcome. In this context we find that
there exist quality and productivity differences such that for quantity competition only
one intermediary is willing to procure inputs from the input supplier, while for price
competition both intermediaries are willing to purchase inputs. The formal analysis in
the forthcoming sections is backwards. We start with the competition stage for given
product qualities and then investigate the innovation stage.
The analysis proceeds as follows: Section 2 analyzes the competition for resources
and customers between the intermediaries for given differences in product qualities. We
begin with the assumptions on the customer’s demand, followed by the analysis of two
different modes of competition between the intermediaries. As proposed in Ha¨ckner
(2003) we explicitly consider an input market with a monopolistic input supplier.
We start with quantity competition, investigate price competition and compare them
afterwards. Section 3 considers the innovation stage with a focus on the intermediaries’
decisions to invest in product quality for symmetric productivities. A final conclusion
is made in section 4, whereas proofs can be found in the appendix.
3.2 Competition between Intermediaries
3.2.1 The customer
In order to allow for substitutable as well as for complementary products of the inter-
mediaries, we assume that a representative customer has a utility function, which is
of the following standard form as for instance in Singh and Vives (1984):
U(q1, q2) = α1q1 + α2q2 − 1
2
(
q21 + q
2
2 + 2γq1q2
)
+ I. (3.1)
Hereby, q = (q1, q2) denotes the quantities the customer buys from each of the two
intermediaries. The parameter α = (α1, α2) indicates the customer’s valuation for
the quality of the according product. For simplicity reasons we will denote α as
product quality in the following. The variable γ ∈ [−1, 1] represents the degree of
horizontal product differentiation and defines whether products of the intermediaries
are substitutable, complementary or independent. If γ = −1 the products are perfect
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complements, if γ = 1 they are perfect substitutes, while γ = 0 describes the case where
products are independent and thus, both intermediaries are monopolists. We assume
the customer to maximize his utility subject to the budget constraint p1q1+p2q2+I ≤
m, where m is the customer’s income and I his consumption of other goods. The
customer’s income is assumed to be sufficiently large such that utility maximization
leads to an inner solution. Taking prices (p1, p2) as given, the customer optimally
chooses to buy and consume those quantities (q1, q2) that maximize his utility function
subject to his budget constraint, satisfying
αi − qi − γq3−i − pi = 0 for i = 1, 2. (3.2)
As in Mukherjee et al. (2012), the two intermediaries may differ in their productivity
to transform inputs to a final product, i.e., intermediary i needs λi > 0 input units
to produce one unit of his final product (i = 1, 2). Therefore, asymmetries between
intermediaries may arise from distinct product qualities and from differences in input
productivities. To describe these asymmetries we refer to αi
λi
as the relative quality
(with respect to the input productivity) for intermediary i = 1, 2.
3.2.2 Cournot competition
Within Cournot competition the two intermediaries compete by strategically choos-
ing the quantities they produce. The price that intermediary i ∈ {1, 2} charges his
customer is not just depending on his own output quantity, but also on that of the
other intermediary. From Eq. (3.2) we obtain the customer’s demand function for
intermediary i:
pi(q1, q2) = αi − qi − γq3−i, (3.3)
where pi(q1, q2) is the market price which intermediary i charges in order to sell the
quantities (q1, q2) that are produced. Intermediary i’s profit function is given by the
difference of the market price per unit on the sales side and the marginal input price
on the procurement side, multiplied by the quantity he produces and sells:
piCi (qi, q3−i, c, αi, α3−i) = (pi(q1, q2)− λic) qi = (αi − qi − γq3−i − λic) qi, (3.4)
where λi is the input productivity and c the marginal input price charged by the input
supplier. From Eq. (3.4) and the observation that negative profits can be avoided by
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not selling anything, we derive intermediary i’s best reply function:
qi(q3−i) = max
{
αi − γq3−i − λic
2
, 0
}
. (3.5)
By using the best reply functions of both intermediaries we compute intermediary i’s
Nash equilibrium quantity qCi , which is given by
qCi =

2αi−γα3−i−(2λi−γλ3−i)c
(4−γ2) if c < min
{
2αi−γα3−i
2λi−γλ3−i ,
2α3−i−γαi
2λ3−i−γλi
}
,
αi−λic
2
if 2α3−i−γαi
2λ3−i−γλi ≤ c < αiλi ,
0 otherwise.
(3.6)
The according equilibrium price pCi is
pCi =

qCi + λic if c < min
{
2αi−γα3−i
2λi−γλ3−i ,
2α3−i−γαi
2λ3−i−γλi
}
,
αi+λic
2
if 2α3−i−γαi
2λ3−i−γλi ≤ c < αiλi ,
0 otherwise.
(3.7)
In order to guarantee the quantity to be non-decreasing in “weighted” qualities given
by 2αi − γα3−i and to be non-increasing in the input price c we impose the following
assumption on the parameter choices (α1, λ1, α2, λ2):
Assumption 3.1. We assume min
{
α1
α2
, α2
α1
}
> γ
2
and min
{
λ1
λ2
, λ2
λ1
}
> γ
2
.
We restrict our analysis to parameter choices (α1, λ1, α2, λ2) that satisfy Assump-
tion 3.1. Note that
min
{
2α1 − γα2
2λ1 − γλ2 ,
2α2 − γα1
2λ2 − γλ1
}
=

2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 if
α1
λ1
≤ α2
λ2
,
2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 if
α1
λ1
≥ α2
λ2
.
(3.8)
Taking the intermediaries’ equilibrium quantities and prices as given, we next de-
termine the optimal input price the monopolistic input supplier chooses. The total
market demand on the input market is qCI (c) = λ1q
C
1 + λ2q
C
2 and given by
39 Chapter 3. Simultaneous Competition of Intermediaries
qCI (c) =

2(λ1α1+λ2α2)−γ(λ1α2+λ2α1)−2(λ21+λ22−γλ1λ2)c
(4−γ2) if c < min
{
2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ,
2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1
}
,
λ1(α1−λ1c)
2
if 2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 ≤ c < α1λ1 ,
λ2(α2−λ2c)
2
if 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ≤ c < α2λ2 ,
0 otherwise.
(3.9)
The monopolistic input supplier maximizes his profit qCI (c) c where the supplier’s pro-
duction costs are normalized to zero. The next proposition states the impact of the
input supplier’s optimal decision on the market outcome for Cournot competition.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose the intermediaries compete in choosing quantities. If the
two intermediaries are sufficiently asymmetric, it is optimal for the input supplier to
choose an input price such that he sells his inputs to just one intermediary and thus
excludes the other intermediary from the input market.
More precisely, if 2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 ≤ α12λ1 and
α2 < α1τ
C
1
(
≤ α1λ2
λ1
)
(3.10)
with
τC1 =
√
(4− γ2) (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2)− (2λ1 − γλ2)
(2λ2 − γλ1) , (3.11)
then it is optimal for a profit-maximizing input supplier to only serve intermediary 1
and with analogous conditions to serve intermediary 2. For the remaining specifications
of (α1, λ1, α2, λ2) the input supplier optimally serves both intermediaries.
Proposition 3.1 highlights the market power of the input supplier. If quality or
productivity differences between the intermediaries are too large, which is α2 < α1τ
C
1
(or α1 < α2τ
C
2 ), then the input supplier has an incentive to charge a relatively high
input price such that just one intermediary is willing to purchase inputs from the input
market. As the input price is too high for the other intermediary to realize positive
profits he prefers not to buy and thus, not to produce. This means even if in principal
both intermediaries are willing to purchase positive quantities on the input market,
one intermediary may be excluded from the market at the input supplier’s profit-
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maximizing input price. In contrast, if the intermediaries are sufficiently symmetric,
which is α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 (or α2τC2 ≤ α1 ≤ α2 λ1λ2 ), then at the profit-maximizing
input price both intermediaries purchase resources on the input market.
3.2.3 Bertrand competition
Within this section the two intermediaries compete by strategically choosing the prices
of their products. The according quantities intermediaries are producing depend on
the prices that both charge at the market. Given both intermediaries compete, by
using Eq. (3.2) and assuming γ ∈ (−1, 1) we obtain the customer’s demand function
qi(p1, p2) =
αi − pi + γ (p3−i − α3−i)
(1− γ2) (3.12)
for intermediary i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus, intermediary i’s profit function is
piBi (pi, p3−i, c, αi, α3−i) = (pi − λic)
(
αi − pi + γ (p3−i − α3−i)
(1− γ2)
)
. (3.13)
By using Eq. (3.13) we compute intermediary i’s best reply function. As above, neg-
ative profits can be avoided by not producing anything
pi (p3−i) = max
{
αi − γ (α3−i − p3−i) + λic
2
, 0
}
. (3.14)
Hence, the Nash equilibrium price in Bertrand competition is given by
pBi =

(2−γ2)αi−γα3−i+(2λi+γλ3−i)c
(4−γ2) if c < min
{
(2−γ2)αi−γα3−i
(2−γ2)λi−γλ3−i ,
(2−γ2)α3−i−γαi
(2−γ2)λ3−i−γλi
}
,
αi+λic
2
if
(2−γ2)α3−i−γαi
(2−γ2)λ3−i−γλi ≤ c < αiλi ,
0 otherwise,
(3.15)
and the equilibrium quantity is given by
qBi =

pBi −λic
(1−γ2) if c < min
{
(2−γ2)αi−γα3−i
(2−γ2)λi−γλ3−i ,
(2−γ2)α3−i−γαi
(2−γ2)λ3−i−γλi
}
αi−λic
2
if
(2−γ2)α3−i−γαi
(2−γ2)λ3−i−γλi ≤ c < αiλi
0 otherwise.
(3.16)
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For similar reasons as in Cournot competition we impose an analogue assumption on
the parameter choices (α1, λ1, α2, λ2) for Bertrand competition:
Assumption 3.2. We assume min
{
α1
α2
, α2
α1
}
> γ
2−γ2 and min
{
λ1
λ2
, λ2
λ1
}
> γ
2−γ2 .
We restrict our analysis to parameter choices (α1, λ1, α2, λ2) that satisfy Assump-
tion 3.2. Note that Assumption 3.2 is more restrictive on the parameter choices than
Assumption 3.1. Similarly, as for Cournot competition, we have
min
{
(2− γ2)α1 − γα2
(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2 ,
(2− γ2)α2 − γα1
(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1
}
=

(2−γ2)α1−γα2
(2−γ2)λ1−γλ2 if
α1
λ1
≥ α2
λ2
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1 if
α1
λ1
≤ α2
λ2
.
(3.17)
The total market demand on the input market is qBI (c) = λ1q
B
1 + λ2q
B
2 and given by
qBI (c) =

(2−γ2)(λ1α1+λ2α2)−γ(λ1α2+λ2α1)
(4−γ2)(1−γ2)
− [(2−γ
2)(λ21+λ22)−2γλ1λ2]c
(4−γ2)(1−γ2) if c < min
{
(2−γ2)α1−γα2
(2−γ2)λ1−γλ2 ,
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1
}
,
λ1(α1−λ1c)
2
if
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1 ≤ c < α1λ1 ,
λ2(α2−λ2c)
2
if
(2−γ2)α1−γα2
(2−γ2)λ1−γλ2 ≤ c < α2λ2 ,
0 otherwise.
(3.18)
The monopolistic input supplier maximizes his profit qBI (c) c, where the supplier’s
production costs are normalized to zero. We obtain the analogue of Proposition 3.1
also for Bertrand competition.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose the intermediaries compete in choosing prices. If the two
intermediaries are sufficiently asymmetric, it is optimal for the input supplier to choose
an input price such that he sells his inputs to just one intermediary and thus excludes
the other intermediary from the input market.
More precisely, if
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1 ≤ α12λ1 and
α2 < α1τ
B
1
(
≤ α1λ2
λ1
)
(3.19)
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with
τB1 =
√
2 (1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]− 2 ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)
2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1) ,
(3.20)
then it is optimal for a profit-maximizing input supplier to only serve intermediary 1
and with analogous conditions to serve intermediary 2. For the remaining specifications
of parameters (α1, λ1, α2, λ2) the input supplier optimally sells to both intermediaries.
3.2.4 Comparison of Cournot and Bertrand competition
For the remaining part of this section we assume γ ∈ (−1, 1) and suppose that there
exists an inner solution for the monopolistic input price as assumed in Proposition 3.1
and 3.2. When at first considering the input market by comparing the results of
Proposition 3.1 and 3.2 we observe the following:
Proposition 3.3 (Input Market). There exist parameters (α1, λ1, α2, λ2) such that
in Cournot competition one intermediary is excluded from the input market while, in
Bertrand competition both intermediaries purchase inputs, i.e., we always have τB1 ≤
τC1 and τ
B
2 ≤ τC2 .
Proposition 3.3 makes clear that there exist quality and productivity differences
such that in Cournot competition only one intermediary is willing to procure inputs
from the input supplier while in Bertrand competition still both intermediaries are
willing to purchase inputs. This is illustrated in Fig. 3.2.
Hence, in Proposition 3.3 we establish that there is no situation in which Bertrand
competition leads to an exclusion of one intermediary from the input market while
Cournot competition does not. The reason is that the profits of the input supplier,
given he sells to both intermediaries, are always higher when intermediaries compete
in Bertrand compared to Cournot competition. Therefore, if the asymmetries between
the two intermediaries increase, the input price of a profit-maximizing input supplier
is raised earlier under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. This
has the consequence that under Cournot competition the input price is earlier too high
for the intermediary with quality and/or productivity disadvantages. Thus, he is no
longer willing to purchase inputs. The next proposition explicitly compares the input
prices for the three scenarios from Proposition 3.3 and Fig. 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: The input market for α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1
Proposition 3.4 (Input Prices).
(i) Consider α2 ≤ α1τB1 (or α1 ≤ α2τB2 ). Input prices are equal under Cournot and
Bertrand competition.
(ii) Consider α1τ
B
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1τC1 (or α2τB2 ≤ α1 ≤ α2τC2 ). Input prices are always
higher under Cournot than under Bertrand competition.
(iii) Consider α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 (or α2τC2 ≤ α1 ≤ α2 λ1λ2 ).
If input productivities are equivalent (λ1 = λ2), both intermediaries act as mo-
nopolists (γ = 0) or both intermediaries produce identical relative qualities (α1
λ1
=
α2
λ2
), then under Cournot and Bertrand competition the input prices are equal.
If the goods are substitutes (γ > 0) and the relative quality of the more productive
intermediary is higher, then input prices are higher under Bertrand than under
Cournot competition.
If the goods are complements (γ < 0) and the relative quality of the more pro-
ductive intermediary is higher, then input prices are higher under Cournot than
under Betrand competition.
Proposition 3.4 indeed confirms the intuition behind Proposition 3.3. The first
statement for α2 ≤ α1τB1 (or α1 ≤ α2τB2 ) is obvious. As for Bertrand and Cournot
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competition the input supplier sets an input price that excludes one intermediary from
the market and sells just to the other intermediary, there is no longer competition on
the output market between the intermediaries. Thus, there is no difference in input
prices. The second statement for α1τ
B
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1τC1 (or α2τB2 ≤ α1 ≤ α2τC2 ) confirms
that the input price under Cournot competition is indeed too high for one intermediary
to purchase positive quantities on the input market, while the input price is always
lower under Bertrand competition. However, for the last constellation of parameters
with α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 (or α2τC2 ≤ α1 ≤ α2 λ1λ2 ) the comparison of the input prices
for Cournot and Bertrand competition depends on several parameters. In the proof
of Proposition 3.4 we establish that for α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 the difference of the
input prices cC − cB ≥ 0 if and only if γ3 (λ1 − λ2) (λ1α2 − λ2α1) ≥ 0. Thus, the
products’ substitutability as well as the differences in productivity and in relative
qualities crucially impact the relation of the input prices for Cournot compared to
Bertrand competition.
In order to analyze the intermediaries’ incentives to invest in product quality, we
now summarize their profits using Proposition 3.1 and 3.2. The profits for the scenarios
identified in Proposition 3.3 and Fig. 3.2 can easily be derived accordingly. Consider
α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 . The intermediaries profits are
piC1
(
qC1 , q
C
2 , c
C , α1, α2
)
=

α21
16
for α2 ≤ α1τC1 ,
[2α1−γα2−(2λ1−γλ2)cC]2
(2−γ)2(2+γ)2 for α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 ,
(3.21)
piC2
(
qC1 , q
C
2 , c
C , α1, α2
)
=
0 for α2 ≤ α1τ
C
1 ,
[2α2−γα1−(2λ2−γλ1)cC]2
(2−γ)2(2+γ)2 for α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 ,
(3.22)
with
cC =
2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
4 [λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2]
and
piB1
(
pB1 , p
B
2 , c
B, α1, α2
)
=

α21
16
for α2 ≤ α1τB1 ,
[(2−γ2)α1−γα2−((2−γ2)λ1−γλ2)cB]2
(2−γ)2(2+γ)2(1−γ2) for α1τ
B
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 ,
(3.23)
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piB2
(
pB1 , p
B
2 , c
B, α1, α2
)
=
0 for α2 ≤ α1τ
B
1 ,
[(2−γ2)α2−γα1−((2−γ2)λ2−γλ1)cB]2
(2−γ)2(2+γ)2(1−γ2) for α1τ
B
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 ,
(3.24)
with
cB =
(2− γ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
.
The next two Propositions now compare the intermediaries’ equilibrium prices, quan-
tities and profits for Cournot and Bertrand competition.
Proposition 3.5. Consider λ1 = λ2 and α1 = α2. Then, p
C
i ≥ pBi , qCi ≤ qBi and,
moreover, piCi ≥ piBi for γ ≥ 0 and piCi ≤ piBi for γ ≤ 0 for both intermediaries i = 1, 2.
Proposition 3.6.
(i) There exist (α1, α2, λ1, λ2, γ) such that there is an intermediary i ∈ {1, 2} with
pCi < p
B
i .
(ii) There exist (α1, α2, λ1, λ2, γ) such that there is an intermediary i ∈ {1, 2} with
qCi > q
B
i .
(iii) There exist (α1, α2, λ1, λ2, γ) with γ ≥ 0 such that piCi < piBi for both intermedi-
aries i = 1, 2.
For our model with symmetric intermediaries, Proposition 3.5 confirms a promi-
nent result from literature. Singh and Vives (1984) show for a linear demand structure
that in equilibrium Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot competition,
as it generates a lower price and a higher output level. They find that this result is
independent of whether goods are substitutes or complements and regardless of the
demand structure’s degree of symmetry. Thus, Bertrand competition implies a higher
consumer and total welfare. Furthermore, Singh and Vives (1984) show that firms
prefer to select quantities (prices), if goods are substitutes (complements). However,
Proposition 3.6 establishes that this must not always be true when the input market is
explicitly modeled and asymmetries between the intermediaries are present. Zanchet-
tin (2006), in a setting with quality and cost asymmetries, finds the same relations in
terms of equilibrium prices and quantities as in Proposition 3.5. Nevertheless, in our
model with an endogenous input market this relationship cannot always be guaranteed.
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3.3 Product Innovation
3.3.1 Investments in product quality
We assume that the intermediaries can simultaneously choose to invest in product
innovation, which increases their products’ quality. The product quality is αi ∈ [αi, αi]
with 0 < αi < αi. Without investing intermediary i is assumed to produce the minimal
product quality of αi, whereas investing increases the product quality αi from αi to
maximally αi for i = 1, 2. The marginal costs of investing are assumed to be identical
for both intermediaries and denoted by k > 0.
Proposition 3.7. In Cournot as well as in Bertrand competition, the intermediaries’
profits are strictly convex in own qualities and thus, Nash equilibrium strategies of the
investment game with linear costs are in {αi, αi} ⊂ [αi, αi] for i = 1, 2.
Proposition 3.7 implies that if we are looking for Nash equilibrium investment
levels for linear investment costs, we can restrict our attention to the minimal and
maximal quality levels. Strict convexity of the intermediaries’ profit functions in own
qualities implies that there exists a quality level that minimizes the intermediaries’
profits. Thus, in order to find the optimal level of quality within the interval [αi, αi]
it suffices to compare the profits at the according end points. This also holds if the
minimum itself is not in the interval [αi, αi]. Therefore, if we assume that the minimal
quality always needs to be provided, the actual decision may be simplified to either
invest or not to invest.
The insights from the previous section, in particular from Proposition 3.3, imply
that the mode of competition actually influences the incentives to invest in product
quality. This means the profits of the intermediaries crucially depend on the degree
of asymmetries and whether they compete in prices or quantities. Thus, besides the
exogeneously given input productivities (λ1, λ2) the range of investment possibilities
(α1, α1, α2, α2) actually impacts the asymmetries between the intermediaries and with
that the investment incentives. Suppose α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 and consider the example from
Fig. 3.3. The productivities and therewith τB1 and τ
C
1 as well as the range of invest-
ments are such that for the minimal quality levels intermediary 2 is excluded from the
input market. In case of Bertrand competition, intermediary 2 is able to sufficiently
lower the price on the input market by investing in product quality while this is not
possible for Cournot competition. Whether an investment leads to positive profits for
47 Chapter 3. Simultaneous Competition of Intermediaries
intermediary 2 crucially depends on the costs of investing in product quality. More-
over, for the equilibrium analysis we also have to take the investment incentives of
intermediary 1 into account.
-
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1
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λ1
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Figure 3.3: Example for investments into product quality
Fig. 3.3 indicates that there are various possibilities of how the productivity and
quality parameters may relate to each other and influence the intermediaries’ asym-
metries. As we would like to put our focus on the investment incentives, we for the
next subsection assume that the intermediaries have identical input productivities.
3.3.2 Nash equilibrium investments for symmetric productiv-
ities
We assume that the intermediaries can simultaneously choose to invest in quality-
increasing product innovation. We analyze these investments for symmetric produc-
tivities, i.e., λ1 = λ2, which simplifies the expressions from the previous section to:
τC1 =
√
2 + γ − 1 and τB1 =
√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1.
Note that τB1 ≤ τC1 < 1. The profits of the intermediaries for α2 ≤ α1 are
piC1
(
pC1 , p
C
2 , c
C , α1, α2
)
=

α21
16
for α2 ≤ α1τC1 ,
[α1(6+γ)−α2(2+3γ)]2
16(4−γ2)2 for α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1,
piC2
(
pC1 , p
C
2 , c
C , α1, α2
)
=
0 for α2 ≤ α1τC1 ,[α2(6+γ)−α1(2+3γ)]2
16(4−γ2)2 for α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1,
and
piB1
(
pB1 , p
B
2 , c
B, α1, α2
)
=

α21
16
for α2 ≤ α1τB1 ,
[α1(6+γ−3γ2)−α2(2+3γ−γ2)]2
16(4−γ2)2(1−γ2) for α1τ
B
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1,
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piB2
(
pB1 , p
B
2 , c
B, α1, α2
)
=
0 for α2 ≤ α1τ
B
1 ,
[α2(6+γ−3γ2)−α1(2+3γ−γ2)]2
16(4−γ2)2(1−γ2) for α1τ
B
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1.
We use these profits to analyze the incentives to invest in product quality. Suppose
α1 = α2 = α, α1 = α2 = α and define κ
C/B = k (α− α). Fig. 3.4 shows the investment
game in normalform. Both intermediaries simultaneously decide whether to invest or
not to invest in product quality.
α α
α
pi
C/B
1 (α, α)
pi
C/B
2 (α, α)
pi
C/B
1 (α, α)
pi
C/B
2 (α, α)− κC/B
α
pi
C/B
1 (α, α)− κC/B
pi
C/B
2 (α, α)
pi
C/B
1 (α, α)− κC/B
pi
C/B
2 (α, α)− κC/B
Figure 3.4: Normalform investment game
The payoffs shown in Fig. 3.4 are based on the investments chosen by the interme-
diaries. The effect an investment has on the profits and the market outcome depends
on the quality difference between investing and not investing, which is α − α. If this
difference is sufficiently large, an intermediary who does not invest while his competi-
tor is investing may be excluded from the input market. Therefore, the decision to
invest may actually change the situation on the input market. If an intermediary was
excluded from the market while not investing, an investment may induce the input
supplier to lower his input price and therefore to sell to both intermediaries.
We now continue with some general remarks on the Nash equilibrium conditions
of the normalform investment game in Fig. 3.4. Due to symmetry reasons of the two
intermediaries we may define an upper κC/B and a lower bound κC/B to describe the
Nash equilibrium conditions on the investment costs κC/B. This is
κC/B := pi
C/B
1 (α, α)− piC/B1 (α, α) = piC/B2 (α, α)− piC/B2 (α, α) , (3.25)
κC/B := pi
C/B
1 (α, α)− piC/B1 (α, α) = piC/B2 (α, α)− piC/B2 (α, α) . (3.26)
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The according equilibrium conditions are shown in Fig. 3.5. We explicitly deter-
mine the equilibrium profits and the conditions on the investment costs for Cournot
competition in Appendix 3.5.8 and for Bertrand competition in Appendix 3.5.9.
strategy profile investment costs
(α, α) κC/B ∈ [κC/B,∞)
(α, α), (α, α) κC/B ∈ [κC/B, κC/B]
(α, α) κC/B ∈ (−∞, κC/B]
Figure 3.5: Equilibrium conditions on the investment costs κC/B
The next proposition states that the existence of asymmetric Nash equilibria cru-
cially depends on the substitutability and complementarity of the intermediaries’ prod-
ucts. It turns out that asymmetric Nash equilibria may fail to exist.
Proposition 3.8 (Asymmetric investment equilibria, Cournot competition).
(i) For α ≤ α (√2 + γ − 1) there are no asymmetric Nash equilibria if γ ∈ [−1, 0].
More precisely, there are no asymmetric Nash equilibria if γ (4 + γ)α2−4α2 < 0
(which is bounded above by γ < 2
(√
2− 1) ≈ 0.83).
(ii) For α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α there are no asymmetric equilibria if γ ∈ [−1,−2
3
] ≈
[−1,−0.67].
Similarly, as in Cournot competition, asymmetric Nash equilibria may also fail to
exist in case of Bertrand competition, as is indicated by the next proposition.
Proposition 3.9 (Asymmetric investment equilibria, Bertrand competition).
(i) For α ≤ α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
there are no asymmetric Nash equilibria if γ ∈
[−1, 0]. More precisely, there are no asymmetric Nash equilibria if α2γ (4− 3γ + γ2)−
4α2 (1− γ) < 0 (which is bounded above for γ by 0.61).
(ii) For α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
≤ α there are no asymmetric equilibria if γ ∈ [−1,−0.56].
Finally, we compare the upper and lower bounds for the investment costs for the
two types of competition and the different scenarios that may arise depending on the
effect of investments.
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Proposition 3.10.
(i) Consider α ≤ α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
. Then, for complements with γ ∈ (−1, 0]
we have κC ≤ κB and κB ≤ κC. For substitutes with γ ∈ [0, 1) we have κB ≤ κC
and κC ≤ κB.
(ii) Consider α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
≤ α ≤ α (√2 + γ − 1). Then, for substitutes
with γ ∈ [0, 1) we have κB ≤ κC. The relationship of κB and κC depends on the
values of α and α. The same is true for complements for the lower and upper
bounds.
(iii) Consider α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α. Then, for complements with γ ∈ (−1, 0] we
always have κC ≤ κB and if and only if α (3 + 5γ) ≥ α (7 + γ), then we also
have κB ≤ κC. For substitutes with γ ∈ [0, 1) we always have κB ≤ κC and if
and only if α (3 + 5γ) ≥ α (7 + γ), then we also have κC ≤ κB.
Proposition 3.10 compares the incentives to invest in product quality for Cournot
and Bertrand competition. The lower and upper bounds for the investment costs are
conditions on the Nash equilibria of the investment game. According to the first state-
ment in Proposition 3.10(i), for complementary products the lower bound on the in-
vestment costs in Cournot competition is less or equal to the lower bound for Bertrand
competition, κC ≤ κB for α ≤ ατB1 . This means that if the intermediaries compete
by choosing quantities, the range of costs for which it is a Nash equilibrium for both
intermediaries to invest, is contained in the according interval for price competition.
Hence, there may exist investment costs for which in price competition both intermedi-
aries invest in product quality, while these strategies are not a Nash equilibrium if the
intermediaries compete in choosing quantities. The upper bound on the investment
costs determine the scenarios in which not investing is a Nash equilibrium. When
considering the upper bound we observe for complementary products that κB ≤ κC
for α ≤ ατB1 . Thus, there are investment costs such that not investing is a Nash equi-
librium for Bertrand competition, while for Cournot competition it is not. This is the
case as the investment costs are still sufficiently low for at least one intermediary to de-
viate and invest. For substitutable products we have according to Proposition 3.10(i)
the reverse relationship between Cournot and Bertrand competition.
Fig. 3.6 exemplarily summarizes the results of Propositions 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 graph-
ically for complements and substitutes if the quality difference between investing and
not investing is sufficiently large. For complements we observe in Fig. 3.6(a) that in
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Complements
Cournot competition
Bertrand competition
(
κC , κC
)
= (11.1111, 6.1389)
(
κB, κB
)
= (12.0000, 6.1300)
|(α, α)
| (α, α)
|(α, α)
| (α, α)
-| |
κB κB
| |
κC κC
(a) γ = − 12 and (α, α) = (10, 1)
Substitutes
Cournot competition
Bertrand competition
(
κC , κC
)
= (0.2500, 0.3506)
(
κB, κB
)
= (0.2315, 0.3536)
(α, α) (α, α)(α, α)
(α, α)
| |
(α, α) (α, α)(α, α)
(α, α)
||
-| |
κB κB
| |
κC κC
(b) γ = 12 and (α, α) =
(
5
2 , 1
)
Figure 3.6: Examples for Nash equilibria of the investment game for λ1 = λ2
case of Bertrand competition we have a larger range of investment costs for which
the two symmetric Nash equilibria of the investment game coexist. For substitutes in
Fig. 3.6(b) the interval of investment costs for which asymmetric Nash equilibria exist
is larger for price than for quantity competition. Note that the intervals in Fig. 3.6
are schematic and not drawn to scale. However, the numerical values for the upper
and lower bounds on the investment costs of the examples in Fig. 3.6(a) and 3.6(b)
are explicitly mentioned in the according figures. These examples illustrate that if
investing in product quality has an sufficient impact on the asymmetries between the
intermediaries, we observe a range of cost parameters in which both symmetric in-
vestment Nash equilibria coexist when products are complements. For substitutable
products, however, asymmetric Nash equilibria also exist. This observation confirms
the intuition that for complementary products the investment decisions of the inter-
mediaries are coordinated, while for substitutable products there are also equilibria
with asymmetric investment strategies. These effects are in a sense stronger for price
competition compared to quantity competition.
We finish the analysis of the investment game with a last remark on the special
case of independent products, where γ = 0 and α ≤ α (√2− 1). Here, the situation
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is similar to the one described in Fig. 3.6(a), but with identical intervals in which
the symmetric equilibria exist within Cournot and Bertrand competition. For γ = 0
and α
(√
2− 1) ≤ α the intervals resemble the one in Fig. 3.6(b), also with identical
intervals for Cournot and Bertrand competition. The according mathematics can be
found after Proof of Proposition 3.10 in Appendix 3.5.10.
3.4 Conclusion
We analyzed the influence of asymmetries between intermediaries on an intermediate
goods market with horizontal and vertical product differentiation. The interaction
between the intermediaries was divided into two different decision stages: innovation
and competition. The according analysis proceeded backwards.
For the competition stage, we established that introducing a strategically acting
input supplier may lead to exclusion of one intermediary from the input market if the
asymmetries are sufficiently large (Propositions 3.1 and 3.2). There exists a range of
asymmetries where in Cournot competition the input prices are too high for one inter-
mediary, while in Bertrand competition both intermediaries demand positive quantities
on the input market (Propositions 3.3 and 3.4). Compared to Zanchettin (2006), we
excluded by Assumption 3.1 and Assumption 3.2 the range of parameters for which
asymmetries drive the inefficient firm immediately out of the market (Zanchettin, 2006,
Eq. 8). However, due to the explicit inclusion of the input market, we make no initial
assumption on the relation between qualities and input prices as done in Zanchettin
(2006). Nevertheless, in our model with a strategically acting input supplier and thus,
an endogenously determined input price, this exclusion from the input market even
survives for a more restrictive range of asymmetries. Our bound on the asymmetries is
established for substitutable as well as for complementary products with γ ∈ (−1, 1).
Related to our approach, the model in Mukherjee et al. (2012) is also focused on the
presence of an input market. However, in order to point out the effect of efficiency
differences and also analyzing the impact of uniform prices compared to price dis-
crimination, the quality of the intermediaries’ products is assumed to be identical.
This distinguishes from our goal to examine the impact of a strategically acting input
supplier on the intermediaries’ decisions to purchase resources on the input market
for their products and their incentives for product innovation. The analysis of price
discrimination is indeed one direction to further extend our model. An additional
objective for future research is the investigation of competition on the input market.
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In Appendix 3.6 we already indicate the similarities and differences compared to the
monopolistic input market. However, the comprehensive analysis of the relation be-
tween the number of suppliers and the optimal decisions on the input market is left
for future research. Additionally we also compared the intermediaries’ equilibrium
prices, quantities and profits for Cournot and Bertrand competition (Propositions 3.5
and 3.6). We observed that the relations established in Singh and Vives (1984) cannot
always be guaranteed in our model with an endogenous input market and asymmetric
intermediaries.
For the innovation stage, we analyzed the intermediaries’ incentives to improve the
quality of their products. Using the intermediaries’ equilibrium profits from the com-
petition stage and taking the assumption of linear investment costs into account, we
first established that the intermediaries’ Nash equilibrium investments into product
quality are always at the minimum or maximum product quality (Proposition 3.7).
Afterwards, we investigated the Nash equilibrium investments for the case of sym-
metric productivities in more detail and compared them for Cournot and Bertrand
competition (Propositions 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10). Taking the results from the competi-
tion stage into consideration, the focus of our analysis for the innovation stage was
on the equilibrium conditions for the investments. We compared those conditions for
the different scenarios derived for the input market as well as for the substitutability
between the intermediaries’ products. In contrast to the model in Symeonidis (2003),
who modifies the approach of Motta (1993) by additionally allowing for technological
spillovers, we investigated the direct impact of investments on product quality. In our
model, the function that links quality to innovation expenditures is simply the iden-
tity whereas in Symeonidis (2003) this is assumed to be a fourth root function. This
allows Symeonidis (2003) to analyze interior symmetric investment equilibria while
our equilibrium investments are always at the minimum or maximum product quality,
which is a consequence of the direct influence of investments on product quality. Be-
sides the above-mentioned investigation of a price discriminating input supplier, the
examination of more complex investment effects, in particular related to technologi-
cal spillovers for quality investments, is also considered to be an objective for further
research, which is beyond the scope of our current analysis.
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3.5 Appendix A: Proofs
3.5.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof of Proposition 3.1. The proof proceeds in two steps. In a first step we deter-
mine the prices the input supplier charges. In doing so we distinguish different cases
depending on the number of intermediaries demanding positive quantities. Afterwards
the according profits are compared in step two.
Step 1 (Input Prices and Profits)
Case 1: The input price is chosen such that both intermediaries produce strictly
positive quantities. Therefore, the following must hold:
c < min
{
2α1 − γα2
2λ1 − γλ2 ,
2α2 − γα1
2λ2 − γλ1
}
. (3.27)
Maximizing the profit of the input supplier qCI (c) c yields an input price
cC =
2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
4 [λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2]
. (3.28)
Note that for this input price both intermediaries indeed purchase positive quan-
tities. Suppose α1
α2
> λ1
λ2
, then 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 >
2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 . Using min
{
λ1
λ2
, λ2
λ1
}
> γ
2
and
min
{
α1
α2
, α2
α1
}
> γ
2
we have
0 <
(
4− γ2)(α1
α2
− λ1
λ2
)
⇔ 2α2 − γα1
2α1 − γα2 <
2λ2 − γλ1
2λ1 − γλ2
and thus,
2
[
λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2
]
= λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
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> λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) λ2 (2α2 − γα1)
λ1 (2α1 − γα2) .
By using
4
[
λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2
]
> 2
[
λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2
]
for λ1, λ2 > 0
this implies that
4
[
λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2
]
> λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) λ2 (2α2 − γα1)
λ1 (2α1 − γα2) .
Rearranging yields
2α1 − γα2
2λ1 − γλ2 >
2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
4 [λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2]
showing that the input price cC is indeed sufficiently small to sell to both inter-
mediaries. The profit of the input supplier is
qCI (c
C) cC =
[2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2
8 (4− γ2) [λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2]
. (3.29)
Case 2: The input price is chosen such that intermediary 1 produces a strictly positive
quantity while intermediary 2 produces zero. Thus, we require
2α2 − γα1
2λ2 − γλ1 ≤ c <
α1
λ1
, (3.30)
which implies α1
α2
> λ1
λ2
. Maximizing the profit of the input supplier qCI (c) c and
taking a sufficiently high input price into account yields an input price
cC = max
{
2α2 − γα1
2λ2 − γλ1 ,
α1
2λ1
}
. (3.31)
Note that by definition this input price is indeed too high for intermediary 2 to
purchase positive quantities. The analogous argument holds if intermediary 2
produces a strictly positive quantity while intermediary 1 produces zero. The
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profit of the input supplier is
qCI (c
C) cC =

α21
8
if 2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 ≤ α12λ1 ,
λ1(2α2−γα1)(α1λ2−α2λ1)
(2λ2−γλ1)2 if
2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 ≥ α12λ1 .
(3.32)
Case 3: The input price is too high for at least one intermediary to purchase strictly
positive quantities.
Step 2 (Comparing Profits)
An input price as suggested in Case 3 cannot be optimal. In this scenario the input
price is too high for the intermediaries to demand goods and the input supplier’s profit
is zero. In contrast, Case 1 as well as Case 2 yield positive profits. Therefore, we an-
alyze the input supplier’s profits for Cases 1 and 2. We compare the two monopoly
profits for selling to intermediary 1 with the duopoly profits for selling to both in-
termediaries. Thus, suppose α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 . The remaining part when only selling to
intermediary 2 follows analogously.
Step 2.1: We compare the two monopoly profits for selling to intermediary 1 and
obtain by observing
(α1 (2λ2 + γλ1)− 4λ1α2)2 ≥ 0 (3.33)
that
α21
8
≥ λ1 (2α2 − γα1) (α1λ2 − α2λ1)
(2λ2 − γλ1)2
. (3.34)
Step 2.2: We compare the duopoly profit with the monopoly profit for selling to in-
termediary 1. If the duopoly profit is greater than or equal to both monopoly
profits, then the input supplier decides to sell to both intermediaries. Therefore,
we obtain that if
α2 ≥ α1τC1 (3.35)
with
τC1 =
(√
(4− γ2) (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2)− (2λ1 − γλ2)
(2λ2 − γλ1)
)
, (3.36)
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then
α21
8
≤ [2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]
2
8 (4− γ2) [λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2]
(3.37)
holds. Thus, whenever condition (3.35) holds, we know that a profit-maximizing
input supplier prefers to sell in any case to both intermediaries. Thus, we know
that for
α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1
λ2
λ1
the input supplier prefers to set a price for which both intermediaries procure
inputs. Note that the following is always true:
τC1 ≤
λ2
λ1
. (3.38)
Step 2.1 and Step 2.2 show that for 2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 ≤ α12λ1 the the claim of Proposition 3.1
holds. Note that requiring 2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 ≤ α12λ1 is equivalent to choosing α2 ≤ α1
(
2λ2+γλ1
4λ1
)
.
3.5.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof of Proposition 3.2. The proof proceeds in two steps. In a first step we deter-
mine the prices the input supplier charges. In doing so we distinguish different cases
depending on the number of intermediaries demanding positive quantities. Afterwards
the according profits are compared in step two.
Step 1 (Input Prices and Profits)
Case 1: The input price is chosen such that both intermediaries produce strictly
positive quantities. Therefore the following must hold:
c < min
{
(2− γ2)α1 − γα2
(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2 ,
(2− γ2)α2 − γα1
(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1
}
. (3.39)
Maximizing the profit of the input supplier yields
cB =
(2− γ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
. (3.40)
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Note that for this input price both intermediaries indeed purchase positive quan-
tities. Suppose α1
α2
> λ1
λ2
, then
(2−γ2)α1−γα2
(2−γ2)λ1−γλ2 >
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1 . Using min
{
λ1
λ2
, λ2
λ1
}
>
γ
2−γ2 and min
{
α1
α2
, α2
α1
}
> γ
2−γ2 we have
0 <
(
2− γ2)2(α1
α2
− λ1
λ2
)
⇔ (2− γ
2)α2 − γα1
(2− γ2)α1 − γα2 <
(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1
(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2
and thus,
(
2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2
= λ1
((
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)+ λ1 ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2) λ2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)
λ1 ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)
> λ1
((
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)+ λ1 ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2) λ2 ((2− γ2)α2 − γα1)
λ1 ((2− γ2)α1 − γα2)
which implies when using
2
((
2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2) > (2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2 for λ1, λ2 > 0
that
2
((
2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2)
> λ1
((
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)+ λ1 ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2) λ2 ((2− γ2)α2 − γα1)
λ1 ((2− γ2)α1 − γα2) .
Rearranging yields
(2− γ2)α1 − γα2
(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2 >
(2− γ2)(λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ(λ1α2 + λ2α1)
2[(2− γ2)(λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
showing that the input price cB is indeed sufficiently small to sell to both inter-
mediaries. The profit of the input supplier is
qBI (c
B) cB =
[(2− γ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2
4 (1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
. (3.41)
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Case 2: The input price is chosen such that intermediary 1 produces a strictly positive
quantity while intermediary 2 produces zero. Thus, we require
(2− γ2)α2 − γα1
(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1 ≤ c <
α1
λ1
, (3.42)
which implies α1
α2
> λ1
λ2
. Given a sufficiently high input price, maximizing the
profit of the input supplier yields
cB = max
{
(2− γ2)α2 − γα1
(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1 ,
α1
2λ1
}
. (3.43)
Note that by definition this input price is indeed too high for intermediary 2 to
purchase positive quantities. The analogous argument holds if intermediary 2
produces a strictly positive quantity while intermediary 1 produces zero. The
profit of the input supplier is
qBI (c
B) cB =

α21
8
if
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1 ≤ α12λ1
λ1(2−γ2)[(2−γ2)α2−γα1](α1λ2−α2λ1)
2[(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1]2 if
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1 ≥ α12λ1 .
(3.44)
Case 3: The input price is too high for at least one intermediary to purchase strictly
positive quantities.
Step 2 (Comparing Profits)
As in Cournot competition, it suffices to compare the profits of the input supplier for
Cases 1 and 2. We compare the two monopoly profits for selling to intermediary 1
with the duopoly profits for selling to both intermediaries. Thus, suppose α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 .
The remaining part when selling to intermediary 2 follows analogously.
Step 2.1: We compare the two monopoly profits for selling to intermediary 1. We
obtain by observing
[
α1
((
2− γ2)λ2 + γλ1)− 4 (2− γ2)α2λ1]2 ≥ 0 (3.45)
that
α21
8
≥ λ1 (2− γ
2) [(2− γ2)α2 − γα1] (α1λ2 − α2λ1)
2 [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]2
. (3.46)
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Step 2.2: We compare the duopoly profit with the monopoly profit for selling to in-
termediary 1. If the duopoly profit is greater than or equal to both monopoly
profits, then the input supplier decides to sell to both intermediaries. Therefore,
we obtain that if
α2 ≥ α1τB1 (3.47)
with
τB1 =
(√
2 (1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]− 2 ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)
2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)
)
,
(3.48)
then
α21
8
≤ [(2− γ
2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2
4 (1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
(3.49)
holds. Thus, whenever condition (3.47) is true, we know that a profit-maximizing
input supplier prefers to sell only to intermediary 1. Thus, we know that for
α1τ
B
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1
λ2
λ1
the input supplier prefers to set a price to sell to both intermediaries. Note that
the following is always true:
τB1 ≤
λ2
λ1
. (3.50)
Step 2.1 and Step 2.2 show that for
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1 ≤ α12λ1 the the claim of Propo-
sition 3.1 holds. Note that requiring
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1 ≤ α12λ1 is equivalent to choosing
α2 ≤ α1
(
(2−γ2)λ2+γλ1
2(2−γ2)λ1
)
.
3.5.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof of Proposition 3.3. The proof proceeds in two steps. First we compare the prof-
its of the input supplier in the case of intermediaries competing in quantities with the
setting in which intermediaries compete in prices.
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Step 1 (Duopoly Profit of the Input Supplier)
Suppose the input supplier sells inputs to both intermediaries, which is
max
{
α1τ
B
1 , α1τ
C
1
} ≤ α2 ≤ α1λ2
λ1
. (3.51)
We show that
qBI (c
B) cB ≥ qCI (cC) cC . (3.52)
The nominator of
qBI (c
B) cB − qCI (cC) cC
=
[(2− γ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2
4 (1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
− [2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]
2
8 (4− γ2) [λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2]
=
2 [(2− γ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2 [λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2]
8 (1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2] [λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2]
− (1− γ
2) [2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
8 (1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2] [λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2]
can be rewritten as
2
[(
2− γ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2 [λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2]
− (1− γ2) [2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
= γ2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [[λ1 − γλ2] (α1 − α2)2 + 2 (1− γ)α1α2 (λ1 + λ2)]
+ γ2λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
[(
2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1] [[λ2 − γλ1] (α1 − α2)2 + 2 (1− γ)α1α2 (λ1 + λ2)] .
Assumption 3.1 and 3.2, which is
min
{
λ1
λ2
,
λ2
λ1
}
>
γ
2
and min
{
λ1
λ2
,
λ2
λ1
}
>
γ
2− γ2 ,
implies for λ1 ≥ λ2 that
0 ≤ 2λ2 − γλ1 ≤ 2λ1 − γλ2,
0 ≤ (2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1 ≤ (2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2.
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Thus, we obtain
γ2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [[λ1 − γλ2] (α1 − α2)2 + 2 (1− γ)α1α2 (λ1 + λ2)]
+ γ2λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
[(
2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1] [[λ2 − γλ1] (α1 − α2)2 + 2 (1− γ)α1α2 (λ1 + λ2)]
≥ γ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
[(
2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1][(
(λ1 − λ2)2 + 2 (1− γ)λ1λ2
)
(α1 − α2)2 + 2 (1− γ)α1α2 (λ1 + λ2)
]
≥ 0.
The analogous argument holds for λ1 ≤ λ2. Note that we have for qCI (cC)cC with
Assumption 3.1
∂
[
qCI (c
C)cC
]
∂α2
= 2
[2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)] [2λ2 − γλ1]
8 (4− γ2) [(λ21 + λ22)− γλ1λ2]
≥ 0, (3.53)
and with Assumption 3.2 for qBI (c
B)cB
∂
[
qBI (c
B)cB
]
∂α2
= 2
[(2− γ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)] [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]
4 (1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
≥ 0.
(3.54)
Step 2 (Comparing τC1 and τ
B
1 )
Note that τB1 and τ
C
1 was deduced within the proof of Proposition 3.1 and Proposi-
tion 3.2 by comparing the profit to sell to both intermediaries with the profit to sell
only to intermediary 1. This is stated in Ineq. (3.37) and (3.46). When considering
the difference between those profits and using step 1, we therefore have
α21
8
− [(2− γ
2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2
4 (1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
≤ α
2
1
8
− [2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]
2
8 (4− γ2) [(λ21 + λ22)− γλ1λ2]
. (3.55)
With the observation that the input supplier’s profit when selling to both intermedi-
aries is non-decreasing in α2, Ineq. (3.53) and (3.54) and thus, the right- and left-hand
side of Ineq. (3.55) are non-increasing in α2. This implies that the zero of the left-hand
side is less or equal than the zero of the right-hand side. Therefore,
τB1 ≤ τC1 (3.56)
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and thus, max
{
α1τ
B
1 , α1τ
C
1
}
= α1τ
C
1 and min
{
α1τ
B
1 , α1τ
C
1
}
= α1τ
B
1 .
Similarly, we have α2τ
B
2 ≤ α2τC2 .
3.5.4 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof of Proposition 3.4.
Case 1: α2 ≤ α1τB1 (or α1 ≤ α2τB2 )
In Bertrand as well as in Cournot competition intermediary 2 is excluded from
the input market. As the input demand of the intermediary is identical for both
types of competition, the input price is identical also.
Case 2: α1τ
B
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1τC1 (or α2τB2 ≤ α1 ≤ α2τC2 )
In Bertrand competition both intermediaries purchase inputs, while in Cournot
competition only intermediary 1 procures on the input market. We have
cC − cB = α1
2λ1
− (2− γ
2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
=
(λ2α1 − λ1α2) [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]
2λ1 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
. (3.57)
Therefore, cC−cB ≥ 0 as α2 ≤ α1τC1 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 and per assumption min
{
λ1
λ2
, λ2
λ1
}
>
γ
2−γ2 .
Case 3: α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 (or α2τC2 ≤ α1 ≤ α2 λ1λ2 )
Both intermediaries purchase inputs on the input market in Bertrand as well as
in Cournot competition. We have
cC − cB
=
2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
4 [(λ21 + λ
2
2)− γλ1λ2]
− (2− γ
2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
=
γ3 (λ1 − λ2) (λ1 + λ2) (λ1α2 − λ2α1)
4 (λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2) ((2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2)
. (3.58)
Therefore, cC − cB ≥ 0 if and only if γ3 (λ1 − λ2) (λ1α2 − λ2α1) ≥ 0.
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3.5.5 Proof of Proposition 3.5
Proof of Proposition 3.5. For λ1 = λ2 and α1 = α2 we have
pCi − pBi =
(3 + γ)αi
2 (2 + γ)
− (3− 2γ)αi
2 (2− γ) =
γ2αi
2 (4− γ2) , (3.59)
qCi − qBi =
αi
2 (2 + γ)
− αi
2 (2− γ) (1 + γ) = −
γ2αi
2 (4− γ2) (1 + γ) , (3.60)
piCi − piBi =
α2i
4 (2 + γ)2
− (1− γ)α
2
i
4 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ) =
γ3α2i
2 (4− γ2)2 (1 + γ) . (3.61)
Thus, pCi ≥ pBi and qCi ≤ qBi . Moreover, piCi ≥ piBi for γ ≥ 0 and piCi ≤ piBi for γ ≤ 0 for
i = 1, 2.
3.5.6 Proof of Proposition 3.6
Proof of Proposition 3.6. For this proof consider α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 (or α2τC2 ≤ α1 ≤
α2
λ1
λ2
) and λ1 = λ2.
(i) We have
pCi − pBi =
γ2 (3αi − α3−i)
4 (4− γ2) . (3.62)
Thus, for
(α1, α2, λ1, λ2, γ) =
(
4, 1, 1, 1,−1
2
)
it can easily be verified that Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 as well as α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1
hold and we have
pC2 =
89
60
<
3
2
= pB2 .
(ii) We have
qCi − qBi = −
γ2 [(3 + γ)αi − (1 + 3γ)α3−i]
4 (4− γ2) (1− γ2) . (3.63)
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Thus, it can easily be verified for
(α1, α2, λ1, λ2, γ) =
(
3
2
, 1, 1, 1,
1
2
)
that Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 as well as α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 hold and we have
qC2 =
1
12
>
7
90
= qB2 .
(iii) We have
piCi
(
pC1 , p
C
2 , c
C , α1, α2
)− piBi (pB1 , pB2 , cB, α1, α2)
=
γ3
[
4αiα3−i (1− γ)− (αi − α3−i)2 (3 + 5γ)
]
8 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2) . (3.64)
Thus, for
(α1, α2, λ1, λ2, γ) =
(
3
2
, 1, 1, 1,
3
4
)
it can easily be verified that Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 as well as α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1
hold and we have
piC1
(
pC1 , p
C
2 , c
C ,
3
2
, 1
)
=
2209
12100
<
625
3388
= piB1
(
pB1 , p
B
2 , c
B,
3
2
, 1
)
,
piC2
(
pC1 , p
C
2 , c
C ,
3
2
, 1
)
=
9
12100
<
9
3388
= piB2
(
pB1 , p
B
2 , c
B,
3
2
, 1
)
.
3.5.7 Proof of Proposition 3.7
Proof of Proposition 3.7. We consider the different cases from the previous proposi-
tions separately and show that the intermediaries’ profit functions are convex in own
qualities.
Case 1: α2 ≤ α1τB1 (or α1 ≤ α2τB2 )
We obtain
piC1 (α1, α2) = pi
B
1 (α1, α2) =
α21
16
.
Chapter 3. Simultaneous Competition of Intermediaries 66
Thus, for all α1 ∈ [α1, α1] we have
∂2piC1 (α1, α2)
∂α21
=
∂2piC1 (α1, α
2
2)
∂α21
=
2
16
> 0.
Case 2: α1τ
B
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1τC1 (or α2τB2 ≤ α1 ≤ α2τC2 )
We already computed the profit for Cournot competition in Case 1, the result
for Bertrand competition is shown in Case 3.
Case 3: α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 (or α2τC2 ≤ α1 ≤ α2 λ1λ2 )
First observe that for Cournot as well as for Bertrand competition the profit of
intermediary i is quadratic in αi for i = 1, 2. Consider intermediary i. In the
case of Cournot competition we obtain the following second derivative of the
profit function using Assumption 3.1
∂2piCi (αi, α3−i)
∂α2i
=
∂2
[(
pCi (αi, α3−i)− λicC (αi, α3−i)
)
qCi (αi, α3−i)
]
∂α2i
= 2
(
∂pCi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
− λi∂c
C (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
)
∂qCi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
= 2
(
∂qCi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
)2
= 2
(
2
(4− γ2) −
(2λi − γλ3−i)2
(4− γ2) 4 (λ2i + λ23−i − γλiλ3−i)
)2
=
(
(4− γ2)λ23−i + 4
(
λ2i + λ
2
3−i − γλiλ3−i
))2
8 (4− γ2)2 (λ2i + λ23−i − γλiλ3−i)2 > 0
for all αi ∈ [αi, αi] for i = 1, 2. Similarly, we obtain for Bertrand competition
with γ ∈ (−1, 1) using Assumption 3.2
∂2piBi (αi, α3−i)
∂α2i
=
∂2
[(
pBi (αi, α3−i)− λicB (αi, α3−i)
)
qBi (αi, α3−i)
]
∂α2i
= 2
(
∂pBi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
− λi∂c
B (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
)
∂qBi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
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=
(
(2− γ2) 2 [(2− γ2) (λ2i + λ23−i)− 2γλiλ3−i]− ((2− γ2)λi − γλ3−i)2)2
(4− γ2)2 (1− γ2) 2 [(2− γ2) (λ2i + λ23−i)− 2γλiλ3−i]2
=
(
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)λ23−i + (2− γ2)
(
(2− γ2) (λ2i + λ23−i)− 2γλiλ3−i))2
2 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2) ((2− γ2) (λ2i + λ23−i)− 2γλiλ3−i)2 > 0
for all αi ∈ [αi, αi] for i = 1, 2. Hence, for Cournot as well as for Bertrand com-
petition any zero of the first-order condition is a minimum which is independent
of the other intermediary’s investment choice. Thus, the candidates for optimal
investment choices are at the corner points of the according interval.
3.5.8 Proof of Proposition 3.8
For Cournot competition, the payoffs of the non-cooperative game are
piC1 (α, α) = pi
C
2 (α, α) =
α2
4 (2 + γ)2
, (3.65)
piC1 (α, α) =

α2
16
for α ≤ α (√2 + γ − 1),
[α(6+γ)−α(2+3γ)]2
16(4−γ2)2 for α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α, (3.66)
piC2 (α, α) =
0 for α ≤ α
(√
2 + γ − 1),
[α(6+γ)−α(2+3γ)]2
16(4−γ2)2 for α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α, (3.67)
piC1 (α, α) =
0 for α ≤ α
(√
2 + γ − 1),
[α(6+γ)−α(2+3γ)]2
16(4−γ2)2 for α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α, (3.68)
piC2 (α, α) =

α2
16
for α ≤ α (√2 + γ − 1),
[α(6+γ)−α(2+3γ)]2
16(4−γ2)2 for α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α, (3.69)
piC1 (α, α) = pi
C
2 (α, α) =
α2
4 (2 + γ)2
, (3.70)
where the upper and lower bound for the investment costs are given by
κC =

α2
4(2+γ)2
for α ≤ α (√2 + γ − 1),
(6+γ)[α−α][α(2−5γ)+α(6+γ)]
16(4−γ2)2 for α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α, (3.71)
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κC =

[α(2+γ)−2α][α(2+γ)+2α]
16(2+γ)2
for α ≤ α (√2 + γ − 1),
(6+γ)[α−α][α(6+γ)+α(2−5γ)]
16(4−γ2)2 for α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α. (3.72)
Proof of Proposition 3.8.
(i) Consider α ≤ α (√2 + γ − 1). If α2γ (4 + γ)− 4α2 < 0, then
4α2 > [α (2 + γ)− 2α] [α (2 + γ) + 2α] ,
and hence, κC > κC . The zeros of α2γ (4 + γ)− 4α2 are
γ ∈
{
2
√
α (α + α)− 2α
α
,−2
√
α (α + α) + 2α
α
}
=
{
2
(√
1 +
α
α
− 1
)
,−2
(√
1 +
α
α
+ 1
)}
.
(ii) Consider α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α. If γ < −2
3
, then
α(2− 5γ) + α(6 + γ) > α(6 + γ) + α(2− 5γ),
and hence, κC > κC .
3.5.9 Proof of Proposition 3.9
The payoffs of the non-cooperative game for Bertrand competition are
piB1 (α, α) = pi
B
2 (α, α) =
α2 (1− γ)
4 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ) , (3.73)
piB1 (α, α) =

α2
16
for α ≤ α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
,
[α(6+γ−3γ2)−α(2+3γ−γ2)]2
16(4−γ2)2(1−γ2) for α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
≤ α,
(3.74)
piB2 (α, α) =
0 for α ≤ α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
,
[α(6+γ−3γ2)−α(2+3γ−γ2)]2
16(4−γ2)2(1−γ2) for α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
≤ α,
(3.75)
piB1 (α, α) =
0 for α ≤ α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
,
[α(6+γ−3γ2)−α(2+3γ−γ2)]2
16(4−γ2)2(1−γ2) for α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
≤ α,
(3.76)
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piB2 (α, α) =

α2
16
for α ≤ α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
,
[α(6+γ−3γ2)−α(2+3γ−γ2)]2
16(4−γ2)2(1−γ2) for α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
≤ α,
(3.77)
piB1 (α, α) = pi
C
2 (α, α) =
α2 (1− γ)
4 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ) . (3.78)
Moreover the upper and lower bounds for the investment costs are given by
κB =

α2(1−γ)
4(2−γ)2(1+γ) for α ≤ α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
,
(6+γ−3γ2)[α−α][α(2−5γ−γ2)+α(6+γ−3γ2)]
16(4−γ2)2(1−γ2) for α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
≤ α,
(3.79)
κB =

α2(2−γ)2(1+γ)−4α2(1−γ)
16(2−γ)2(1+γ) for α ≤ α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
,
(6+γ−3γ2)[α−α][α(6+γ−3γ2)+α(2−5γ−γ2)]
16(4−γ2)2(1−γ2) for α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
≤ α.
(3.80)
Proof of Proposition 3.9.
(i) Consider α ≤ α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
. If α2γ (4− 3γ + γ2)−4α2 (1− γ) < 0, then
4α2 (1− γ) > α2 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)− 4α2 (1− γ) ,
and hence, κB > κB. Note that α2γ (4− 3γ + γ2) − 4α2 (1− γ) is increasing in
γ for γ ∈ [0, 1], which can be seen as follows
∂ (α2γ (4− 3γ + γ2)− 4α2 (1− γ))
∂γ
= α2
(
4− 6γ + 3γ2)+ 4α2
= α2
(
3 (1− γ)2 + 1)+ 4α2 > 0,
and decreasing in the multiplier ξ, if we write α = ξα with ξ ∈ (0, 1], which is
∂ (α2γ (4− 3γ + γ2)− 4ξ2α2 (1− γ))
∂γ
= −8ξα2 (1− γ) < 0 for γ ∈ [0, 1).
These two observations imply that the zero in γ of α2γ (4− 3γ + γ2)−4α2 (1− γ)
is shifted in the direction of the origin if the difference between α and α is
increased. Thus, we need to look at α = α to find an upper bound γ for which
asymmetric Nash equilibria do not exist. This means we need to find the zeros
of
4− 8γ + 3γ2 − γ3.
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The only real zero is at
γ =
(
2
√
2
√
19− 3√3) 23 +√3 (2√2√19− 3√3) 13 − 5
√
3
(
2
√
2
√
19− 3√3) 13 ≈ 0.6117.
(ii) Consider α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
≤ α. If γ < −
√
17−3
2
≈ −0.56, then
α
(
2− 5γ − γ2)+ α (6 + γ − 3γ2) > α (6 + γ − 3γ2)+ α (2− 5γ − γ2) ,
and hence, κB > κB.
3.5.10 Proof of Proposition 3.10
Proof of Proposition 3.10. We have
κC − κB
=

γ3α2
2(4−γ2)2(1+γ) for α ≤ α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
,
8γ3(1−γ)α2+[α(6+γ−3γ2)−α(2+3γ−γ2)]2
16(4−γ2)2(1−γ2) for α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
≤ α ≤ α (√2 + γ − 1),
γ3[α−α][α(7+γ)−α(3+5γ)]
8(4−γ2)2(1−γ2) for α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α,
and
κC − κB
=

− γ3α2
2(4−γ2)2(1+γ) for α ≤ α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
,
α2
16
− 8γ
3(1−γ)α2+[α(6+γ−3γ2)−α(2+3γ−γ2)]2
16(4−γ2)2(1−γ2) for α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
≤ α ≤ α (√2 + γ − 1),
−γ3[α−α][α(3+5γ)−α(7+γ)]
8(4−γ2)2(1−γ2) for α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α.
From these expressions for κC−κB and κC−κB we immediately derive the statements
of Proposition 3.10.
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For the special case of γ = 0 the lower and upper bounds of investment are given
by
κC/B =
α
2
16
for α ≤ α (√2− 1),
3[α−α][3α+α]
64
for α
(√
2− 1) ≤ α, (3.81)
κC/B =

[α−α][α+α]
16
for α ≤ α (√2− 1),
3[α−α][α+3α]
64
for α
(√
2− 1) ≤ α. (3.82)
Hence, the expressions from the proof of Proposition 3.10 simplify to
κC/B − κC/B =
−
[α−α][5α−α]
64
for α ≤ α (√2− 1),
[α−3α]2
64
for α
(√
2− 1) ≤ α. (3.83)
3.6 Appendix B: Competing Input Suppliers
So far the input market was assumed to be monopolistic. In this section we relax this
assumption and analyze an input market with m > 1 competing input suppliers. The
total input demands of the intermediaries were determined in Eq. (3.9) for Cournot
competition and in Eq. (3.18) for Bertrand competition. Let Q denote the total input
demand, then in both cases the total input demand is of the form
Q (c) = ψ − ϑc with ψ, ϑ > 0. (3.84)
This implies that the inverse demand function for the input market is
c (Q) =
ψ −Q
ϑ
. (3.85)
We suppose that the input suppliers deliver a homogenous product and compete by
choosing quantities.1 The total quantity provided on the input market is the sum of
individual quantities of all input suppliers. This is
Q =
m∑
r=1
Qr. (3.86)
1Note that price competition for homogeneous goods implies pricing at marginal costs and thus,
with the assumption that marginal costs are zero, the input price is zero. We therefore analyze
quantity competition between the intermediaries.
Chapter 3. Simultaneous Competition of Intermediaries 72
Assuming zero marginal costs, each input supplier ` chooses his production quantity
Q` to maximize (
ψ −∑mr=1Qr
ϑ
)
Q`. (3.87)
The first-order condition of input supplier ` is
ψ −∑mr 6=`Qr − 2Q`
ϑ
= 0. (3.88)
As the input suppliers are symmetric, we look for the symmetric Nash equilibrium
with Q` = Qr for 1 ≤ r, ` ≤ m. Thus, the first-order condition becomes
ψ − (m+ 1)Q`
ϑ
= 0 (3.89)
and therefore,
Q` =
ψ
m+ 1
and c (Q) =
ψ −mQ`
ϑ
=
ψ
(m+ 1)ϑ
with a profit of
c (Q)Q` =
ψ2
(m+ 1)2 ϑ
.
Hence, we just have to insert the according expressions for ψ and ϑ from Eq. (3.9)
and (3.18) to obtain the input prices for an input market with m input suppliers. The
input prices for selling to both intermediaries are
cC =
2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
2 (m+ 1) [λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2]
, (3.90)
cB =
(2− γ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
(m+ 1) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
, (3.91)
and if α1
α2
> λ1
λ2
, for selling to intermediary 1 the input prices are
cC = max
{
2α2 − γα1
2λ2 − γλ1 ,
α1
(m+ 1)λ1
}
, (3.92)
cB = max
{
(2− γ2)α2 − γα1
(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1 ,
α1
(m+ 1)λ1
}
. (3.93)
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These input prices indicate that introducing competition on the input market requires
additional comparisons of the input suppliers’ profits beyond those considered in the
proof of Proposition 3.1 (step 2.1) and 3.2 (step 2.1). The reason is that the importance
of the corner solution can no longer be denied when selling to just one intermediary,
given the number of input suppliers grows.
Mathematically, if we assume that the profit of the corner solution is always less
than or equal to the profit of the interior solution for selling to just one intermediary,
then comparing these profits and rearranging, we have for Cournot competition the
condition
m
(m+ 1)2
≥ 2λ1 (2α2 − γα1) (α1λ2 − α2λ1)
α21 (2λ2 − γλ1)2
, (3.94)
and for Bertrand competition
m
(m+ 1)2
≥ λ1 (2− γ
2) ((2− γ2)α2 − γα1) (α1λ2 − α2λ1)
α21 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)2
. (3.95)
However, as limm→∞ m(m+1)2 = 0, this is not always possible. This implies that there
exists an m such that in a symmetric situation the input suppliers have to charge the
price for the corner solution in order to sell to just one intermediary. Thus, including
competition on the input market may influence the decisions on the input market and
hence, impact our results. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of the relation between
the number of suppliers and the optimal decisions on the input market is left for future
research.
3.7 Appendix C: Computations
Computation of Equation 3.6
By using the best reply functions of both intermediaries we compute intermediary i’s
Nash equilibrium quantity qCi , which is given by
qCi =

2αi−γα3−i−(2λi−γλ3−i)c
(4−γ2) if c < min
{
2αi−γα3−i
2λi−γλ3−i ,
2α3−i−γαi
2λ3−i−γλi
}
,
αi−λic
2
if 2α3−i−γαi
2λ3−i−γλi ≤ c < αiλi ,
0 otherwise.
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The equilibrium quantity qCi for a sufficiently low input price with c < min{2αi−γα3−i2λi−γλ3−i ,
2α3−i−γαi
2λ3−i−γλi }
is determined as follows:
qCi =
αi − γ
(
α3−i−γqCi −λ3−ic
2
)
− λic
2
⇔ qCi =
2αi − γ
(
α3−i − γqCi − λ3−ic
)− 2λic
4
⇔ qCi −
γ2qCi
4
=
2αi − γα3−i + γλ3−ic− 2λic
4
⇔ qCi
(
1− γ
2
4
)
=
2αi − γα3−i + γλ3−ic− 2λic
4
⇔ qCi
(
4− γ2
4
)
=
2αi − γα3−i + γλ3−ic− 2λic
4
⇔ qCi =
2αi − γα3−i + γλ3−ic− 2λic
4− γ2
⇔ qCi =
2αi − γα3−i − (2λi − γλ3−i) c
(4− γ2) .
Computations of Equation 3.7
The according equilibrium price pCi is
pCi =

qCi + λic if c < min
{
2αi−γα3−i
2λi−γλ3−i ,
2α3−i−γαi
2λ3−i−γλi
}
,
αi+λic
2
if 2α3−i−γαi
2λ3−i−γλi ≤ c < αiλi ,
0 otherwise.
The equilibrium price for a sufficiently low input price is determined as follows:
pCi = pi(q
C
1 , q
C
2 )
= αi − 2αi − γα3−i − (2λi − γλ3−i) c
(2− γ)(2 + γ) − γ
2α3−i − γαi − (2λ3−i − γλi) c
(2− γ)(2 + γ)
= αi − 2αi − γα3−i − (2λi − γλ3−i) c+ 2γα3−i − γ
2αi − (2γλ3−i − γ2λi) c
(2− γ)(2 + γ)
= αi − (2− γ
2)αi + γα3−i − ((2− γ2)λi + γλ3−i) c
(2− γ)(2 + γ)
=
(4− γ2)αi − (2− γ2)αi − γα3−i + ((2− γ2)λi + γλ3−i) c
(2− γ)(2 + γ)
=
2αi − γα3−i − ((γ2 − 2)λi − γλ3−i) c
(2− γ)(2 + γ)
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=
2αi − γα3−i − (2λi − γλ3−i) c− (γ2 − 4)λic
(2− γ)(2 + γ)
=
2αi − γα3−i − (2λi − γλ3−i) c+ (4− γ2)λic
(2− γ)(2 + γ)
=
2αi − γα3−i − (2λi − γλ3−i) c
(2− γ)(2 + γ) + λic
= qCi + λic.
Computations of Assumption 3.1
Consider the equilibrium quantity qCi with c < min{2αi−γα3−i2λi−γλ3−i ,
2α3−i−γαi
2λ3−i−γλi }. For the
Cournot equilibrium quantity qCi to be non-decreasing in “weighted” qualities we de-
mand
2αi − γα3−i > 0
2αi > γα3−i
αi
α3−i
>
γ
2
.
For qCi to be non-increasing in the input price c we need
2λi − γλ3−i > 0
2λi > γλ3−i
λi
λ3−i
>
γ
2
.
Computations of Equation 3.9
Taking the intermediaries’ equilibrium quantities as given, the total market demand
on the input market is qCI (c) = λ1q
C
1 + λ2q
C
2 and given by
qCI (c) =

2(λ1α1+λ2α2)−γ(λ1α2+λ2α1)−2(λ21+λ22−γλ1λ2)c
(4−γ2) if c < min
{
2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ,
2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1
}
,
λ1(α1−λ1c)
2
if 2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 ≤ c < α1λ1 ,
λ2(α2−λ2c)
2
if 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ≤ c < α2λ2 ,
0 otherwise.
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The total market demand for a sufficiently small input price c < min{2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ,
2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 }
is determined as follows:
λ1
(
2α1 − γα2 − (2λ1 − γλ2) c
(4− γ2)
)
+ λ2
(
2α2 − γα1 − (2λ2 − γλ1) c
(4− γ2)
)
⇔ λ1 (2α1 − γα2 − (2λ1 − γλ2) c) + λ2 (2α2 − γα1 − (2λ2 − γλ1) c)
(4− γ2)
⇔ 2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)− 2 (λ
2
1 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2) c
(4− γ2) .
Computations of Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof of Proposition 3.1. The proof proceeds in two steps. In a first step we deter-
mine the prices the input supplier charges. In doing so we distinguish different cases
depending on the number of intermediaries demanding positive quantities. Afterwards
the according profits are compared in step two.
Step 1 (Input Prices and Profits)
Case 1: The input price is chosen such that both intermediaries produce strictly
positive quantities. Therefore, the following must hold:
c < min
{
2α1 − γα2
2λ1 − γλ2 ,
2α2 − γα1
2λ2 − γλ1
}
.
Maximizing the profit of the input supplier qCI (c) c yields an input price
cC =
2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
4 [λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2]
.
This can be seen as follows:
∂
[
2(λ1α1+λ2α2)−γ(λ1α2+λ2α1)−2(λ21+λ22−γλ1λ2)c
(4−γ2) c
]
∂c
!
= 0
⇔ 2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)− 4 (λ
2
1 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2) cC
(4− γ2)
!
= 0
⇔ 2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
(4− γ2) =
4 (λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2) cS
(4− γ2)
⇔ 2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
4 (λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2)
= cC
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and
∂2
[
2(λ1α1+λ2α2)−γ(λ1α2+λ2α1)−2(λ21+λ22−γλ1λ2)c
(4−γ2) c
]
∂c2
=
−4 (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2)
(4− γ2) ≤ 0.
Note that for this input price both intermediaries indeed purchase positive quan-
tities. Suppose α1
α2
> λ1
λ2
, then 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 >
2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 . Using min
{
λ1
λ2
, λ2
λ1
}
> γ
2
and
min
{
α1
α2
, α2
α1
}
> γ
2
we have
0 <
(
4− γ2)(α1
α2
− λ1
λ2
)
⇔ 2α2 − γα1
2α1 − γα2 <
2λ2 − γλ1
2λ1 − γλ2 ,
which can be seen as follows:
2α2 − γα1
2α1 − γα2 <
2λ2 − γλ1
2λ1 − γλ2
⇔ (2α2 − γα1) (2λ1 − γλ2) < (2λ2 − γλ1) (2α1 − γα2)
⇔ 4α2λ1 − 2γα2λ2 − 2γα1λ1 + γ2α1λ2 < 4α1λ2 − 2γα2λ2 − 2γα1λ1 + γ2α2λ1
⇔ 4α2λ1 + γ2α1λ2 < 4α1λ2 + γ2α2λ1
⇔ 0 < (4− γ2) (α1λ2 − α2λ1)
⇔ 0 < (4− γ2)(α1
α2
− λ1
λ2
)
,
and thus,
2
[
λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2
]
= λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
> λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) λ2 (2α2 − γα1)
λ1 (2α1 − γα2) .
By using
4
[
λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2
]
> 2
[
λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2
]
for λ1, λ2 > 0
this implies that
4
[
λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2
]
> λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) λ2 (2α2 − γα1)
λ1 (2α1 − γα2) .
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Rearranging yields
2α1 − γα2
2λ1 − γλ2 >
2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
4 [λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2]
showing that the input price cC is indeed sufficiently small to sell to both inter-
mediaries. Alternatively, this can be seen as follows:
We have
cC <
2α1 − γα2
2λ1 − γλ2
⇔ 2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
4 [λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2]
<
2α1 − γα2
2λ1 − γλ2
⇔ λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (2α2 − γα1)
4 [λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2]
<
λ1 (2α1 − γα2)
λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
⇔ λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) λ2 (2α2 − γα1)
λ1 (2α1 − γα2) < 4
[
λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2
]
and, therefore, using 2α2−γα1
2α1−γα2 <
2λ2−γλ1
2λ1−γλ2 it suffices to show
λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) < 4
[
λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2
]
⇔ λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1) < 4
[
λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2
]
⇔ 2 [λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2] < 4 [λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2] ,
which is always true for λ1, λ2 > 0. The profit of the input supplier is
qCI (c
C) cC =
[2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2
8 (4− γ2) [λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2]
.
Case 2: The input price is chosen such that intermediary 1 produces a strictly positive
quantity while intermediary 2 produces zero. Thus, we require
2α2 − γα1
2λ2 − γλ1 ≤ c <
α1
λ1
,
which implies α1
α2
> λ1
λ2
. Maximizing the profit of the input supplier qCI (c) c and
taking a sufficiently high input price into account yields an input price
cC = max
{
2α2 − γα1
2λ2 − γλ1 ,
α1
2λ1
}
.
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This can be seen as follows:
∂
[
λi(αi−λic)
2
c
]
∂c
!
= 0
⇔ λiαi − 2λ
2
i c
2
!
= 0
⇔ λiαi = 2λ2i c
⇔ αi
2λi
= c.
Note that by definition this input price is indeed too high for intermediary 2 to
purchase positive quantities. The analogous argument holds if intermediary 2
produces a strictly positive quantity while intermediary 1 produces zero. The
profit of the input supplier is
qCI (c
C) cC =

α21
8
if 2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 ≤ α12λ1 ,
λ1(2α2−γα1)(α1λ2−α2λ1)
(2λ2−γλ1)2 if
2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 ≥ α12λ1 .
Suppose 2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 ≥ α12λ1 , then cC =
2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 ,
qCI (c
C) =
λ1(α1 − λ1cC)
2
=
λ1(α1 − λ1 2α2−γα12λ2−γλ1 )
2
=
λ1(
α1(2λ2−γλ1)−λ1(2α2−γα1)
2λ2−γλ1 )
2
=
λ1(α1(2λ2 − γλ1)− λ1(2α2 − γα1))
2(2λ2 − γλ1) ,
and
qCI (c
C)cC =
λ1(α1(2λ2 − γλ1)− λ1(2α2 − γα1))(2α2 − γα1)
2(2λ2 − γλ1)2
=
λ1((2α1α2 − γα21)(2λ2 − γλ1)− (2λ1α2 − γλ1α1)(2α2 − γα1))
2(2λ2 − γλ1)2
=
λ1(4λ2α1α2 − 2γλ1α1α2 − 2γλ2α21 + γ2λ1α21 − 4λ1α22
2(2(2λ2 − γλ1))2
+
2γλ1α1α2 + 2γλ1α1α2 − γ2λ1α21)
2(2λ2 − γλ1)2
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=
λ1(2λ2α1α2 − γλ2α21 − 2λ1α22 + γλ1α1α2)
(2λ2 − γλ1)2
=
λ1(λ2α1(2α2 − γα1)− λ1α2(2α2 − γα1))
(2λ2 − γλ1)2
=
λ1((2α2 − γα1)(λ2α1 − λ1α2))
(2λ2 − γλ1)2 .
Note that if 2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 =
α1
2λ1
, then
2α2 − γα1
2λ2 − γλ1 =
α1
2λ1
⇔ 2λ1 (2α2 − γα1) = α1 (2λ2 − γλ1)
⇔ 4α2λ1 − 2γα1λ1 = 2α1λ2 − γα1λ1
⇔ 4α2λ1 − 2γα1λ1 − 2α1λ2 + γα1λ1 = 0
⇔ 2 (α2λ1 − α1λ2) + λ1 (2α2 − γα1) = 0
⇔ λ1 (2α2 − γα1) = 2 (α1λ2 − α2λ1)
and thus,
qCI (c
C)cC =
λ1((2α2 − γα1)(λ2α1 − λ1α2))
(2λ2 − γλ1)2
= λ1
α1
2λ1
(λ2α1 − λ1α2)
(2λ2 − γλ1)
=
α1
2
2(λ2α1 − λ1α2)
2(2λ2 − γλ1)
=
α1
2
λ1 (2α2 − γα1)
2(2λ2 − γλ1)
=
α1
2
λ1
2
α1
2λ1
=
α21
8
.
Case 3: The input price is too high for at least one intermediary to purchase strictly
positive quantities.
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Summing up, given the input demand the monopolistic input supplier charges a
price of
cC =

2(λ1α1+λ2α2)−γ(λ1α2+λ2α1)
4[λ21+λ22−γλ1λ2]
for selling to both intermediaries,
max
{
2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 ,
α1
2λ1
} for selling only to intermediary 1
and 2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 <
α1
λ1
holds,
max
{
2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ,
α2
2λ2
} for selling only to intermediary 2
and 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 <
α2
λ2
holds,
and obtains a profit of
qCI (c
C) cC =

[2(λ1α1+λ2α2)−γ(λ1α2+λ2α1)]2
8(4−γ2)[λ21+λ22−γλ1λ2]
for selling to both intermediaries
α21
8
for selling only to intermediary 1
and 2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 ≤ α12λ1 < α1λ1 holds,
λ1(2α2−γα1)(α1λ2−α2λ1)
(2λ2−γλ1)2
for selling only to intermediary 1
and α1
2λ1
≤ 2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 <
α1
λ1
holds,
α22
8
for selling only to intermediary 2
and 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ≤ α22λ2 < α2λ2 holds,
λ2(2α1−γα2)(α2λ1−α1λ2)
(2λ1−γλ2)2
for selling only to intermediary 2
and α2
2λ2
≤ 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 <
α2
λ2
holds.
Step 2 (Comparing Profits)
An input price as suggested in Case 3 cannot be optimal. In this scenario the input
price is too high for the intermediaries to demand goods and the input supplier’s profit
is zero. In contrast, Case 1 as well as Case 2 yield positive profits. Therefore, we an-
alyze the input supplier’s profits for Cases 1 and 2. We compare the two monopoly
profits for selling to intermediary 1 with the duopoly profits for selling to both in-
termediaries. Thus, suppose α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 . The remaining part when only selling to
intermediary 2 follows analogously.
Step 2.1: We compare the two monopoly profits for selling to intermediary 1 and
obtain by observing
(α1 (2λ2 + γλ1)− 4λ1α2)2 ≥ 0
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that
α21
8
≥ λ1 (2α2 − γα1) (α1λ2 − α2λ1)
(2λ2 − γλ1)2
.
This can be seen as follows:
α21
8
≥ λ1 (2α2 − γα1) (α1λ2 − α2λ1)
(2λ2 − γλ1)2
⇔ α21 (2λ2 − γλ1)2 ≥ 8λ1 (2α2 − γα1) (α1λ2 − α2λ1)
⇔ α21
(
4λ22 − 4γλ1λ2 + γ2λ21
) ≥ 8λ1 (2α2α1λ2 − 2α22λ1 − γα21λ2 + γα1α2λ1)
⇔ α21
(
4λ22 − 4γλ1λ2 + γ2λ21
) ≥ 16α2α1λ2λ1 − 16α22λ21 − 8γα21λ1λ2 + 8γα1α2λ21
⇔ α21(4λ22 − 4γλ1λ2 + 8γλ1λ2 + γ2λ21) ≥ 16λ1λ2α1α2 − 16λ21α22 + 8γλ21α1α2
⇔ α21(4λ22 + 4γλ1λ2 + γ2λ21)− 16λ1λ2α1α2 + 16λ21α22 − 8γλ21α1α2 ≥ 0
⇔ α21 (2λ2 + γλ1)2 − 16α2α1λ2λ1 + 16α22λ21 − 8γα1α2λ21 ≥ 0
⇔ α21 (2λ2 + γλ1)2 − 16λ1α2α1λ2 − 8γλ21α1α2 + 16λ21α22 ≥ 0
⇔ α21 (2λ2 + γλ1)2 − 8λ1α2α1 (2λ2 + γλ1) + 16λ21α22 ≥ 0
⇔ (α1 (2λ2 + γλ1)− 4λ1α2)2 ≥ 0.
Step 2.2: We compare the duopoly profit with the monopoly profit for selling to in-
termediary 1. If the duopoly profit is greater than or equal to both monopoly
profits, then the input supplier decides to sell to both intermediaries. Therefore,
we obtain that if
α2 ≥ α1τC1
with
τC1 =
(√
(4− γ2) (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2)− (2λ1 − γλ2)
(2λ2 − γλ1)
)
,
then
α21
8
≤ [2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]
2
8 (4− γ2) [λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2]
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holds. This can be seen as follows:
(2(α1λ1 + α2λ2)− γ(α1λ2 + α2λ1))2
8 (4− γ2) (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2)
≥ α
2
1
8
⇔ (2(α1λ1 + α2λ2)− γ(α1λ2 + α2λ1))
2
(4− γ2) (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2)
≥ α21
⇔ (2(α1λ1 + α2λ2)− γ(α1λ2 + α2λ1))2 ≥ α21(
(
4− γ2) (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2))
⇔ (α1(2λ1 − γλ2) + α2(2λ2 − γλ1))2 ≥ α21
(
4− γ2) (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2)
⇔ α1(2λ1 − γλ2) + α2(2λ2 − γλ1) ≥ α1
√
(4− γ2) (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2)
⇔ α2 ≥ α1
(√
(4− γ2) (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2)− (2λ1 − γλ2)
(2λ2 − γλ1)
)
.
Thus, whenever condition (3.35) holds, we know that a profit-maximizing input
supplier prefers to sell in any case to both intermediaries. Thus, we know that
for
α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1
λ2
λ1
the input supplier prefers to set a price for which both intermediaries procure
inputs. Note that the following is always true:
τC1 ≤
λ2
λ1
.
This can be seen as follows:√
(4− γ2) (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2)− (2λ1 − γλ2)
(2λ2 − γλ1) ≤
λ2
λ1
⇔ λ1
√
(4− γ2) (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2)− λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) ≤ λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
⇔ λ1
√
(4− γ2) (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2) ≤ λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1) + λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
⇔ λ21
(
4− γ2) (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2) ≤ (λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1) + λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2))2
⇔ λ21
(
4− γ2) (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2) ≤ (2λ22 − γλ1λ2 + 2λ21 − γλ1λ2)2
⇔ λ21
(
4− γ2) (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2) ≤ 4 (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2)2
⇔ 0 ≤ 4 (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2)2 − λ21 (4− γ2) (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2)
⇔ 0 ≤ (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2) (4λ21 + 4λ22 − 4γλ1λ2 − λ21 (4− γ2))
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⇔ 0 ≤ (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2) (4λ22 − 4γλ1λ2 + λ21γ2)
⇔ 0 ≤ (λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2) (2λ2 − γλ1)2 .
Step 2.1 and Step 2.2 show that for 2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 ≤ α12λ1 the the claim of Proposition 3.1 holds.
Note that requiring 2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 ≤ α12λ1 is equivalent to choosing α2 ≤ α1
(
2λ2+γλ1
4λ1
)
.
Computations of Equation 3.12
Given both intermediaries compete, by using Eq. (3.2) and assuming γ ∈ (−1, 1) we
obtain the customer’s demand function
qi(p1, p2) =
αi − pi + γ (p3−i − α3−i)
(1− γ2)
for intermediary i ∈ {1, 2}. This can be seen as follows: we have qi = αi − γq3−i − pi
and q3−i = α3−i − γqi − p3−i. Therefore,
qi = αi − γ (α3−i − γqi − p3−i)− pi
⇔ qi = αi − γα3−i + γ2qi + γp3−i − pi
⇔ qi − γ2qi = αi − γα3−i + γp3−i − pi
⇔ qi
(
1− γ2) = αi − γα3−i + γp3−i − pi
⇔ qi = αi − γα3−i + γp3−i − pi
(1− γ2) .
Computations of Equation 3.14
By using Eq. (3.13) we compute intermediary i’s best reply function. As above, neg-
ative profits can be avoided by not producing anything
pi (p3−i) = max
{
αi − γ (α3−i − p3−i) + λic
2
, 0
}
.
This can be seen as follows:
∂piBi (pi, p3−i, c, αi, α3−i)
∂pi
!
= 0
⇔ 1
1− γ2 (αi − γα3−i + γp3−i − 2pi + λic)
!
= 0
⇔ αi − γα3−i + γp3−i − 2pi + λic = 0
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⇔ 2pi = αi − γα3−i + γp3−i + λic
⇔ pi = αi − γα3−i + γp3−i + λic
2
⇔ pi = αi − γ (α3−i − p3−i) + λic
2
.
Computations of Equation 3.15 and Equation 3.16
The Nash equilibrium price in Bertrand competition is given by
pBi =

(2−γ2)αi−γα3−i+(2λi+γλ3−i)c
(4−γ2) if c < min
{
(2−γ2)αi−γα3−i
(2−γ2)λi−γλ3−i ,
(2−γ2)α3−i−γαi
(2−γ2)λ3−i−γλi
}
,
αi+λic
2
if
(2−γ2)α3−i−γαi
(2−γ2)λ3−i−γλi ≤ c < αiλi ,
0 otherwise,
which can be seen as follows:
pBi =
αi − γα3−i + γ
(
α3−i−γαi+γpBi +λ3−ic
2
)
+ λic
2
⇔ pBi =
1
2
(
αi − γα3−i + 1
2
γ
(
α3−i − γαi + γpBi + λ3−ic
)
+ λic
)
⇔ 2pBi = αi − γα3−i +
1
2
γ
(
α3−i − γαi + γpBi + λ3−ic
)
+ λic
⇔ 2pBi −
1
2
γ2pBi = αi − γα3−i +
1
2
γ (α3−i − γαi + λ3−ic) + λic
⇔ pBi
(
2− 1
2
γ2
)
= αi − γα3−i + 1
2
γ (α3−i − γαi + λ3−ic) + λic
⇔ pBi =
αi − γα3−i + 12γ (α3−i − γαi + λ3−ic) + λic
2− 1
2
γ2
⇔ pBi =
αi − γα3−i + 12γα3−i − 12γ2αi + 12γλ3−ic+ λic
2− 1
2
γ2
⇔ pBi =
αi
(
1− 1
2
γ2
)− 1
2
γα3−i + 12γλ3−ic+ λic
2− 1
2
γ2
⇔ pBi =
αi (2− γ2)− γα3−i + γλ3−ic+ 2λic
4− γ2
⇔ pBi =
(2− γ2)αi − γα3−i + (2λi + γλ3−i)c
4− γ2
⇔ pBi =
(2− γ2)αi − γ (α3−i − λ3−ic) + 2λic
4− γ2 .
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The equilibrium quantity is denoted by
qBi =

pBi −λic
(1−γ2) if c < min
{
(2−γ2)αi−γα3−i
(2−γ2)λi−γλ3−i ,
(2−γ2)α3−i−γαi
(2−γ2)λ3−i−γλi
}
αi−λic
2
if
(2−γ2)α3−i−γαi
(2−γ2)λ3−i−γλi ≤ c < αiλi
0 otherwise.
This can be seen as follows: using
pBi =
αi (2− γ2)− γ (α3−i − λ3−ic) + 2λic
4− γ2
pB3−i =
α3−i (2− γ2)− γ (αi − λic) + 2λ3−ic
4− γ2
we have
qBi =
αi −
(
αi(2−γ2)−γ(α3−i−λ3−ic)+2λic
4−γ2
)
− γ
(
α3−i −
(
α3−i(2−γ2)−γ(αi−λic)+2λ3−ic
4−γ2
))
1− γ2
=
αi −
(
αi(2−γ2)−γ(α3−i−λ3−ic)+2λic−γα3−i(2−γ2)+γ2(αi−λic)−2γλ3−ic
4−γ2 + γα3−i
)
1− γ2
=
αi +
−αi(2−γ2)+γ(α3−i−λ3−ic)−2λic+γα3−i(2−γ2)−γ2(αi−λic)+2γλ3−ic
4−γ2 − γα3−i
1− γ2
=
(4− γ2)αi − αi (2− γ2) + γ (α3−i − λ3−ic)− 2λic+ γα3−i (2− γ2)
(1− γ2) (4− γ2)
+
−γ2 (αi − λic) + 2γλ3−ic− γ (4− γ2)α3−i
(1− γ2) (4− γ2)
=
(2− γ2) (αi − λic) + γ (α3−i − λ3−ic) + γα3−i (2− γ2)
(1− γ2) (4− γ2)
+
2γλ3−ic− γ (4− γ2)α3−i
(1− γ2) (4− γ2)
=
(2− γ2) (αi − λic) + γ (α3−i − λ3−ic)− 2γα3−i + 2γλ3−ic
(1− γ2) (4− γ2)
=
(2− γ2) (αi − λic)− γ (α3−i − λ3−ic)
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
=
(2− γ2)αi − γα3−i − ((2− γ2)λi − γλ3−i) c
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
=
(2− γ2)αi − γα3−i
(4− γ2) (1− γ2) −
((2− γ2)λi − γλ3−i) c
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
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+
(2λi + γλ3−i) c
(4− γ2) (1− γ2) −
(2λi + γλ3−i) c
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
=
(2− γ2)αi − γα3−i + (2λi + γλ3−i) c
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
− ((2− γ
2)λi − γλ3−i) c+ (2λi + γλ3−i) c
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
=
(2− γ2)αi − γα3−i + (2λi + γλ3−i) c
(4− γ2) (1− γ2) −
(4− γ2)λic
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
=
pBi
(1− γ2) −
λic
(1− γ2)
=
pBi − λic
(1− γ2) .
Computations of Equation 3.18
The total market demand on the input market is qBI (c) = λ1q
B
1 + λ2q
B
2 and given by
qBI (c) =

(2−γ2)(λ1α1+λ2α2)−γ(λ1α2+λ2α1)
(4−γ2)(1−γ2)
− [(2−γ
2)(λ21+λ22)−2γλ1λ2]c
(4−γ2)(1−γ2) if c < min
{
(2−γ2)α1−γα2
(2−γ2)λ1−γλ2 ,
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1
}
,
λ1(α1−λ1c)
2
if
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1 ≤ c < α1λ1 ,
λ2(α2−λ2c)
2
if
(2−γ2)α1−γα2
(2−γ2)λ1−γλ2 ≤ c < α2λ2 ,
0 otherwise.
The total market demand for a sufficiently small input price c < min{2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ,
2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 }
is determined as follows:
qBI (c) =λ1
(
(2− γ2)α1 − γα2 − ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2) c
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
)
+ λ2
(
(2− γ2)α2 − γα1 − ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1) c
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
)
⇔ (2− γ
2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
− [(2− γ
2) (λ21 + λ
2
2)− 2γλ1λ2] c
(4− γ2) (1− γ2) .
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Computations of Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof of Proposition 3.2. The proof proceeds in two steps. In a first step we deter-
mine the prices the input supplier charges. In doing so we distinguish different cases
depending on the number of intermediaries demanding positive quantities. Afterwards
the according profits are compared in step two.
Step 1 (Input Prices and Profits)
Case 1: The input price is chosen such that both intermediaries produce strictly
positive quantities. Therefore the following must hold:
c < min
{
(2− γ2)α1 − γα2
(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2 ,
(2− γ2)α2 − γα1
(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1
}
.
Maximizing the profit of the input supplier yields
cB =
(2− γ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
.
This can be seen as follows:
∂
[
(2−γ2)(λ1α1+λ2α2)−γ(λ1α2+λ2α1)−[(2−γ2)(λ21+λ22)−2γλ1λ2]c
(4−γ2)(1−γ2) c
]
∂c
!
= 0
⇔ (2− γ
2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
− 2 [(2− γ
2) (λ21 + λ
2
2)− 2γλ1λ2] c
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
!
= 0
⇔ (2− γ
2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
=
2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2] c
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
⇔ (2− γ
2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
= c
and
∂2
[
(2−γ2)(λ1α1+λ2α2)−γ(λ1α2+λ2α1)−[(2−γ2)(λ21+λ22)−2γλ1λ2]c
(4−γ2)(1−γ2) c
]
∂c2
=
−2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
(4− γ2) (1− γ2) ≤ 0.
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Note that for this input price both intermediaries indeed purchase positive quan-
tities. Suppose α1
α2
> λ1
λ2
, then
(2−γ2)α1−γα2
(2−γ2)λ1−γλ2 >
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1 . Using min
{
λ1
λ2
, λ2
λ1
}
>
γ
2−γ2 and min
{
α1
α2
, α2
α1
}
> γ
2−γ2 we have
0 <
(
2− γ2)2(α1
α2
− λ1
λ2
)
⇔ (2− γ
2)α2 − γα1
(2− γ2)α1 − γα2 <
(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1
(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2
which can be seen as follows:
(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1
(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2 >
(2− γ2)α2 − γα1
(2− γ2)α1 − γα2
⇔ ((2− γ2)α1 − γα2) ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)
>
(
(2− γ2)α2 − γα1
) (
(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2
)
⇔ (2α1 − γ2α1 − γα2) (2λ2 − γ2λ2 − γλ1)
>
(
2α2 − γ2α2 − γα1
) (
2λ1 − γ2λ1 − γλ2
)
⇔ 4λ2α1 − 2γ2λ2α1 − 2γλ1α1 − 2γ2λ2α1 + γ4λ2α1
+ γ3λ1α1 − 2γλ2α2 + γ3λ2α2 + γ2λ1α2
>4λ1α2 − 2γ2λ1α2 − 2γλ2α2 − 2γ2λ1α2 + γ4λ1α2
+ γ3λ2α2 − 2γλ1α1 + γ3λ1α1 + γ2λ1α2
⇔ 4λ2α1 − 4γ2λ2α1 + γ4λ2α1 + 4γ2λ1α2 − 4λ1α2 − γ4λ1α2 > 0
⇔ λ2α1
(
4− 4γ2 + γ4)− λ1α2 (4− 4γ2 − γ4) > 0
⇔ (4− 4γ2 + γ4) (λ2α1 − λ1α2) > 0
⇔ (2− γ2)2 (λ2α1 − λ1α2) > 0
⇔ (2− γ2)2(α1
α2
− λ1
λ2
)
> 0,
and thus,
(
2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2
= λ1
((
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)+ λ1 ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2) λ2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)
λ1 ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)
> λ1
((
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)+ λ1 ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2) λ2 ((2− γ2)α2 − γα1)
λ1 ((2− γ2)α1 − γα2) ,
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which implies when using
2
((
2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2) > (2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2 for λ1, λ2 > 0
that
2
((
2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2)
> λ1
((
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)+ λ1 ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2) λ2 ((2− γ2)α2 − γα1)
λ1 ((2− γ2)α1 − γα2) .
Rearranging yields
(2− γ2)α1 − γα2
(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2 >
(2− γ2)(λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ(λ1α2 + λ2α1)
2[(2− γ2)(λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
showing that the input price cB is indeed sufficiently small to sell to both inter-
mediaries. Alternatively, this can be seen as follows: we have
cB <
(2− γ2)α1 − γα2
(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2
⇔ (2− γ
2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
<
(2− γ2)α1 − γα2
(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2
⇔ 2λ1α1 + 2λ2α2 − γ
2λ1α1 − γ2λ2α2 − γλ1α2 − γλ2α1
2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
<
(2− γ2)α1 − γα2
(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2
⇔ λ1 ((2− γ
2)α1 − γα2) + λ2 ((2− γ2)α2 − γα1)
2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
<
λ1 ((2− γ2)α1 − γα2)
λ1 ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)
⇔ λ1
((
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)+ λ1 ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2) λ2 ((2− γ2)α2 − γα1)
λ1 ((2− γ2)α1 − γα2)
< 2
[(
2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
and therefore, using
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)α1−γα2 <
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1
(2−γ2)λ1−γλ2 it suffices to show
λ1
((
2− γ2)λ1 − λ2γ)+ λ1 ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2) λ2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)
λ1 ((2− γ2)λ1 − λ2γ)
< 2
[(
2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
⇔ λ1
((
2− γ2)λ1 − λ2γ)+ λ2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)
< 2
[(
2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
⇔ (2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2 < 2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
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which is always true for λ1, λ2 > 0. The profit of the input supplier is
qBI (c
B) cB =
[(2− γ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2
4 (1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
.
Case 2: The input price is chosen such that intermediary 1 produces a strictly positive
quantity while intermediary 2 produces zero. Thus, we require
(2− γ2)α2 − γα1
(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1 ≤ c <
α1
λ1
,
which implies α1
α2
> λ1
λ2
. Given a sufficiently high input price, maximizing the
profit of the input supplier yields
cB = max
{
(2− γ2)α2 − γα1
(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1 ,
α1
2λ1
}
.
This can be seen as follows:
∂
[
λi(αi−λic)
2
c
]
∂c
!
= 0
⇔ λiαi − 2λ
2
i c
2
!
= 0
⇔ λiαi = 2λ2i c
⇔ αi
2λi
= c.
Note that by definition this input price is indeed too high for intermediary 2 to
purchase positive quantities. The analogous argument holds if intermediary 2
produces a strictly positive quantity while intermediary 1 produces zero. The
profit of the input supplier is
qBI (c
B) cB =

α21
8
if
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1 ≤ α12λ1
λ1(2−γ2)[(2−γ2)α2−γα1](α1λ2−α2λ1)
2[(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1]2 if
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1 ≥ α12λ1 .
Suppose
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1 ≥ α12λ1 , then cB =
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1 ,
qBI
(
cB
)
= λ1
α1 − λ1cB
2
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= λ1
α1 − λ1 (2−γ
2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1
2
= λ1
α1 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)− (2− γ2)λ1α2 + γλ1α1
2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)
= λ1
λ2α1 (2− γ2)− γλ1α1 − λ1α2 (2− γ2) + γλ1α1
2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)
= λ1
(2− γ2) (λ2α1 − λ1α2)
2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)
and
qBI
(
cB
)
cB = λ1
(2− γ2) (λ2α1 − λ1α2)
2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)
(2− γ2)α2 − γα1
(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1
= λ1
(2− γ2) (λ2α1 − λ1α2) (2− γ2)α2 − (2− γ2) (λ2α1 − λ1α2) γα1
2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)2
= λ1
(2− γ2) [(λ2α1 − λ1α2) (2− γ2)α2 − (λ2α1 − λ1α2) γα1]
2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)2
= λ1
(2− γ2) [2λ2α1α2 − 2λ1α22 − γ2λ2α1α2 + γ2λ1α22 − γλ2α21 + γλ1α1α2]
2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)2
= λ1
(2− γ2) [α1λ2 (2α2 − γ2α2 − γα1)− α2λ1 (2α2 − γ2α2 − γα1)]
((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)2
= λ1
(2− γ2) [(λ2α1 − λ1α2) (2α2 − γ2α2 − γα21)]
2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)2
.
Note that if
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1 =
α1
2λ1
, then
(2− γ2)α2 − γα1
(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1 =
α1
2λ1
⇔ 2λ1
((
2− γ2)α2 − γα1) = α1 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)
⇔ 2 (2− γ2)α2λ1 − 2γα1λ1 = (2− γ2)α1λ2 − γα1λ1
⇔ 2 (2− γ2)α2λ1 − 2γα1λ1 − (2− γ2)α1λ2 + γα1λ1 = 0
⇔ (2− γ2) (α2λ1 − α1λ2) + λ1 ((2− γ2)α2 − γα1) = 0
⇔ λ1
((
2− γ2)α2 − γα1) = (2− γ2) (α1λ2 − α2λ1)
and thus,
qBI (c
B)cB =
λ1 (2− γ2) [(2− γ2)α2 − γα1] (α1λ2 − α2λ1)
2 [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]2
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= λ1
α1
2λ1
(2− γ2) (α1λ2 − α2λ1)
2 [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]
=
α1
2
(2− γ2) (α1λ2 − α2λ1)
2 [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]
=
α1
2
λ1 [(2− γ2)α2 − γα1]
2 [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]
=
α1
2
λ1
2
α1
2λ1
=
α21
8
.
Case 3: The input price is too high for at least one intermediary to purchase strictly
positive quantities.
Summing up, given the input demand the monopolistic input supplier charges a price
of
cB =

(2−γ2)(λ1α1+λ2α2)−γ(λ1α2+λ2α1)
2[(2−γ2)(λ21+λ22)−2γλ1λ2]
for selling to both intermediaries,
max
{
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1 ,
α1
2λ1
} for selling only to intermediary 1
and
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1 <
α1
λ1
holds,
max
{
(2−γ2)α1−γα2
(2−γ2)λ1−γλ2 ,
α2
2λ2
} for selling only to intermediary 2
and
(2−γ2)α1−γα2
(2−γ2)λ1−γλ2 <
α2
λ2
holds,
and obtains a profit of
qBI (c
B) cB =

[(2−γ2)(λ1α1+λ2α2)−γ(λ1α2+λ2α1)]2
4(1−γ2)(4−γ2)[(2−γ2)(λ21+λ22)−2γλ1λ2]
for selling to both intermediaries,
α21
8
for selling only to intermediary 1
and
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1 <
α1
λ1
holds,
λ1(2−γ2)[(2−γ2)α2−γα1](α1λ2−α2λ1)
2[(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1]2
for selling only to intermediary 1
and α1
2λ1
≤ (2−γ
2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1 <
α1
λ1
holds,
α22
8
for selling only to intermediary 2
and
(2−γ2)α1−γα2
(2−γ2)λ1−γλ2 ≤ α22λ2 < α2λ2 holds,
λ2(2−γ2)[(2−γ2)α1−γα2](α2λ1−α1λ2)
2[(2−γ2)λ1−γλ2]2
for selling only to intermediary 2
and α2
2λ2
≤ (2−γ
2)α1−γα2
(2−γ2)λ1−γλ2 <
α2
λ2
holds.
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Step 2 (Comparing Profits)
As in Cournot competition, it suffices to compare the profits of the input supplier for
Cases 1 and 2. We compare the two monopoly profits for selling to intermediary 1
with the duopoly profits for selling to both intermediaries. Thus, suppose α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 .
The remaining part when selling to intermediary 2 follows analogously.
Step 2.1: We compare the two monopoly profits for selling to intermediary 1. We
obtain by observing
[
α1
((
2− γ2)λ2 + γλ1)− 4 (2− γ2)α2λ1]2 ≥ 0
that
α21
8
≥ λ1 (2− γ
2) [(2− γ2)α2 − γα1] (α1λ2 − α2λ1)
2 [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]2
.
This can be seen as follows:
α21
8
≥ λ1 (2− γ
2) [(2− γ2)α2 − γα1] (α1λ2 − α2λ1)
2 [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]2
⇔ 2α21
[(
2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]2 ≥ 8λ1 (2− γ2) [(2− γ2)α2 − γα1] (α1λ2 − α2λ1)
⇔ 2α21
[(
2− γ2)2 λ22 − 2 (2− γ2)λ2γλ1 + γ2λ21]
≥ 8λ1
(
2− γ2) [(2− γ2)α2 − γα1] (α1λ2 − α2λ1)
⇔ 2α21
[(
2− γ2)2 λ22 − 2 (2− γ2)λ2γλ1 + γ2λ21]
≥ 8λ1
(
2− γ2) [(2− γ2)α2α1λ2 − (2− γ2)α22λ1 − γα21λ2 + γα1α2λ1]
⇔ 2α21
[(
2− γ2)2 λ22 − 2 (2− γ2)λ2γλ1 + γ2λ21]
≥ 8 (2− γ2)2 α2α1λ1λ2 − 8 (2− γ2)2 α22λ21 − 8γ (2− γ2)α21λ1λ2
+ 8γ
(
2− γ2)α1α2λ21
⇔ 2α21
[(
2− γ2)2 λ22 + 4γ (2− γ2)λ1λ2 + γ2λ21]
≥ 8 (2− γ2)2 α2α1λ1λ2 − 8 (2− γ2)2 α22λ21 + 8γ (2− γ2)α1α2λ21
⇔ α21
[(
2− γ2)λ2 + γλ1]2
≥ 4 (2− γ2)2 α2α1λ1λ2 − 4 (2− γ2)2 α22λ21 + 4γ (2− γ2)α1α2λ21
⇔ α21
[(
2− γ2)λ2 + γλ1]2
− 4 (2− γ2)2 α2α1λ1λ2 + 4 (2− γ2)2 α22λ21 − 4γ (2− γ2)α1α2λ21 ≥ 0
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⇔ α21
[(
2− γ2)λ2 + γλ1]2
+ 4
(
2− γ2)2 α22λ21 − 4 (2− γ2)α1α2λ1 ((2− γ2)λ2 + γλ1) ≥ 0
⇔ [α1 ((2− γ2)λ2 + γλ1)− 4 (2− γ2)α2λ1]2 ≥ 0.
Step 2.2: We compare the duopoly profit with the monopoly profit for selling to in-
termediary 1. If the duopoly profit is greater than or equal to both monopoly
profits, then the input supplier decides to sell to both intermediaries. Therefore,
we obtain that if
α2 ≥ α1τB1
with
τB1 =
(√
2 (1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]− 2 ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)
2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)
)
,
then
α21
8
≤ [(2− γ
2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2
4 (1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
holds. This can be seen as follows:
[(2− γ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2
4 (1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
≥ α
2
1
8
⇔ 2 [(2− γ
2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2
(1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
≥ α21
⇔ 2 [(2− γ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2
≥ α21
(
1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
⇔ 2 [α1 ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)+ α2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)]2
≥ α21
(
1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
⇔
√
2
[
α1
((
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)+ α2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)]
≥ α1
√
(1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
⇔ α2
√
2
((
2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)
≥ α1
√
(1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
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− α1
√
2
((
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)
⇔ α2
√
2
((
2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)
≥ α1
(√
(1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
−
√
2
((
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2) )
⇔ α2 ≥ α1
(√(1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]√
2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)
+
−√2 ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)√
2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)
)
⇔ α2 ≥ α1
(√2 (1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)
+
−2 ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)
2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)
)
.
Thus, whenever condition (3.47) is true, we know that a profit-maximizing input
supplier prefers to sell only to intermediary 1. Thus, we know that for
α1τ
B
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1
λ2
λ1
the input supplier prefers to set a price to sell to both intermediaries. Note that
the following is always true:
τB1 ≤
λ2
λ1
.
This can be seen as follows:√
2 (1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]− 2 ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)
2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1) ≤
λ2
λ1
⇔
√
(1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]−
√
2 ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)√
2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)
≤ λ2
λ1
⇔ λ1
√
(1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]− λ1
√
2
((
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)
≤ λ2
√
2
((
2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)
⇔ λ1
√
(1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
≤ λ2
√
2
((
2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)+ λ1√2 ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2)
⇔ λ21
(
1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
97 Chapter 3. Simultaneous Competition of Intermediaries
≤ 2 (λ2 ((2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1)+ λ1 ((2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2))2
⇔ λ21
(
1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
≤ 2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]2
⇔ 0 ≤ [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2] [2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
− λ21
(
1− γ2) (4− γ2) ]
⇔ 0 ≤ [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2] [2 (2− γ2)λ22 − 4γλ1λ2
+
[
2
(
2− γ2)− (1− γ2) (4− γ2)]λ21]
⇔ 0 ≤ [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2] [2 (2− γ2)λ22 − 4γλ1λ2 + γ2 (3− γ2)λ21]
⇔ 0 ≤ [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2] [2 (2− γ2)2 λ22 − 4 (2− γ2) γλ1λ2
+ γ2
(
2− γ2) (3− γ2)λ21]
⇔ 0 ≤ [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2] [2 (2− γ2)2 λ22 − 4 (2− γ2) γλ1λ2
+ 2γ2λ21 +
((
2− γ2) (3− γ2)− 2) γ2λ21]
⇔ 0 ≤ [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2] [2 [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]2
+
(
1− γ2) (4− γ2) γ2λ21].
Step 2.1 and Step 2.2 show that for
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1 ≤ α12λ1 the the claim of Propo-
sition 3.1 holds. Note that requiring
(2−γ2)α2−γα1
(2−γ2)λ2−γλ1 ≤ α12λ1 is equivalent to choosing
α2 ≤ α1
(
(2−γ2)λ2+γλ1
2(2−γ2)λ1
)
.
Computations of Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof of Proposition 3.3. The proof proceeds in two steps. First we compare the prof-
its of the input supplier in the case of intermediaries competing in quantities with the
setting in which intermediaries compete in prices.
Step 1 (Duopoly Profit of the Input Supplier)
Suppose the input supplier sells inputs to both intermediaries, which is
max
{
α1τ
B
1 , α1τ
C
1
} ≤ α2 ≤ α1λ2
λ1
.
We show that
qBI (c
B) cB ≥ qCI (cC) cC .
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The nominator of
qBI (c
B) cB − qCI (cC) cC
=
[(2− γ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2
4 (1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
− [2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]
2
8 (4− γ2) [λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2]
=
2 [(2− γ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2 [λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2]
8 (1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2] [λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2]
− (1− γ
2) [2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
8 (1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2] [λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2]
can be rewritten as
2
[(
2− γ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2 [λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2]
− (1− γ2) [2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
= γ2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [ [λ1 − γλ2] (α1 − α2)2
+ 2 (1− γ)α1α2 (λ1 + λ2)
]
+ γ2λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
[(
2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1] [ [λ2 − γλ1] (α1 − α2)2
+ 2 (1− γ)α1α2 (λ1 + λ2)
]
.
This can be seen as follows: comparing Cournot and Bertrand profits yields
[2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2
8(2− γ)(2 + γ) [λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2]
≤ [(2− γ
2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2
4 (1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
⇔ [2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]
2
2 [λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2]
≤ [(2− γ
2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2
(1− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
⇔ (1− γ2) [2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
≤ 2 [(2− γ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2 [λ21 + λ22 − γλ1λ2]
⇔ (1− γ2) [α1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + α2 (2λ2 − γλ1)]2 [λ1 [(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2]
+ λ2
[(
2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1] ]
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≤ [α1 [(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2]+ α2 [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]]2
[λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)]
⇔ (1− γ2) [λ1 [(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2]+ λ2 [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]][
α21 (2λ1 − γλ2)2 + 2α1α2 (2λ1 − γλ2) (2λ2 − γλ1) + α22 (2λ2 − γλ1)2
]
≤ [λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)][
α21
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2]2 + 2α1α2 [(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2][(
2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]+ α22 [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]2 ]
⇔ 0 ≤ [λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)][
α21
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2]2 + 2α1α2 [(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]
+ α22
[(
2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]2 ]
− (1− γ2) [λ1 [(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2]+ λ2 [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]][
α21 (2λ1 − γλ2)2 + 2α1α2 (2λ1 − γλ2) (2λ2 − γλ1) + α22 (2λ2 − γλ1)2
]
.
We look first at the coefficient of α21 and obtain
[λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)]
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2]2
− (1− γ2) [λ1 [(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2]+ λ2 [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]] (2λ1 − γλ2)2
= λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2]2 − (1− γ2)λ1 [(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] (2λ1 − γλ2)2
+ λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2]2 − (1− γ2)λ2 [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1] (2λ1 − γλ2)2
= λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [[(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2]− (1− γ2) (2λ1 − γλ2)]
+ λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [[(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2]− (1− γ2) (2λ2 − γλ1)]
= γ2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [λ1 − γλ2] + γ2λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [λ2 − γλ1] .
For the coefficient of α22 we have analogously
γ2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [λ1 − γλ2]
+ γ2λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [λ2 − γλ1] ,
and for the coefficient of 2α1α2 this is
[λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)]
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]
− (1− γ2) [λ1 [(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2]+ λ2 [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]] (2λ1 − γλ2) (2λ2 − γλ1)
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= λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]
− (1− γ2)λ1 [(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] (2λ1 − γλ2) (2λ2 − γλ1)
+ λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]
− (1− γ2)λ2 [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1] (2λ1 − γλ2) (2λ2 − γλ1)
= λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [[(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]− (1− γ2) (2λ2 − γλ1)]
+ λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
[(
2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1] [[(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2]− (1− γ2) (2λ1 − γλ2)]
= γ2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [λ2 − γλ1]
+ γ2λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
[(
2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1] [λ1 − γλ2] .
Hence,
α21
[
γ2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [λ1 − γλ2]
+ γ2λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [λ2 − γλ1] ]
+ 2α1α2
[
γ2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [λ2 − γλ1]
+ γ2λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
[(
2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1] [λ1 − γλ2] ]
+ α22
[
γ2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [λ1 − γλ2]
+ γ2λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [λ2 − γλ1] ]
= γ2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [α21 [λ1 − γλ2]
+ 2α1α2 [λ2 − γλ1] + α22 [λ1 − γλ2]
]
+ γ2λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
[(
2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1][
α21 [λ2 − γλ1] + 2α1α2 [λ1 − γλ2] + α22 [λ2 − γλ1]
]
= γ2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [ [λ1 − γλ2] (α1 − α2)2 + 2α1α2 [λ2 − γλ1]
+ 2α1α2 [λ1 − γλ2]
]
+ γ2λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
[(
2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1][
[λ2 − γλ1] (α1 − α2)2 + 2α1α2 [λ1 − γλ2] + 2α1α2 [λ2 − γλ1]
]
= γ2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2][
[λ1 − γλ2] (α1 − α2)2 + 2 (1− γ)α1α2 (λ1 + λ2)
]
+ γ2λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
[(
2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1][
[λ2 − γλ1] (α1 − α2)2 + 2 (1− γ)α1α2 (λ1 + λ2)
]
.
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Assumption 3.1 and 3.2, which is
min
{
λ1
λ2
,
λ2
λ1
}
>
γ
2
and min
{
λ1
λ2
,
λ2
λ1
}
>
γ
2− γ2 ,
implies for λ1 ≥ λ2 that
0 ≤ 2λ2 − γλ1 ≤ 2λ1 − γλ2,
0 ≤ (2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1 ≤ (2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2.
Thus, we obtain
γ2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
[(
2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] [[λ1 − γλ2] (α1 − α2)2 + 2 (1− γ)α1α2 (λ1 + λ2)]
+ γ2λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
[(
2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1] [ [λ2 − γλ1] (α1 − α2)2
+ 2 (1− γ)α1α2 (λ1 + λ2)
]
≥ γ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
[(
2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1][
λ1 [λ1 − γλ2] (α1 − α2)2 + 2 (1− γ)λ1α1α2 (λ1 + λ2)
+ λ2 [λ2 − γλ1] (α1 − α2)2 + 2 (1− γ)λ2α1α2 (λ1 + λ2)
]
= γ2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
[(
2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1][(
(λ1 − λ2)2 + 2 (1− γ)λ1λ2
)
(α1 − α2)2 + 2 (1− γ)α1α2 (λ1 + λ2)
]
≥ 0.
The analogous argument holds for λ1 ≤ λ2. Note that we have for qCI (cC)cC with
Assumption 3.1
∂
[
qCI (c
C)cC
]
∂α2
= 2
[2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)] [2λ2 − γλ1]
8 (4− γ2) [(λ21 + λ22)− γλ1λ2]
≥ 0,
and with Assumption 3.2 for qBI (c
B)cB
∂
[
qBI (c
B)cB
]
∂α2
= 2
[(2− γ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)] [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]
4 (1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
≥ 0.
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Step 2 (Comparing τC1 and τ
B
1 )
Note that τB1 and τ
C
1 was deduced within the proof of Proposition 3.1 and Proposi-
tion 3.2 by comparing the profit to sell to both intermediaries with the profit to sell
only to intermediary 1. This is stated in Ineq. (3.37) and (3.46). When considering
the difference between those profits and using step 1, we therefore have
α21
8
− [(2− γ
2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]2
4 (1− γ2) (4− γ2) [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
≤ α
2
1
8
− [2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)]
2
8 (4− γ2) [(λ21 + λ22)− γλ1λ2]
.
With the observation that the input supplier’s profit when selling to both intermedi-
aries is non-decreasing in α2, Ineq. (3.53) and (3.54) and thus, the right- and left-hand
side of Ineq. (3.55) are non-increasing in α2. This implies that the zero of the left-hand
side is less or equal than the zero of the right-hand side. Therefore,
τB1 ≤ τC1
and thus, max
{
α1τ
B
1 , α1τ
C
1
}
= α1τ
C
1 and min
{
α1τ
B
1 , α1τ
C
1
}
= α1τ
B
1 .
Similarly, we have α2τ
B
2 ≤ α2τC2 .
Computations of Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof of Proposition 3.4.
Case 1: α2 ≤ α1τB1 (or α1 ≤ α2τB2 )
In Bertrand as well as in Cournot competition intermediary 2 is excluded from
the input market. As the input demand of the intermediary is identical for both
types of competition, the input price is identical also.
Case 2: α1τ
B
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1τC1 (or α2τB2 ≤ α1 ≤ α2τC2 )
In Bertrand competition both intermediaries purchase inputs, while in Cournot
competition only intermediary 1 procures on the input market. We have
cC − cB = α1
2λ1
− (2− γ
2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
=
(λ2α1 − λ1α2) [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]
2λ1 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
.
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This can be seen as follows:
cC − cB = α1
2λ1
− (2− γ
2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
=
α1 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]− λ1
[
(2− γ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)
2λ1 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
+
−γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
]
2λ1 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
=
α1 [λ1 [(2− γ2)λ1 − γλ2] + λ2 [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]]
2λ1 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
− λ1 [α1 [(2− γ
2)λ1 − γλ2] + α2 [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]]
2λ1 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
=
λ2α1 [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]− λ1α2 [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]
2λ1 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
=
(λ2α1 − λ1α2) [(2− γ2)λ2 − γλ1]
2λ1 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
.
Therefore, cC−cB ≥ 0 as α2 ≤ α1τC1 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 and per assumption min
{
λ1
λ2
, λ2
λ1
}
>
γ
2−γ2 .
Case 3: α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 (or α2τC2 ≤ α1 ≤ α2 λ1λ2 )
Both intermediaries purchase inputs on the input market in Bertrand as well as
in Cournot competition. We have
cC − cB
=
2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
4 [(λ21 + λ
2
2)− γλ1λ2]
− (2− γ
2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
=
γ3 (λ1 − λ2) (λ1 + λ2) (λ1α2 − λ2α1)
4 (λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2) ((2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2)
.
This can be seen as follows:
cC − cB
=
2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
4 [(λ21 + λ
2
2)− γλ1λ2]
− (2− γ
2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
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=
(4 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]− (2− γ2) 4 [(λ21 + λ22)− γλ1λ2]) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)
4 [(λ21 + λ
2
2)− γλ1λ2] 2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
+
(4 [(λ21 + λ
2
2)− γλ1λ2]− 2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]) γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
4 [(λ21 + λ
2
2)− γλ1λ2] 2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
=
(−8γλ1λ2 + 4 (2− γ2) γλ1λ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)
4 [(λ21 + λ
2
2)− γλ1λ2] 2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
+
(4λ21 + 4λ
2
2 − 2 (2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)) γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
4 [(λ21 + λ
2
2)− γλ1λ2] 2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
=
(−4γ3λ1λ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)
4 [(λ21 + λ
2
2)− γλ1λ2] 2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
+
2γ3 (λ21 + λ
2
2) (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
4 [(λ21 + λ
2
2)− γλ1λ2] 2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
=
(−4γ3λ1λ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2) + 2γ3 (λ21 + λ22) (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
4 [(λ21 + λ
2
2)− γλ1λ2] 2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
=
γ3 (−4λ21λ2α1 − 4λ1λ22α2 + 2λ31α2 + 2λ21λ2α1 + 2λ1λ22α2 + 2λ32α1)
4 [(λ21 + λ
2
2)− γλ1λ2] 2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
=
γ3 (−2λ21λ2α1 − 2λ1λ22α2 + 2λ31α2 + 2λ32α1)
4 [(λ21 + λ
2
2)− γλ1λ2] 2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
=
2γ3 (−λ21λ2α1 − λ1λ22α2 + λ31α2 + λ32α1)
4 [(λ21 + λ
2
2)− γλ1λ2] 2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
=
2γ3 (λ21 (λ1α2 + λ2α1)− λ22 (λ1α2 + λ2α1))
4 [(λ21 + λ
2
2)− γλ1λ2] 2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
=
2γ3 (λ1 − λ2) (λ1 + λ2) (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
4 [(λ21 + λ
2
2)− γλ1λ2] 2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
=
2γ3 (λ21 − λ22) (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
4 [(λ21 + λ
2
2)− γλ1λ2] 2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
=
γ3 (λ21 − λ22) (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
4 [(λ21 + λ
2
2)− γλ1λ2] [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
.
Therefore, cC − cB ≥ 0 if and only if γ3 (λ1 − λ2) (λ1α2 − λ2α1) ≥ 0.
Computations of Equation 3.21 and of Equation 3.23
The intermediaries profits are
piC1
(
pC1 , p
C
2 , c
C , α1, α2
)
=

α21
16
for α2 ≤ α1τC1 ,
[2α1−γα2−(2λ1−γλ2)cC]2
(2−γ)2(2+γ)2 for α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 ,
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piC2
(
pC1 , p
C
2 , c
C , α1, α2
)
=
0 for α2 ≤ α1τ
C
1 ,
[2α2−γα1−(2λ2−γλ1)cC]2
(2−γ)2(2+γ)2 for α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 ,
with
cC =
2 (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
4 [λ21 + λ
2
2 − γλ1λ2]
and
piB1
(
pB1 , p
B
2 , c
B, α1, α2
)
=

α21
16
for α2 ≤ α1τB1 ,
[(2−γ2)α1−γα2−((2−γ2)λ1−γλ2)cB]2
(2−γ)2(2+γ)2(1−γ2) for α1τ
B
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 ,
piB2
(
pB1 , p
B
2 , c
B, α1, α2
)
=
0 for α2 ≤ α1τ
B
1 ,
[(2−γ2)α2−γα1−((2−γ2)λ2−γλ1)cB]2
(2−γ)2(2+γ)2(1−γ2) for α1τ
B
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 ,
with
cB =
(2− γ2) (λ1α1 + λ2α2)− γ (λ1α2 + λ2α1)
2 [(2− γ2) (λ21 + λ22)− 2γλ1λ2]
.
This can be seen as follows:
Cournot Competition: α2 ≤ α1τC1
piC1
(
pC1 , p
C
2 , c
C , α1, α2
)
=
(
α1 + λ1c
C
2
− λ1cC
)
α1 − λ1cC
2
=
(
α1 − λ1cC
2
)2
=
(
α1 − λ1 α12λ1
2
)2
=
( α1
2
2
)2
=
(α1
4
)2
=
α21
16
and piC2 (α1, α2) = 0.
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Cournot Competition: α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1
piCi
(
pCi , p
C
3−i, c
C , αi, α3−i
)
=
(
pCi − λicC
)
qCi
=
(
qCi + λic
C − λicC
)
qCi
=
(
qCi
)2
=
(
2αi − γα3−i − (2λi − γλ3−i) cC
(2− γ)(2 + γ)
)2
=
[
2αi − γα3−i − (2λi − γλ3−i) cC
]2
(2− γ)2 (2 + γ)2 for i = 1, 2.
Bertrand Competition: α2 ≤ α1τB1
piB1
(
pB1 , p
B
2 , c
B, α1, α2
)
=
(
α1 + λ1c
B
2
− λ1cC
)
α1 − λ1cB
2
=
(
α1 − λ1cB
2
)2
=
(
α1 − λ1 α12λ1
2
)2
=
( α1
2
2
)2
=
(α1
4
)2
=
α21
16
and piB2 (α1, α2) = 0.
Bertrand Competition: α1τ
B
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1
piBi
(
pBi , p
B
3−i, c
B, αi, α3−i
)
=
(
pBi − λicB
)
qBi
=
(
(2− γ2)αi − γα3−i + (2λi + γλ3−i) cB
(4− γ2) − λic
B
)
(
(2− γ2)αi − γα3−i − ((2− γ2)λi − γλ3−i) cB
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
)
=
(
(2− γ2)αi − γα3−i + (2λi + γλ3−i) cB − (4− γ2)λicB
(4− γ2)
)
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(
(2− γ2)αi − γα3−i − ((2− γ2)λi − γλ3−i) cB
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
)
=
(
(2− γ2)αi − γα3−i − ((2− γ2)λi − γλ3−i) cB
(4− γ2)
)
(
(2− γ2)αi − γα3−i − ((2− γ2)λi − γλ3−i) cB
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
)
=
[
(2− γ2)αi − γα3−i − ((2− γ2)λi − γλ3−i) cB
]2
(2− γ)2 (2 + γ)2 (1− γ2) for i = 1, 2.
Computations of Proof of Proposition 3.5
Proof of Proposition 3.5. For λ1 = λ2 and α1 = α2 we have
pCi − pBi =
(3 + γ)αi
2 (2 + γ)
− (3− 2γ)αi
2 (2− γ) =
γ2αi
2 (4− γ2) ,
qCi − qBi =
αi
2 (2 + γ)
− αi
2 (2− γ) (1 + γ) = −
γ2αi
2 (4− γ2) (1 + γ) ,
piCi − piBi =
α2i
4 (2 + γ)2
− (1− γ)α
2
i
4 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ) =
γ3α2i
2 (4− γ2)2 (1 + γ) .
Thus, pCi ≥ pBi and qCi ≤ qBi . Moreover, piCi ≥ piBi for γ ≥ 0 and piCi ≤ piBi for γ ≤ 0 for
i = 1, 2.
cC =
2 (λiαi + λiαi)− γ (λiαi + λiαi)
4 (λ2i + λ
2
i − γλ2i )
=
2λiαi (2− γ)
4λ2i (2− γ)
=
αi
2λi
qCi =
2αi − γαi − (2λi − γλi) cC
(4− γ2)
=
αi (2− γ)− (2− γ)λicC
(4− γ2)
=
(2− γ) (αi − λicC)
(4− γ2)
=
(
αi − λicC
)
(2 + γ)
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=
αi − αi2λiλi
(2 + γ)
=
2αi − αi
2 (2 + γ)
=
αi
2 (2 + γ)
pCi = q
C
i + λic
C
=
αi
2 (2 + γ)
+ λi
αi
2λi
=
αi + αi (2 + γ)
2 (2 + γ)
=
αi (3 + γ)
2 (2 + γ)
piCi =
(
αi (3 + γ)
2 (2 + γ)
− λi αi
2λi
)
αi
2 (2 + γ)
=
(
αi (3 + γ)− αi (2 + γ)
2 (2 + γ)
)
αi
2 (2 + γ)
=
α2i
4 (2 + γ)2
cB =
(2− γ2) (λiαi + λiαi)− γ (λiαi + λiαi)
2[(2− γ2) (λ2i + λ2i )− 2γλ2i ]
=
2 (2− γ2)λiαi − 2γλiαi
2[2λ2i (2− γ2)− 2γλ2i ]
=
2λiαi ((2− γ2)− γ)
4λ2i [(2− γ2)− γ]
=
αi
2λi
pBi =
αi (2− γ − γ2) + (2 + γ)λic
(4− γ2)
=
αi (2− γ − γ2) + (2 + γ) αi2
(4− γ2)
=
αi (4− 2γ − 2γ2 + 2 + γ)
2 (4− γ2)
=
αi (6− γ − 2γ2)
2 (4− γ2)
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=
αi (3− 2γ) (2 + γ)
2 (2− γ) (2 + γ)
=
αi (3− 2γ)
2 (2− γ)
qBi =
pBi − λic
(1− γ2)
=
αi(3−2γ)
2(2−γ) − λi αi2λi
(1− γ2)
=
αi (3− 2γ)− αi (2− γ)
2 (2− γ) (1− γ) (1 + γ)
=
αi (3− 2γ − 2 + γ)
2 (2− γ) (1− γ) (1 + γ)
=
αi (1− γ)
2 (2− γ) (1− γ) (1 + γ)
=
αi
2 (2− γ) (1 + γ)
piBi =
(
pBi − λicB
)
qBi
=
(
αi (3− 2γ)
2 (2− γ) − λi
αi
2λi
)
αi
2 (2− γ) (1 + γ)
=
(
αi (3− 2γ)
2 (2− γ) −
αi
2
)
αi
2 (2− γ) (1 + γ)
=
(
αi (3− 2γ)− αi (2− γ)
2 (2− γ)
)
αi
2 (2− γ) (1 + γ)
=
αi (1− γ)
2 (2− γ) ·
αi
2 (2− γ) (1 + γ)
=
α2i (1− γ)
4 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)
pCi − pBi =
(3 + γ)αi
2 (2 + γ)
− (3− 2γ)αi
2 (2− γ)
=
(3 + γ) (2− γ)αi − (3− 2γ) (2 + γ)αi
=
(6− 3γ + 2γ − γ2 − 6− 3γ + 4γ + 2γ2)αi
2 (4− γ2)
=
γ2αi
2 (4− γ2)
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qCi − qBi =
αi
2 (2 + γ)
− αi
2 (2− γ) (1 + γ)
=
αi (2− γ) (1 + γ)− αi (2 + γ)
2 (4− γ2) (1 + γ)
=
αi (2 + 2γ − γ − γ2 − 2− γ)
2 (4− γ2) (1 + γ)
= − αiγ
2
2 (4− γ2) (1 + γ)
piCi − piBi =
α2i
4 (2 + γ)2
− (1− γ)α
2
i
4 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)
=
α2i (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)− α2i (1− γ) (2 + γ)2
4 (2 + γ)2 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)
=
αi ((4− 4γ + γ2) (1 + γ)− (1− γ) (4 + 4γ + γ2))
4 (2 + γ)2 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)
=
α2i (4− 4γ + γ2 + 4γ − 4γ2 + γ3 − 4− 4γ − γ2 + 4γ + 4γ2 + γ3)
4 (2 + γ)2 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)
=
2α2i γ
3
4 (2 + γ)2 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)
=
α2i γ
3
2 (2 + γ)2 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)
Computations of Proof of Proposition 3.6
Proof of Proposition 3.6. For this proof consider α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 (or α2τC2 ≤ α1 ≤
α2
λ1
λ2
) and λ1 = λ2.
(i) We have
pCi − pBi =
γ2 (3αi − α3−i)
4 (4− γ2) .
This can be seen as follows: We have
pCi − pBi
=
2αi − γα3−i − (2λi − γλ3−i) cC + (4− γ2)λicC
(4− γ2)
− (2− γ
2)αi − γα3−i + (2λi + γλ3−i) cB
(4− γ2)
=
γ2
(
αi − λicC
)
+
(
cC − cB) (2λi + γλ3−i)
(4− γ2) .
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and
pCi − pBi
=
2αi − γα3−i − (2λi − γλ3−i) cC + (4− γ2)λicC
(4− γ2)
− (2− γ
2)αi − γα3−i + (2λi + γλ3−i) cB
(4− γ2)
=
γ2αi − γ2λicC − (2λi − γλ3−i) cC + 4λicC − γλ3−icB − 2λicB
(4− γ2)
=
γ2
(
αi − λicC
)
+ 2λic
C + γλ3−icC − γλ3−icB − 2λicB
(4− γ2)
=
γ2
(
αi − λicC
)
+ 2λi
(
cC − cB)+ γλ3−i (cC − cB)
(4− γ2)
=
γ2
(
αi − λicC
)
+
(
cC − cB) (2λi + γλ3−i)
(4− γ2) .
For λ1 = λ2 we have c
C = cB and cC = α1+α2
4λ1
and, thus,
pCi − pBi
=
γ2
(
αi − λi αi+α3−i4λi
)
(4− γ2)
=
γ2 (4αi − αi − α3−i)
4 (4− γ2)
=
γ2 (3αi − α3−i)
4 (4− γ2) .
Thus, for
(α1, α2, λ1, λ2, γ) =
(
4, 1, 1, 1,−1
2
)
it can easily be verified that Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 as well as α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1
hold and we have
pC2 =
89
60
<
3
2
= pB2 .
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This can be seen as follows: Intermediary 2’s equilibrium prices are
pC2 =
89
60
≈ 1.4833
pB2 =
3
2
= 1.5
and the according conditions are
τC1 =
√
2− 1
2
− 1 =
√
3
2
− 1 ≈ 0.2247,
Condition α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 : α1
λ2
λ1
− α2 = 4− 1 = 3 > 0,
Condition α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2: α2 − τC1 α1 = 1−
(
4
√
3
2
− 4
)
= 5− 4
√
3
2
≈ 0.1010 > 0,
Assumption 3.1: min
{
α1
α2
,
α2
α1
}
− γ
2
=
1
4
−
(
−1
4
)
=
1
2
= 0.5 > 0,
min
{
λ1
λ2
,
λ2
λ1
}
− γ
2
= 1−
(
−1
4
)
=
5
4
= 1.25 > 0,
Assumption 3.2: min
{
α1
α2
,
α2
α1
}
− γ
2− γ2 =
1
4
−
(−1
2
7
4
)
=
1
4
−
(
−2
7
)
=
15
28
≈ 0.5357 > 0,
min
{
λ1
λ2
,
λ2
λ1
}
− γ
2− γ2 = 1−
(
−2
7
)
=
9
7
≈ 1.2857 > 0.
(ii) We have
qCi − qBi = −
γ2 [(3 + γ)αi − (1 + 3γ)α3−i]
4 (4− γ2) (1− γ2) .
This can be seen as follows: We have
qCi − qBi
=
2αi − γα3−i − (2λi − γλ3−i) cC
(4− γ2) −
(2− γ2) (αi − λicB)− γ (α3−i − λ3−icB)
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
= −γ
2
[
αi − λicC − γ
(
α3−i − λ3−icC
)]
+
(
cC − cB) (2λi − γ2λi − γλ3−i)
(4− γ2) (1− γ2) .
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qCi − qBi
=
2αi − γα3−i − (2λi − γλ3−i) cC
(4− γ2) −
(2− γ2) (αi − λicB)− γ (α3−i − λ3−icB)
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
=
(1− γ2) (2αi − γα3−i)− (1− γ2) (2λi − γλ3−i) cC
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
− (2− γ
2)
(
αi − λicB
)− γ (α3−i − λ3−icB)
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
=
−γ2αi + γ3α3−i − (1− γ2) (2λi − γλ3−i) cC + (2− γ2)λicB − γλ3−icB
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
=
−γ2αi + γ3α3−i − (1− γ2) (2λi − γλ3−i) cC + (2λi − γ2λi − γλ3−i) cB
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
=
−γ2αi + γ3α3−i − (2λi − γλ3−i) cC + γ2 (2λi − γλ3−i) cC
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
+
(2λi − γ2λi − γλ3−i) cB
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
=
−γ2αi + γ3α3−i − (2λi − γ2λi − γλ3−i) cC + γ2 (λi − γλ3−i) cC
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
+
(2λi − γ2λi − γλ3−i) cB
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
= −γ
2
[
αi − λicC − γ
(
α3−i − λ3−icC
)]
+
(
cC − cB) (2λi − γ2λi − γλ3−i)
(4− γ2) (1− γ2) .
For λ1 = λ2 we have c
C = cB and cC = α1+α2
4λ1
and, thus,
qCi − qBi = −
γ2
[
αi − λicC − γ
(
α3−i − λ3−icC
)]
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
= −γ
2 [3αi − α3−i − γ (3α3−i − αi)]
4 (4− γ2) (1− γ2)
= −γ
2 [(3 + γ)αi − (1 + 3γ)α3−i]
4 (4− γ2) (1− γ2) .
Thus, it can easily be verified for
(α1, α2, λ1, λ2, γ) =
(
3
2
, 1, 1, 1,
1
2
)
that Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 as well as α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 hold and we have
qC2 =
1
12
>
7
90
= qB2 .
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This can be seen as follows: Intermediary 2’s equilibrium quantities are
qC2 =
1
12
≈ 0.0833
qB2 =
7
90
≈ 0.0778
and the according conditions are
τC1 =
√
2 +
1
2
− 1 =
√
5
2
− 1 ≈ 0.5811,
Condition α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 : α1
λ2
λ1
− α2 = 3
2
− 1 = 1
2
= 0.5 > 0,
Condition α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2: α2 − τC1 α1 = 1−
(
3
2
√
5
2
− 3
2
)
=
5
2
− 3
2
√
5
2
≈ 0.1283 > 0,
Assumption 3.1: min
{
α1
α2
,
α2
α1
}
− γ
2
=
2
3
− 1
4
=
5
12
≈ 0.4167 > 0,
min
{
λ1
λ2
,
λ2
λ1
}
− γ
2
= 1− 1
4
=
3
4
= 0.75 > 0,
Assumption 3.2: min
{
α1
α2
,
α2
α1
}
− γ
2− γ2 =
2
3
−
1
2
7
4
=
2
3
− 2
7
=
8
21
≈ 0.3810 > 0,
min
{
λ1
λ2
,
λ2
λ1
}
− γ
2− γ2 = 1−
2
7
=
5
7
≈ 0.7142 > 0.
(iii) We have
piCi
(
pC1 , p
C
2 , c
C , α1, α2
)− piBi (pB1 , pB2 , cB, α1, α2)
=
γ3
[
4αiα3−i (1− γ)− (αi − α3−i)2 (3 + 5γ)
]
8 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2) .
This can be seen as follows: We show
piC2
(
pC1 , p
C
2 , c
C , α1, α2
)− piB2 (pB1 , pB2 , cB, α1, α2)
=
γ3
[
4α1α2 (1− γ)− (α1 − α2)2 (3 + 5γ)
]
8 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2) .
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Consider
[α2(6 + γ)− α1(2 + 3γ)]2
16 (4− γ2)2 −
[α2(6 + γ − 3γ2)− α1(2 + 3γ − γ2)]2
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
=
[
α22 (6 + γ)
2 − 2α1α2 (6 + γ) (2 + 3γ) + α21 (2 + 3γ)2
]
16 (4− γ2)2
−
[
α22 (6 + γ − 3γ2)2 − 2α1α2 (6 + γ − 3γ2) (2 + 3γ − γ2) + α21 (2 + 3γ − γ2)2
]2
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
=
α22 [−2γ3 (3 + 5γ)]− 2α1α2 [−2γ3 (5 + 3γ)] + α21 [−2γ3 (3 + 5γ)]
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
= −γ3α
2
2 (3 + 5γ)− 2α1α2 (5 + 3γ) + α21 (3 + 5γ)
8 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
= −γ3
[
(α1 − α2)2 (3 + 5γ)− 2α1α2 (5 + 3γ) + 2α1α2 (3 + 5γ)
]
8 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
= −γ3
[
(α1 − α2)2 (3 + 5γ) + 2α1α2 (−2 + 2γ)
]
8 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
= −γ3
[
(α1 − α2)2 (3 + 5γ)− 4α1α2 (1− γ)
]
8 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
= γ3
[
4α1α2 (1− γ)− (α1 − α2)2 (3 + 5γ)
]
8 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
The second equality follows from
(
1− γ2) (6 + γ)2 − (6 + γ − 3γ2)2
=
(
1− γ2) (6 + γ)2 − [(6 + γ)2 − 6γ2 (6 + γ) + 9γ4]
= −γ2 (6 + γ)2 + 6γ2 (6 + γ)− 9γ4
= −γ2 [(6 + γ)2 − 6 (6 + γ) + 9γ2]
= −γ2 [36 + 12γ + γ2 − 36− 6γ + 9γ2]
= −2γ3 (3 + 5γ) ,
(
1− γ2) (2 + 3γ)2 − (2 + 3γ − γ2)2
=
(
1− γ2) (2 + 3γ)2 − [(2 + 3γ)2 − 2 (2 + 3γ) γ2 + γ4]
= −γ2 (2 + 3γ)2 + 2 (2 + 3γ) γ2 − γ4
= −γ2 [(2 + 3γ)2 − 2 (2 + 3γ) + γ2]
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= −γ2 [4 + 12γ + 9γ2 − 4− 6γ + γ2]
= −2γ3 (3 + 5γ) ,
(
1− γ2) (6 + γ) (2 + 3γ)− (6 + γ − 3γ2) (2 + 3γ − γ2)
=
(
1− γ2) (6 + γ) (2 + 3γ)− [(6 + γ) (2 + 3γ)− γ2 (6 + γ)− 3γ2 (2 + 3γ) + 3γ4]
= −γ2 (6 + γ) (2 + 3γ) + γ2 (6 + γ) + 3γ2 (2 + 3γ)− 3γ4
= −γ2 [(6 + γ) (2 + 3γ)− (6 + γ)− 3 (2 + 3γ) + 3γ2]
= −γ2 [12 + 18γ + 2γ + 3γ2 − 6− γ − 6− 9γ + 3γ2]
= −γ3 (5 + 3γ) .
Thus, for
(α1, α2, λ1, λ2, γ) =
(
3
2
, 1, 1, 1,
3
4
)
it can easily be verified that Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 as well as α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1
hold and we have
piC1
(
pC1 , p
C
2 , c
C ,
3
2
, 1
)
=
2209
12100
<
625
3388
= piB1
(
pB1 , p
B
2 , c
B,
3
2
, 1
)
,
piC2
(
pC1 , p
C
2 , c
C ,
3
2
, 1
)
=
9
12100
<
9
3388
= piB2
(
pB1 , p
B
2 , c
B,
3
2
, 1
)
.
This can be seen as follows: The intermediaries’ equilibrium profits are
piC1
(
pC1 , p
C
2 , c
C ,
3
2
, 1
)
=
472
22 · 52 · 112 =
2209
12100
≈ 0.1826,
piB1
(
pB1 , p
B
2 , c
B,
3
2
, 1
)
=
54
22 · 7 · 112 =
625
3388
≈ 0.1845,
piC2
(
pC1 , p
C
2 , c
C ,
3
2
, 1
)
=
32
22 · 52 · 112 =
9
12100
≈ 0.0007,
piB2
(
pB1 , p
B
2 , c
B,
3
2
, 1
)
=
32
22 · 7 · 112 =
9
3388
≈ 0.0027.
and the according conditions are
τC1 =
√
2 +
3
4
− 1 =
√
11
2
− 1 ≈ 0.6583,
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Condition α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 : α1
λ2
λ1
− α2 = 3
2
− 1 = 1
2
= 0.5 > 0,
Condition α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2: α2 − τC1 α1 = 1−
(
3
2
√
11
2
− 3
2
)
=
5
2
− 3
4
√
11
≈ 0.0125 > 0,
Assumption 3.1: min
{
α1
α2
,
α2
α1
}
− γ
2
=
2
3
− 3
8
=
7
24
≈ 0.2917 > 0,
min
{
λ1
λ2
,
λ2
λ1
}
− γ
2
= 1− 3
8
=
5
8
= 0.625 > 0,
Assumption 3.2: min
{
α1
α2
,
α2
α1
}
− γ
2− γ2 =
2
3
−
3
4
23
16
=
2
3
− 12
23
=
10
69
≈ 0.1450 > 0,
min
{
λ1
λ2
,
λ2
λ1
}
− γ
2− γ2 = 1−
12
23
=
11
23
≈ 0.4783 > 0.
Computations of Proof of Proposition 3.7
Proof of Proposition 3.7. We consider the different cases from the previous proposi-
tions separately and show that the intermediaries’ profit functions are convex in own
qualities.
Case 1: α2 ≤ α1τB1 (or α1 ≤ α2τB2 )
We obtain
piC1 (α1, α2) = pi
B
1 (α1, α2) =
α21
16
.
Thus, for all α1 ∈ [α1, α1] we have
∂2piC1 (α1, α2)
∂α21
=
∂2piC1 (α1, α
2
2)
∂α21
=
2
16
> 0.
Case 2: α1τ
B
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1τC1 (or α2τB2 ≤ α1 ≤ α2τC2 )
We already computed the profit for Cournot competition in Case 1, the result
for Bertrand competition is shown in Case 3.
Case 3: α1τ
C
1 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1 (or α2τC2 ≤ α1 ≤ α2 λ1λ2 )
First observe that for Cournot as well as for Bertrand competition the profit of
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intermediary i is quadratic in αi for i = 1, 2. Consider intermediary i. In the
case of Cournot competition we obtain the following second derivative of the
profit function using Assumption 3.1
∂2piCi (αi, α3−i)
∂α2i
=
∂2
[(
pCi (αi, α3−i)− λicC (αi, α3−i)
)
qCi (αi, α3−i)
]
∂α2i
= 2
(
∂pCi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
− λi∂c
C (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
)
∂qCi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
= 2
(
∂qCi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
)2
= 2
(
2
(4− γ2) −
(2λi − γλ3−i)2
(4− γ2) 4 (λ2i + λ23−i − γλiλ3−i)
)2
=
(
(4− γ2)λ23−i + 4
(
λ2i + λ
2
3−i − γλiλ3−i
))2
8 (4− γ2)2 (λ2i + λ23−i − γλiλ3−i)2 > 0
for all αi ∈ [αi, αi] for i = 1, 2. Similarly, we obtain for Bertrand competition
with γ ∈ (−1, 1) using Assumption 3.2
∂2piBi (αi, α3−i)
∂α2i
=
∂2
[(
pBi (αi, α3−i)− λicB (αi, α3−i)
)
qBi (αi, α3−i)
]
∂α2i
= 2
(
∂pBi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
− λi∂c
B (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
)
∂qBi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
= 2
(
(2− γ2) + (2λi + γλ3−i) ∂cB(αi,α3−i)∂αi
(4− γ2) − λi
∂cB (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
)
(
(2− γ2)− (2λi − γλ3−i) ∂cB(αi,α3−i)∂αi
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
)
= 2
(
(2− γ2)− ((2− γ2)λi − γλ3−i) ∂cB(αi,α3−i)∂αi
(4− γ2)
)
(
(2− γ2)− ((2− γ2)λi − γλ3−i) ∂cB(αi,α3−i)∂αi
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)
)
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= 2
(
(2− γ2)− ((2− γ2)λi − γλ3−i) ∂cB(αi,α3−i)∂αi
)2
(4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
= 2
(
(2− γ2)− ((2− γ2)λi − γλ3−i) (2−γ
2)λi−γλ3−i
2[(2−γ2)(λ2i+λ23−i)−2γλiλ3−i]
)2
(4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
=
(
(2− γ2) 2 [(2− γ2) (λ2i + λ23−i)− 2γλiλ3−i]− ((2− γ2)λi − γλ3−i)2)2
(4− γ2)2 (1− γ2) 2 [(2− γ2) (λ2i + λ23−i)− 2γλiλ3−i]2
=
(
(4− γ2) (1− γ2)λ23−i + (2− γ2)
(
(2− γ2) (λ2i + λ23−i)− 2γλiλ3−i))2
2 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2) ((2− γ2) (λ2i + λ23−i)− 2γλiλ3−i)2 > 0
for all αi ∈ [αi, αi] for i = 1, 2. Hence, for Cournot as well as for Bertrand com-
petition any zero of the first-order condition is a minimum which is independent
of the other intermediary’s investment choice. Thus, the candidates for optimal
investment choices are at the corner points of the according interval.
Computations of Proof of Proposition 3.8
For Cournot competition, the payoffs of the non-cooperative game are
piC1 (α, α) = pi
C
2 (α, α) =
α2
4 (2 + γ)2
,
piC1 (α, α) =

α2
16
for α ≤ α (√2 + γ − 1),
[α(6+γ)−α(2+3γ)]2
16(4−γ2)2 for α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α,
piC2 (α, α) =
0 for α ≤ α
(√
2 + γ − 1),
[α(6+γ)−α(2+3γ)]2
16(4−γ2)2 for α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α,
piC1 (α, α) =
0 for α ≤ α
(√
2 + γ − 1),
[α(6+γ)−α(2+3γ)]2
16(4−γ2)2 for α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α,
piC2 (α, α) =

α2
16
for α ≤ α (√2 + γ − 1),
[α(6+γ)−α(2+3γ)]2
16(4−γ2)2 for α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α,
piC1 (α, α) = pi
C
2 (α, α) =
α2
4 (2 + γ)2
,
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The profits are derived as follows:
[α(6 + γ)− α(2 + 3γ)]2
16 (4− γ2)2 =
[α(4− 2γ)]2
16 (4− γ2)2
=
4α2(2− γ)2
16 (4− γ2)2
=
α2
4 (2 + γ)2
The equilibrium conditions on the investment costs κC are shown in Table 3.1. These
strategy profile α ≤ α (√2 + γ − 1)
(α, α)
[
[α(2+γ)−2α][α(2+γ)+2α]
16(2+γ)2
,∞
)
(α, α), (α, α)
[
α2
4(2+γ)2
, [α(2+γ)−2α][α(2+γ)+2α]
16(2+γ)2
]
(α, α)
[
0, α
2
4(2+γ)2
]
strategy profile α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α ≤ α
(α, α)
[
(6+γ)[α−α][α(6+γ)+α(2−5γ)]
16(4−γ2)2 ,∞
)
(α, α), (α, α)
[
(6+γ)[α−α][α(2−5γ)+α(6+γ)]
16(4−γ2)2 ,
(6+γ)[α−α][α(6+γ)+α(2−5γ)]
16(4−γ2)2
]
(α, α)
[
0, (6+γ)[α−α][α(2−5γ)+α(6+γ)]
16(4−γ2)2
]
Table 3.1: Equilibrium conditions on the investment costs κC
conditions are derived as follows: Consider the strategy profile (α, α). For this to be
a Nash equilibrium we require for α ≤ α (√2 + γ − 1)
α2
4 (2 + γ)2
≥ α
2
16
− κC
⇔ κC ≥ α
2
16
− α
2
4 (2 + γ)2
⇔ κC ≥ α
2 (2 + γ)2 − 4α2
16 (2 + γ)2
⇔ κC ≥ [α (2 + γ)− 2α] [α (2 + γ) + 2α]
16 (2 + γ)2
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and for α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α ≤ α
α2
4 (2 + γ)2
≥ [α(6 + γ)− α(2 + 3γ)]
2
16 (4− γ2)2 − κ
C
⇔ κC ≥ [α(6 + γ)− α(2 + 3γ)]
2
16 (4− γ2)2 −
α2
4 (2 + γ)2
⇔ κC ≥ [α(6 + γ)− α(2 + 3γ)]
2
16 (4− γ2)2 −
4α2 (2− γ)2
16 (4− γ2)2
⇔ κC ≥ [α(6 + γ)− α(2 + 3γ)]
2 − 4α2 (2− γ)2
16 (4− γ2)2
⇔ κC ≥ [α(6 + γ)− α(2 + 3γ)− 2α (2− γ)] [α(6 + γ)− α(2 + 3γ) + 2α (2− γ)]
16 (4− γ2)2
⇔ κC ≥ [α(6 + γ)− α (6 + γ)] [α(6 + γ) + α(2− 5γ)]
16 (4− γ2)2
⇔ κC ≥ (6 + γ) [α− α] [α(6 + γ) + α(2− 5γ)]
16 (4− γ2)2 .
Consider the strategy profile (α, α). For this to be a Nash equilibrium we require for
α ≤ α (√2 + γ − 1)
α2
4 (2 + γ)2
− κC ≥ 0
⇔ α
2
4 (2 + γ)2
≥ κC
and for α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α ≤ α
α2
4 (2 + γ)2
− κC ≥ [α(6 + γ)− α(2 + 3γ)]
2
16 (4− γ2)2
⇔ α
2
4 (2 + γ)2
− [α(6 + γ)− α(2 + 3γ)]
2
16 (4− γ2)2 ≥ κ
C
⇔ 4α
2 (2− γ)2
16 (4− γ2)2 −
[α(6 + γ)− α(2 + 3γ)]2
16 (4− γ2)2 ≥ κ
C
⇔ 4α
2 (2− γ)2 − [α(6 + γ)− α(2 + 3γ)]2
16 (4− γ2)2 ≥ κ
C
⇔ 4α
2 (2− γ)2 − [α(6 + γ)− α(2 + 3γ)]2
16 (4− γ2)2 ≥ κ
C
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⇔ [2α (2− γ)− α(6 + γ) + α(2 + 3γ)] [2α (2− γ) + α(6 + γ)− α(2 + 3γ)]
16 (4− γ2)2 ≥ κ
C
⇔ [α (6 + γ)− α(6 + γ)] [α(2− 5γ) + α(6 + γ)]
16 (4− γ2)2 ≥ κ
C
⇔ (6 + γ) [α− α] [α(2− 5γ) + α(6 + γ)]
16 (4− γ2)2 ≥ κ
C .
For symmetry reasons these are also the bounds for asymmetric Nash equilibria. where
the upper and lower bound for the investment costs are given by
κC =

α2
4(2+γ)2
for α ≤ α (√2 + γ − 1),
(6+γ)[α−α][α(2−5γ)+α(6+γ)]
16(4−γ2)2 for α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α,
κC =

[α(2+γ)−2α][α(2+γ)+2α]
16(2+γ)2
for α ≤ α (√2 + γ − 1),
(6+γ)[α−α][α(6+γ)+α(2−5γ)]
16(4−γ2)2 for α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α.
Computations of Proof of Proposition 3.10
Proof of Proposition 3.10. We have
κC − κB
=

γ3α2
2(4−γ2)2(1+γ) for α ≤ α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
,
8γ3(1−γ)α2+[α(6+γ−3γ2)−α(2+3γ−γ2)]2
16(4−γ2)2(1−γ2) for α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
≤ α ≤ α (√2 + γ − 1),
γ3[α−α][α(7+γ)−α(3+5γ)]
8(4−γ2)2(1−γ2) for α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α,
and
κC − κB
=

− γ3α2
2(4−γ2)2(1+γ) for α ≤ α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
,
α2
16
− 8γ
3(1−γ)α2+[α(6+γ−3γ2)−α(2+3γ−γ2)]2
16(4−γ2)2(1−γ2) for α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
≤ α ≤ α (√2 + γ − 1),
−γ3[α−α][α(3+5γ)−α(7+γ)]
8(4−γ2)2(1−γ2) for α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α.
From these expressions for κC−κB and κC−κB we immediately derive the statements
of Proposition 3.10.
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(i) Consider α ≤ α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
. We have for
κC − κB
=
α2
4 (2 + γ)2
− α
2 (1− γ)
4 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)
=
α2 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)− α2 (1− γ) (2 + γ)2
4 (4− γ2)2 (1 + γ)
=
2αγ3
4 (4− γ2)2 (1 + γ)
=
γ3α2
2 (4− γ2)2 (1 + γ)
and for
κC − κB
=
[α (2 + γ)− 2α] [α (2 + γ) + 2α]
16 (2 + γ)2
− α
2 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)− 4α2 (1− γ)
16 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)
=
[α (2 + γ)− 2α] [α (2 + γ) + 2α] (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)
16 (2 + γ)2 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)
−
[
α2 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)− 4α2 (1− γ)] (2 + γ)2
16 (2 + γ)2 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)
=
[
α2 (2 + γ)2 − 4α2] (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)
16 (2 + γ)2 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)
−
[
α2 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)− 4α2 (1− γ)] (2 + γ)2
16 (2 + γ)2 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)
=
[−4α2 ((2− γ)2 (1 + γ)− (2 + γ)2 (1− γ))]
16 (2 + γ)2 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)
=
[−4α2 ((4− 4γ + γ2) (1 + γ)− (4 + 4γ + γ2) (1− γ))]
16 (2 + γ)2 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)
=
−8α2γ3
16 (2 + γ)2 (2− γ)2 (1 + γ)
= − γ
3α2
2 (4− γ2)2 (1 + γ)
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(ii) Consider α
(√
2 + γ − γ2 − 1
)
≤ α ≤ α (√2 + γ − 1). Note that
κB =
4α2 (2 + γ)2 (1− γ)2 − [α (6 + γ − 3γ2)− α (2 + 3γ − γ2)]2
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2) ,
κB =
[α(6 + γ − 3γ2)− α(2 + 3γ − γ2)]2 − 4α2 (2 + γ)2 (1− γ)2
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2) .
We have for
κC − κB
=
α2
4 (2 + γ)2
− (6 + γ − 3γ
2) [α− α] [α (2− 5γ − γ2) + α (6 + γ − 3γ2)]
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
=
4α2 (1− γ2) (2− γ)2 − (6 + γ − 3γ2) [α− α] [α (2− 5γ − γ2) + α (6 + γ − 3γ2)]
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
=
4α2 (1− γ2) (2− γ)2 − 4α2 (2 + γ)2 (1− γ)2 + [α(6 + γ − 3γ2)− α(2 + 3γ − γ2)]2
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
=
8γ3 (1− γ)α2 + [α(6 + γ − 3γ2)− α(2 + 3γ − γ2)]2
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2) ,
and for
κC − κB
=
[α (2 + γ)− 2α] [α (2 + γ) + 2α]
16 (2 + γ)2
− (6 + γ − 3γ
2) [α− α] [α (6 + γ − 3γ2) + α (2− 5γ − γ2)]
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
=
(2− γ)2 (1− γ2) [α2 (2 + γ)2 − 4α2]
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
+
− (6 + γ − 3γ2) [α− α] [α (6 + γ − 3γ2) + α (2− 5γ − γ2)]
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
=
(2− γ)2 (1− γ2) [α2 (2 + γ)2 − 4α2]
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
+
− [α(6 + γ − 3γ2)− α(2 + 3γ − γ2)]2 + 4α2 (2 + γ)2 (1− γ)2
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
=
(4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)α2 − [α(6 + γ − 3γ2)− α(2 + 3γ − γ2)]2
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
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+
4α2 (2 + γ)2 (1− γ)2 − 4 (2− γ)2 (1− γ2)α2
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
=
(4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)α2 − [α(6 + γ − 3γ2)− α(2 + 3γ − γ2)]2 − 8γ3 (1− γ)α2
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
=
(4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)α2 −
[
8γ3 (1− γ)α2 + [α(6 + γ − 3γ2)− α(2 + 3γ − γ2)]2
]
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
=
(4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)α2
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2) −
8γ3 (1− γ)α2 + [α(6 + γ − 3γ2)− α(2 + 3γ − γ2)]2
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
=
α2
16
− 8γ
3 (1− γ)α2 + [α(6 + γ − 3γ2)− α(2 + 3γ − γ2)]2
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2) .
(iii) Consider α
(√
2 + γ − 1) ≤ α. We have for
κC − κB
=
(6 + γ) [α− α] [α (2− 5γ) + α (6 + γ)]
16 (4− γ2)2
− (6 + γ − 3γ
2) [α− α] [α (2− 5γ − γ2) + α (6 + γ − 3γ2)]
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
=
(6 + γ) [α− α] [α (2− 5γ) + α (6 + γ)] (1− γ2)
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
− (6 + γ − 3γ
2) [α− α] [α (2− 5γ − γ2) + α (6 + γ − 3γ2)]
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
=
[α− α] [α (14γ3 + 2γ4)− α (6γ3 − 10γ4)]
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
=
2γ3 [α− α] [α (7 + γ)− α (3− 5γ)]
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
=
γ3 [α− α] [α (7 + γ)− α (3 + 5γ)]
8 (4− γ2)2 (1 + γ) (1− γ)
and for
κC − κB
=
(6 + γ) [α− α] [α(6 + γ) + α(2− 5γ)]
16 (4− γ2)2
− (6 + γ − 3γ
2) [α− α] [α (6 + γ − 3γ2) + α (2− 5γ − γ2)]
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
Chapter 3. Simultaneous Competition of Intermediaries 126
=
(6 + γ) [α− α] [α(6 + γ) + α(2− 5γ)] (1− γ2)
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
− (6 + γ − 3γ
2) [α− α] [α (6 + γ − 3γ2) + α (2− 5γ − γ2)]
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
=
[α− α] [α (−6γ3 − 10γ4)− α (−14γ3 − 2γ4)]
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
= −2γ
3 [α− α] [α (3 + 5γ)− α (7 + γ)]
16 (4− γ2)2 (1− γ2)
= −γ
3 [α− α] [α (3 + 5γ)− α (7 + γ)]
8 (4− γ2)2 (1 + γ) (1− γ) .
Chapter 4
Sequential Competition of
Intermediaries
4.1 Introduction
Referring to the model used within Chapter 3, we consider a differentiated two-sided
market in which two intermediaries face competition for the demand of a representa-
tive customer on the sales side and for the supply of input goods on the procurement
side. We analyze the impact of the market structure on the equilibrium outcome when
intermediaries choose production quantities sequentially. In this context we are par-
ticularly interested in the equilibrium decisions taken by intermediaries when choosing
first and when choosing second.
4.1.1 Basic setup
Basically, intermediaries procure homogenous products from a monopolistic input sup-
plier, refine them and offer the resulting final product to a representative customer.
On the sales side, by choosing production quantities intermediaries compete for the
customer’s demand. Hereby decisions are taken sequentially. Consequently there is an
intermediary, the Stackelberg leader, who takes a strategic decisions first, followed by
an intermediary, Stackelberg follower, choosing product quantities afterwards. In our
context an intermediaries’ role, whether being in the leading or following position will
be exogenously given.
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Intermediaries must not necessarily be symmetric. Asymmetries between interme-
diaries may be present as a result of product differentiation as well as due to distinct
production technologies that may be used.
When considering differentiation we distinguish between horizontal and vertical
product differentiation. Horizontal product differentiation describes the fact that fi-
nal products can either be substitutes, complements or mutually independent. For
instance, within the white good industry two manufacturers may procure a homoge-
nous input, e.g. steal, from a monopolistic supplier. This input can be used to either
produce washing machines or laundry dryers. In the case that both manufacturers
decide to produce washing machines, provided goods are substitutes. Thus, competi-
tion between manufacturers is rather fierce. Given one firm produces washing machines
whereas the other firm produces laundry dryers, products are (imperfect) complements
and competition is less intense. In contrast to the given example, horizontal product
differentiation will exogenously given in our setting.
Besides horizontal differentiation, products can be vertically differentiated, i.e.,
may have different levels of product quality. Within our model intermediaries are
able to take an investment decision and thus foster their product’s quality. This
quality enhancement increases market demand and may lead to asymmetries, given
one intermediary invests while the other does not.
As mentioned, asymmetries may not just arise due to product differentiation, but
also by reasons of distinct productivities. An intermediary’s productivity describes
the number of input goods needed in order to produce a unit of output. Hence, the
productivity directly determines the intermediaries’ costs of procurement. Intermedi-
aries’ productivities are exogenously given in our setting.
The timing of decisions is displayed in Fig. 4.1. Our model distinguished between
two stages, the innovation stage and the competition stage. In the innovation stage in-
termediaries decide about their investment in product innovation, which increases their
product quality and has a positive effect on the customer’s demand for their product.
The choice of product innovation can be seen as a long-term decision and is therefore
taken first. In the competition stage the monopolistic input supplier strategically de-
cides about the price he is demanding for his input goods. Given the input price, inter-
mediaries compete by choosing their production quantities sequentially. Intermediary
i as the Stackelberg leader chooses his output quantity first, whereas intermediary 3−i
as the Stackelberg follower chooses his quantity thereafter, for i = 1, 2. According to
129 Chapter 4. Sequential Competition of Intermediaries
innovation stage competition stage
-?
Intermediaries
Product Innovation
6
Input Supplier
Input Price
?
Intermediary i
Quantity Decision
6
Customer
Demand
?
Intermediary 3− i
Quantity Decision
time
Figure 4.1: Timing of Decisions when intermediaries move sequentially
the equilibrium quantity choices, input units are procured from the supplier. Finally,
intermediaries refine the inputs and offer their products to a representative customer
on the sales side. In order to determine subgame perfect Nash equilibria our analysis
proceeds via backwards induction.
Close to the approach of Chapter 3, in a first step we analyze the impact of a
two-sided market structure on the equilibrium outcome when intermediaries choose
production quantities sequentially. We find that if asymmetries between intermediaries
are sufficiently high, the input supplier has an incentive to exclude the less competitive
intermediary from the market. This result is independent of an intermediary’s role,
i.e., whether he is in the leading or following position.
For equal productivities, our main result refers to the input supplier’s incentives to
exclude an intermediary from the market. It can be shown that there exist conditions
such that an intermediary being the Stackelberg leader will be excluded, but will be
accepted in the market when taking the role of the Stackelberg follower, ceteris paribus.
When comparing the equilibrium outcomes of the Stackelberg leader and the Stack-
elberg follower it turns out that given an intermediary is more competitive, his equi-
librium output quantity is higher when being the leader than when being the follower.
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This outcome is independent of the degree of horizontal product differentiation and
still holds for a less competitive intermediary, given goods are substitutes. If the inter-
mediary is less competitive and goods are complements, there may exist asymmetries
such that an intermediary being in the position of the Stackelberg follower offers higher
output quantities in equilibrium than when being in the position of the Stackelberg
leader.
Considering the input supplier’s equilibrium prices and profits within a duopoly
market, we observe that for a more competitive intermediary being the Stackelberg
leader input prices are higher compared to the situation in which he is the Stackelberg
follower. In addition, the supplier’s duopoly profit is higher if the more competitive
intermediary is choosing quantities first than if he is choosing second.
Besides analyzing the stage of competition, in a second step, we will give an outlook
in which intermediaries’ incentives to invest in product quality is discussed. A first
result shows that given costs of investment are linear, intermediaries always either
choose a maximum or minimum level of investment.
4.1.2 Literature
The foundations of today’s classical oligopoly theory were established within two sem-
inal works, the contribution of Cournot (1838) discussing a model in which duopolists
compete by setting quantities and of Bertrand (1883) considering competition in which
prices are selected.
Over the years, the standard simultaneous-move models were further extended in
different directions. First steps in the area of differentiated duopolies were taken by the
fundamental work of Singh and Vives (1984), who focus on simultaneous-move games
and discuss the impact of horizontal product differentiation on the outcome of Bertrand
and Cournot competition. By allowing for more general demand functions, Cheng
(1985) generalizes the approach of Singh and Vives (1984), whereas Vives (1985),
Okuguchi (1987), Ha¨ckner (2000) and Amir and Jin (2001) allow for n product varieties
with different focuses of analysis.
Another branch of literature considers vertical product differentiation including
works of Motta (1993) and Symeonidis (2003). Productivity-increasing process inno-
vation finds attention in the articles of for example Bester and Petrakis (1993), Qiu
(1997) and Pauwels et al. (2014). Quite similar to our modeling, Zanchettin (2006)
discusses a model of horizontal and vertical product differentiation with exogenously
given asymmetric product qualities and asymmetric duopolists’ productivities. In
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contrast to our work, he restricts attention to substitute goods with exogenous input
prices. Further contributions with both types of differentiation, going in distinctive
directions are of Bonanno and Haworth (1998b), Weiss (2003), Filippini and Martini
(2010) and Bacchiega et al. (2011) amongst others.
The aforementioned articles did indeed consider differentiated duopolies, but ne-
glect the market power of an input supplier which is considered in Ha¨ckner (2003),
Correa-Lo´pez (2007), Mukherjee et al. (2012) and Manasakis and Vlassis (2014), for
instance. Closest to our modeling is the work of Mukherjee et al. (2012) in which two
unequally productive intermediaries procure their inputs from a monopolistic input
supplier and offer a homogenous final good at the market. Differently to us, the input
supplier is able to discriminate in prices, having the main objective to compare the
market participants’ profits for Bertrand and Cournot competition.
The works described above share the feature of duopolists selecting either prices
or quantities simultaneously. Criticizing the simultaneous-move approach of Cournot
(1838), the work of Von Stackelberg (1934) introduces a homogenous goods market in
which firms take decisions about production quantities sequentially. In his model focus
is put on the market’s outcome in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. It turns out
that first-moving firm must make at least as much profits as in a simultaneous move
Cournot equilibrium. For identical firms, concave demand and convex costs, it could
be shown that there exists a first-mover advantage, i.e., the leader’s profit is higher
than the follower’s profit in equilibrium.
The crucial work of Von Stackelberg (1934) was afterwards extended by models
allowing firms to set prices instead of quantities. In her seminal contribution, Gal-Or
(1985) found that the classical result of Von Stackelberg (1934) showing the existence
of a first-mover advantage does not hold if prices and not quantities are chosen by
duopolists.
Beyond this, further extensions were conducted by Boyer and Moreaux (1987b) or
Banerjee and Chatterjee (2014), who analyze the impact of horizontal product differ-
entiation on the equilibrium outcome when decisions on prices or quantities are taken
sequentially. Lee et al. (2014) introduce an input supplier and investigate for first-
and second-mover advantages. They show that the standard results established by
for Bertrand and Cournot competition must not necessarily hold when considering
vertically related markets. This outcome can be explained by the monopolistic in-
put supplier controlling first- and second-mover advantages by selecting input prices
Chapter 4. Sequential Competition of Intermediaries 132
accordingly. He optimizes his profit by removing the first-mover (second-mover) ad-
vantage under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. Differently than Lee et al. (2014)
within our approach the input supplier charges a unique input price and is thus not
able to discriminate in prices.
Another stream of literature goes in a slightly different direction, namely, settings
in which the role of a firm, whether to be in the leading or following position is
endogenous. First steps in this area were taken by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and
continuously extended over the years of for instance Van Damme and Hurkens (1999)
and van Damme and Hurkens (2004). Further contributions consider asymmetries and
uncertainty with Motta (1993) and Albaek (1990) as well as product innovation which
is treated by for instance Lambertini (1996) and Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2001).
Although differently than the aforementioned works, but similarly to our ideas,
Noh and Moschini (2006) discuss a differentiated market for which the potential entry
of a new product is analyzed. They consider a game including an incumbent and a
potential entry firm and investigate the players’ strategic investment choice in product
quality. This kind of modeling goes in the direction of the discussion we have in the
last section of this paper.
For a more detailed literature overview see Chapter 2. To the best of our knowl-
edge, settings of intermediate goods markets in which choices of intermediaries are
taken sequentially were not considered in literature yet.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In section 4.2 we discuss
the competition stage of our model. In this context we introduce the customer’s util-
ity function and determine his according demand for products of both intermediaries.
Furthermore, the intermediaries’ equilibrium production quantities as well as the in-
put supplier’s optimal choice of input price are determined and discussed. The section
closes with a comparison of the equilibria evolving for the Stackelberg leader and fol-
lower. Section 4.3 considers the innovation stage and gives an outlook for investigating
the intermediaries’ optimal investment decisions in product innovation when produc-
tivities are symmetric. We finally conclude in section 4.4 and identify directions for
future research.
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4.2 Competition between Intermediaries
In the following section we introduce the players of our model, i.e., the customer, the
intermediaries and the input supplier, and analyze the decisions they take. As we
proceed backwards, we start with the customer and the analysis of his utility function,
followed by an investigation of the competition between intermediaries as well as the
input supplier’s optimal price decision.
4.2.1 The customer
The representative customer is able to purchase quantities of two different products
q = (q1, q2) which are supplied by intermediary 1 and intermediary 2 respectively.
The product of intermediary i has a quality of αi > 0 for i = 1, 2. Products are
assumed to be horizontally differentiated, i.e., different degrees of substitutability,
complementarity or mutually independence are possible. The degree of horizontal
product differentiation is formalized by the parameter γ ∈ [−1, 1], where for substitutes
γ ∈ (0, 1], for complements γ ∈ [−1, 0) and for independent products γ = 0 holds.
If γ = 1, goods are perfect substitutes and competition is rather intense, whereas if
γ = −1 goods are perfect complements and competition is less fierce. The customer’s
utility function is similar to the one used by Singh and Vives (1984) and given by
U(q1, q2) = α1q1 + α2q2 − 1
2
(
q21 + q
2
2 + 2γq1q2
)
+ I. (4.1)
The customer is able to obtain utility from consuming a quantity q1 offered by interme-
diary 1 and a quantity q2 offered by intermediary 2. Utility increases in the according
product qualities α = (α1, α2). Hence, the customer prefers to consume high-quality
products over consuming products with low quality. Within Eq. (4.1) it can easily be
seen that if on the one hand goods are complements and therefore γ < 0, the customer
profits from consuming quantities of both products, q1 and q2, resulting in an addi-
tional utility. If on the other hand goods are substitutes and thus γ > 0, consuming
quantities of both goods decreases utility. The factor I represents the quantity of an
outside good which the customer is able to consume besides the quantities of q1 and
q2. The utility function U is linear and separable in the consumption of good I and
prevents income effects on the duopolistic sector.
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In the following, we will focus on the competition between intermediaries within
the intermediate goods market and determine their according subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium strategies. To do so, the customer’s demand for quantities q = (q1, q2) need
to be determined. Taken the prices p = (p1, p2) of intermediary 1’s and intermediary
2’s product as given, the customer chooses to purchase the quantity qi that maximize
his utility function, respecting his budget constraint of m ≥ piqi + p3−iq3−i + I, with
m being the overall budget. In order to ensure an inner solution we assume m to be
sufficiently large. The utility maximizing quantity decision for product i with i = 1, 2,
subject to the budget constraint satisfies
αi − qi − pi − γq3−i = 0. (4.2)
From Eq. (4.2) we obtain the inverse demand function for the product of intermediary
i, which is
pi (qi, q3−i) = αi − qi − γq3−i for i = 1, 2. (4.3)
Given intermediary i chooses to produce quantity qi and intermediary 3 − i chooses
to produce quantity q3−i, the resulting market price for product i is given by pi as
displayed in Eq. (4.3). It can be seen that intermediary i is able to demand a higher
price pi for a product of high quality than for product of low quality. In addition, if
goods are complements and thus γ < 0, pi is increasing in q3−i. The opposite is true,
if goods are substitutes (γ > 0). Finally, if goods are independent (γ = 0), there is no
relation between pi and q3−i.
Intermediary i’s profit function pii is given by
pii (qi, q3−i, c, αi, α3−i) = (pi (qi, q3−i)− λic) qi = (αi − qi − γq3−i − λic) qi. (4.4)
On the sales side, intermediary i achieves returns of piqi whereas on the procurement
side, he suffers total input costs of λiqic. As in Mukherjee et al. (2012) intermediaries
can have different degrees of productivity described by the factor λi > 0. λi represents
the number of inputs that are needed to produce one unit of output. If λi increases,
intermediary i’s productivity decreases as more input units are needed to produce the
same quantity of outputs. Hence, the costs of procurement increase in λi. Within our
model we assume λi to be exogenously given for i = 1, 2. Besides this, c represents
the input price which is charged by the input supplier.
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4.2.2 The intermediaries
In contrast to Chapter 3 we do not consider a game in which decisions are taken
simultaneously. In our approach intermediaries choose their production quantities one
after the other. The Stackelberg leader is the first player to choose quantities whereas
the Stackelberg follower decides thereafter. For the upcoming section, without loss of
generality we assume intermediary 1 to be the Stackelberg leader and intermediary 2
to be the Stackelberg follower.
In the following we will first specify the equilibrium quantities produced by the
Stackelberg leader and the Stackelberg follower. Afterwards we will derive the stated
results for the different market scenarios of duopoly and monopoly market. The equi-
librium quantities of the Stackelberg leader are given by
qSL1 =

(2α1−γα2)−(2λ1−γλ2)c
2(2−γ2) if c < min{2α1−γα22λ1−γλ2 ,
4α2−γ2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 }
α1−λ1c
2
if 4α2−γ
2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 ≤ c < α1λ1
0 otherwise,
(4.5)
whereas equilibrium quantities of the Stackelberg follower are given by
qSF2 =

(4α2−γ2α2−2γα1)−(4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1)c
4(2−γ2) if c < min
{
2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ,
4α2−γ2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1
}
α2−λ2c
2
if 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ≤ c < α2λ2
0 otherwise.
(4.6)
Eq. (4.5) and (4.6) show, that equilibrium quantities of the Stackelberg leader and
the Stackelberg follower depend on the supplier’s input price selection c. Within the
first case, for a sufficiently low input price c < min{2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ,
4α2−γ2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 }, we obtain
a duopoly market in which both intermediaries procure inputs and offer products on
the market. For the second case, c is too high for one of the intermediaries, but still
low enough for the other intermediary to achieve non-negative profits, a monopoly
situation occurs in equilibrium.
We now derive the above stated equilibrium outcomes and start our analysis by
considering the case of a duopoly market in which intermediary 1 (Stackelberg leader)
as well as intermediary 2 (Stackelberg follower) procure input goods from the input
supplier and sell products to the customer (q1 > 0 and q2 > 0). For such a market
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situation, the input price c must be sufficiently low for both intermediaries to achieve
non-negative profits. Given the requirements of a duopoly market are satisfied, we
derive the above displayed equilibrium quantities qSL1 and q
SF
2 via backwards induction.
Thus, we start with the second-moving intermediary 2.
From intermediary 2’s profit function pi2 as well as the fact that negative profits
can be avoided by not producing, we obtain the following best reply function
q2 (q1) = max
{
α2 − γq1 − λ2c
2
, 0
}
. (4.7)
The best reply function of intermediary 2 specifies the quantity choice that maximizes
his profit for a given quantity of intermediary 1. Anticipating q2 (q1), intermediary 1
chooses the profit maximizing equilibrium quantity. For the first case of q2 (q1) > 0 we
obtain
qSL1 =
(2α1 − γα2)− (2λ1 − γλ2) c
2 (2− γ2) . (4.8)
With qSL1 and intermediary 2’s best reply function q2 (q1) we are now able to determine
intermediary 2’s equilibrium quantity, which is given by
qSF2 =
(4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)− (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) c
4 (2− γ2) . (4.9)
When considering the second case of Eq. (4.7) with q2 (q1) = 0, intermediary 2 chooses
not to produce a positive quantity and we obtain a monopoly scenario with interme-
diary 1 as the monopolist.
In a next step we derive conditions on the input price c such that both intermedi-
aries have an incentive to demand inputs on the procurement side and offer positive
quantities on the sales side. For the Stackelberg leader, in order to assure qSL1 > 0 we
need c < 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 , for intermediary 2 to assure q
SF
2 > 0 the input price must satisfy
c < 4α2−γ
2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 . Thus, if the input price satisfies
c < min
{
2α1 − γα2
2λ1 − γλ2 ,
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
}
, (4.10)
both intermediaries procure inputs and offer positive quantities on the market. If c
exceeds the minimum of the above values, there will either be a monopoly market or
no production. It can easily be seen, that the “critical” input price of intermediary 1
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increases in its own product quality α1 and decreases in the productivity λ1. Hence,
for a given input price c an intermediary producing a low-quality product and/or
being unproductive may leave the market whereas an intermediary producing a high-
quality product and/or being productive stays. The influence of intermediary 2’s
quality α2 and λ2 on the critical input price of intermediary 1 is dependening on
whether products are complements or substitutes. If goods are complements, the
critical input price of intermediary 1 is increasing in α2 and decreasing in λ2. In this
case intermediary 1 profits from a high product quality or productivity of intermediary
2. If goods are substitutes, the critical input price of intermediary 1 is decreasing in
α2 and increasing in λ2. In this scenario, a high product quality as well as a high
productivity of intermediary 2 has a negative effect on intermediary 1’s critical input
price. Similar effects as above can be observed when considering intermediary 2’s
critical input price.
When comparing critical input prices of the Stackelberg leader and the Stackelberg
follower, we get Eq. (4.11). Intermediary i is the potential monopolist if and only if
he is more competitive than intermediary 3− i and vice versa. More precisely,
min
{
2αi − γα3−i
2λi − γλ3−i ,
4α3−i − γ2α3−i − 2γαi
4λ3−i − γ2λ3−i − 2γλi
}
=

4α3−i−γ2α3−i−2γαi
4λ3−i−γ2λ3−i−2γλi iff
αi
λi
> α3−i
λ3−i
,
2αi−γα3−i
2λi−γλ3−i iff
αi
λi
< α3−i
λ3−i
(4.11)
holds. For the case that αi
λi
> α3−i
λ3−i
is satisfied, intermediary i has a competitive ad-
vantage towards intermediary 3 − i. This is due to the fact that on the one hand
for a high product quality αi intermediary i faces a higher costumer demand for his
product. On the other hand, when being rather productive with low λi his costs of
procurement low. Eq. (4.11) shows that given intermediary 1 is more competitive than
intermediary 2, with a rising input price c intermediary 2 is the first one to drop out
of the market. Therefore, if c is sufficiently high, intermediary 2 will leave the market
and intermediary 1 will be a monopolist. The same holds vice versa.
After having considered the duopoly market we now analyze the case of a monopoly
market, in which either intermediary 1 or intermediary 2 can be the monopolist. In
order to determine intermediary i’s equilibrium quantity within a monopoly, suppose
αi
λi
> α3−i
λ3−i
for i = 1, 2. Intermediary i is more competitive than intermediary 3− i and
thus the potential monopolist. With q3−i = 0 and maximizing intermediary i’s profit
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function with respect to qi yields the monopolist’s equilibrium quantity of
q
SL/SF
i =
αi − λic
2
. (4.12)
As stated above, a monopoly market only arises if the input price c is small enough for
intermediary i to achieve non-negative profits, but high enough to exclude intermediary
3− i from the market.
Suppose α1
λ1
> α2
λ2
and the input price satisfying c ≥ 4α2−γ2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 . In this setting
intermediary 2 is excluded from the market. By using Eq. (4.12), we obtain that given
qSF2 = 0, if and only if c <
α1
λ1
, intermediary 1 has an incentive to produce a positive
amount with qSL1 > 0. Hence, an input price satisfying
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1 ≤ c <
α1
λ1
, (4.13)
results in a monopoly situation with intermediary 1 as the monopolist.
For the opposite case with α1
λ1
< α2
λ2
the Stackelberg follower is more competitive
and thus the potential monopolist. An input price such that
2α1 − γα2
2λ1 − γλ2 ≤ c <
α2
λ2
(4.14)
guarantees a monopoly with intermediary 2 as the monopolist. As c ≥ 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 holds,
the input price is too high for intermediary 1 to have a positive demand for inputs.
Given qSL1 = 0 and using Eq. (4.12) we obtain that for c <
α2
λ2
intermediary 2 always
has an incentive to offer products on the market resulting in a monopoly.
In the final case, no production occurs if the input price c is too high for inter-
mediaries to achieve non-negative profits. In this scenario neither intermediary 1 nor
intermediary 2 produces and therefore qSL1 = q
SF
2 = 0 holds.
In the following we impose some technical assumptions on the product qualities
αi and productivities λi for i = 1, 2. We demand the equilibrium quantities q
SL
1 and
qSF2 to increase in “weighted” qualities and decrease in the input price c. Note that
the assumptions on qSL1 and q
SF
2 to increase in “weighted” qualities excludes a range
of quality-asymmetries that immediately forces one of the intermediary out of the
market.
139 Chapter 4. Sequential Competition of Intermediaries
Assumption 4.1. Given intermediary 1 is the Stackelberg leader and intermediary 2
the Stackelberg follower, we assume α1
α2
, λ1
λ2
∈
[
γ
2
, 4−γ
2
2γ
]
for γ > 0.
Given equilibrium quantities qSL1 and q
SF
2 as well as the customer’s inverse demand
function are as displayed in Eq. (4.3), we are now able to determine the equilibrium
prices of intermediary 1, given by
pSL1 = p
SL
1 (q
SL
1 , q
SF
2 ) =

(
2−γ2
2
)
qSL1 + λ1c if c < min
{
2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ,
4α2−γ2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1
}
α1+λ1c
2
if 4α2−γ
2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 ≤ c < α1λ1
0 otherwise,
(4.15)
and of intermediary 2, given by
pSF2 (q
SL
1 , q
SF
2 ) =

qSF2 + λ2c if c < min
{
2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ,
4α2−γ2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1
}
α2+λ2c
2
if 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ≤ c < α2λ2
0 otherwise.
(4.16)
The total equilibrium demand for input products which will be needed within the
next section is depending on the intermediaries’ equilibrium production quantities qSL1
and qSF2 as well as their according input productivities λi for i = 1, 2. For a duopoly
and a monopoly with either intermediary 1 or intermediary 2 producing the total
demand is given by
qSI (c) = λ1q
SL
1 + λ2q
SF
2
=

(2λ1(2α1−γα2)+λ2(4α2−γ2α2−2γα1))
4(2−γ2)
−(2λ1(2λ1−γλ2)+λ2(4λ2−γ
2λ2−2γλ1))c
4(2−γ2) if c < min{2α1−γα22λ1−γλ2 ,
4α2−γ2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 }
λ1(α1−λ1c)
2
if 4α2−α2γ
2−2α1γ
4λ2−λ2γ2−2λ1γ ≤ c < α1λ1
λ2(α2−λ2c)
2
if 2α1−α2γ
2λ1−λ2γ ≤ c < α2λ2
0 otherwise.
(4.17)
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4.2.3 The input supplier
In the following we determine the supplier’s equilibrium input price decision and derive
his according profits. Within our analysis, we distinguish between the cases in which
the supplier serves a duopoly, a monopoly or no production occurs. In general, the
monopolistic input supplier selects the input price that maximizes his profit piI (c) =
qSI (c)c, where his production costs are normalized to zero.
First, consider a duopoly market. When using the input supplier’s profit function
piI (c) as well as the total equilibrium input demand of Eq. (4.17) for a duopoly, we
get the following profit maximizing input price:
c∗ =
2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)
2 (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) . (4.18)
The input price c∗ is a unique maximizer as piI(c) is quadratic in c (see Eq. (4.17))
and Assumption 4.1 ensures concavity. Note that c∗ is the optimal input price for a
duopoly market if and only if c∗ < min{2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ,
4α2−γ2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 } is satisfied.
In the following we derive conditions such that c∗ suffices the above inequality. The
analysis is done for the scenarios in which intermediary 1 and in which intermediary
2 is more competitive.
First suppose intermediary 1 to be more competitive than intermediary 2 with
α1
λ1
> α2
λ2
. According to Eq. (4.11), in such a setting we obtain a duopoly market if
c∗ < 4α2−γ
2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 is satisfied. The input price c
∗ is indeed the maximizer of a duopoly
market if and only if intermediary 2’s product quality α2 is sufficiently high compared
to the weighted product quality α1 of intermediary 1. More precisely, we need
α2 > α1
2 ((4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) (2λ1 + γλ2) + 4γλ1 (2λ1 − γλ2))
(4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) (4λ2 − γ2λ2 + 2γλ1) + 4λ1 (4− γ2) (2λ1 − γλ2) . (4.19)
Thus, is Ineq. (4.19) satisfied we get an interior solution with the optimal input
price cS = c∗. Given α2 is too small and Ineq. (4.19) is not satisfied we face a corner
solution with the optimal input price of cS = 4α2−γ
2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 . This input price guaran-
tees that both intermediaries produce in equilibrium. It is indeed the maximizer, as
the supplier’s profit function piI (c) is concave in c and monotonically increasing in the
interval [0, c∗] with 4α2−γ
2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 ∈ [0, c∗]. Hence, the input supplier’s optimal input
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price is given by
cS = min
{
c∗,
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
}
. (4.20)
Now, suppose the opposite case in which intermediary 2 is more competitive than
intermediary 1 with α1
λ1
< α2
λ2
. According to Eq. (4.11), for c∗ being the maximizing
input price within a duopoly c∗ < 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 must be satisfied. This is true if and only if
the product quality α1 of intermediary 1 is sufficiently large compared to the weighted
product quality of intermediary 2. More precisely, we need
α1 > α2
(2λ1 − γλ2) (4λ2 − γ2λ2 + 2γλ1) + 2γλ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)
2 ((2λ1 − γλ2) (2λ1 + γλ2) + 2λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) . (4.21)
Analogous to the case above, is Ineq. (4.21) satisfied we obtain an interior solution
with cS = c∗. Is Ineq. (4.21) not satisfied we get a corner solution with cS = 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2
guaranteeing that both intermediaries produce in equilibrium. The input price of
cS = 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 is indeed the maximizer, as piI(c) is monotonically increasing in the
interval [0, c∗] with 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ∈ [0, c∗]. Thus, in a duopoly intermediate goods market
the input supplier optimally chooses an input price of
cS = min
{
c∗,
2α1 − γα2
2λ1 − γλ2
}
. (4.22)
Summarized, within a duopoly market the input supplier’s optimal input prices are
cS =

2λ1(2α1−γα2)+λ2(4α2−γ2α2−2γα1)
2(2λ1(2λ1−γλ2)+λ2(4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1)) if c
∗ < min
{
2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ,
4α2−γ2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1
}
4α2−γ2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 if c
∗ > 4α2−γ
2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1
and α1
λ1
> α2
λ2
2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 if c
∗ > 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2
and α1
λ1
< α2
λ2
.
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Given the above optimal input prices, the supplier’s profits when serving a duopoly
are given by
piI
(
cS
)
=

λ1(2α1−γα2)cS
4(2−γ2) if c
∗ < min
{
2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ,
4α2−γ2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1
}
with cS = c∗
2λ1(α1λ2−α2λ1)cS
(4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1) if c
∗ > 4α2−γ
2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1
and α1
λ1
> α2
λ2
with cS = 4α2−γ
2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 ,
λ2(α2λ1−α1λ2)cS
(2λ1−γλ2) if c
∗ > 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2
and α1
λ1
< α2
λ2
with cS = 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 .
(4.23)
After having analyzed the supplier’s optimal input price choices for a duopoly
market, we now consider a monopolistic intermediate goods market. In a first case we
assume the more competitive intermediary 1 to be the monopolist, in a second case
we consider intermediary 2 to be the more competitive monopolist.
Assume intermediary 1 to be more competitive than intermediary 2 with α1
λ1
>
α2
λ2
. The input supplier’s profit maximizing input price with intermediary 1 as the
monopolist is given by
c∗ =
α1
2λ1
. (4.24)
For c∗ to create a monopoly market it must on the one hand be sufficiently low for
intermediary 1 to achieve non-negative profits. This is true for c∗ < α1
λ1
. On the other
hand, c∗ must be high enough to exclude intermediary 2 from the market. This is
satisfied if c∗ > 4α2−γ
2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 is satisfied. The input price c
∗ of Eq. (4.24) satisfies
the above inequalities if and only if the product quality α2 is sufficiently small. More
precisely
α2 < α1
4λ2 − γ2λ2 + 2γλ1
2λ1 (4− γ2) (4.25)
must hold. Hence, is Ineq. (4.25) satisfied we obtain an interior solution with cS = c∗.
Is α2 too large, we get a corner solution with the input price of c
S = 4α2−γ
2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 .
The corner solution indeed maximizes the input supplier’s profit, as piI (c) is concave
in c. Hence, the optimal input price for a monopoly with intermediary 1 being the
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monopolist is given by
cS = max
{
α1
2λ1
,
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
}
.
The resulting input supplier’s equilibrium profits for the cases interior and corner
solutions are given by
piI
(
cS
)
=

α21
8
if 4α2−γ
2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 ≤ c < α1λ1
and 4α2−γ
2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 <
α1
2λ1
λ1(α1λ2−α2λ1)(4−γ2)
2(4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1) · cS if
4α2−γ2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 ≤ c < α1λ1
and 4α2−γ
2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 >
α1
2λ1
with cS = 4α2−γ
2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 .
(4.26)
Now suppose intermediary 2 to be more competitive than intermediary 1 with
α1
λ1
< α2
λ2
. Intermediary 2 will be the potential monopolist in this scenario. We have
shown above, that a monopoly market arises, if the input supplier selects an input
price such that 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ≤ c < α2λ2 . The input price that maximizes the supplier’s profit
function for intermediary 2 as the monopolist is given by
c∗ =
α2
2λ2
. (4.27)
The input price c∗ of Eq. (4.27) satisfies 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ≤ c < α2λ2 if and only if the product
quality α1 is sufficiently small. More precisely we need
α1 < α2
2λ1 + γλ2
4λ2
. (4.28)
Thus, is Ineq. (4.28) satisfied we obtain an interior solution with the input price of
cS = c∗. Is α1 too large, we get a corner solution with the input price of
2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 . Note
that cS indeed maximizes the input supplier’s profit, as the input supplier’s monopoly
profit function is concave in c. The input supplier’s optimal input price for a monopoly
in which intermediary 2 produces is therefore given by
cS =
{
α2
2λ2
,
2α1 − γα2
2λ1 − γλ2
}
. (4.29)
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The resulting input supplier’s equilibrium profits for the cases of interior and corner
solutions are given by
piI
(
cS
)
=

α22
8
if 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ≤ c < α2λ2
and 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 <
α2
2λ2
λ2(α2λ1−α1λ2)
(2λ1−γλ2) · cS if
2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ≤ c < α2λ2
and 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 >
α2
2λ2
with cS = 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 .
(4.30)
Besides duopoly and monopoly, the final case of no production occurs, if the input
price is too high for both of the intermediaries to produce. In this case qSL1 = q
SF
2 = 0
holds and therefore the total input demand is qSI = 0 with the input supplier’s profit
piI (c) = 0.
In the above section we have seen that by choosing the input price accordingly,
the supplier is able to influence the type of market, i.e., duopoly, monopoly or no
production. While focusing on interior solutions within monopoly and duopoly, the
next Proposition discusses the supplier’s incentives to exclude one of the intermediaries
from the market.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose an interior solution within monopoly and duopoly market.
If intermediaries are sufficiently asymmetric in favor of the more competitive Stackel-
berg leader, it is optimal for the input supplier to choose an input price c such that he
sells his inputs only to the Stackelberg leader excluding the Stackelberg follower from
the market.
More precisely, if
α2 < α1τ
SL
1 (4.31)
with
τSL1 =
√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1))− 2 (2λ1 − γλ2)
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1 ,
then it is optimal for the input supplier to only serve intermediary 1. The same holds if
intermediary 1 is the Stackelberg follower and intermediary 2 is the Stackelberg leader.
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Note that τSL1 can be rewritten as
τSL1 =
√
2 (2− γ2)
(
2λ1
λ2
(
2λ1
λ2
− γ
)
+
(
4− γ2 − 2γ λ1
λ2
))
− 2
(
2λ1
λ2
− γ
)
4− γ2 − 2γ λ1
λ2
and is therefore homogeneous of degree zero in λ1 and λ2.
Within Proposition 4.1 we analyze the scenarios for which the input supplier’s
profit when serving a monopoly is higher than when serving a duopoly, given inter-
mediary 1 is more competitive than intermediary 2. It could be seen that if there
are high asymmetries of product qualities with α2 < α1τ
SL
1 the input supplier se-
lects the input price cS = α1
2λ1
, excluding intermediary 2 from the market and hence
resulting in a monopoly with only intermediary 1 producing. For the opposite case
with α2 ≥ α1τSL1 , the input supplier favors to serve a duopoly with the input price of
cS =
2λ1(2α1−γα2)+λ2(4α2−γ2α2−2γα1)
2(2λ1(2λ1−γλ2)+λ2(4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1)) .
The next Proposition considers the case in which the Stackelberg follower is more
competitive than the Stackelberg leader with α1
λ1
< α2
λ2
. It states the impact of the input
supplier’s optimal input price decision on the type of market for interior monopoly and
duopoly solutions. Differently to Proposition 4.1, Proposition 4.2 analyzes the input
supplier’s incentive to exclude the less competitive Stackelberg leader from the market.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose an interior solution within monopoly and duopoly market
where intermediary 2 is the more competitive Stackelberg follower. If intermediaries
are sufficiently asymmetric in favor of the more competitive Stackelberg follower, it is
optimal for the input supplier to choose an input price c such that he sells his inputs
only to intermediary 2 excluding intermediary 1 from the market.
More precisely, if
α1 < α2τ
SF
2 (4.32)
with
τSF2 =
√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1))− (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)
2 (2λ1 − γλ2) ,
then it is optimal for the input supplier to only serve intermediary 2. The same holds
if intermediary 1 is the more competitive Stackelberg follower and intermediary 2 is
the Stackelberg leader.
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The multiplier τSF2 is homogeneous of degree zero in λ1 and λ2 and can be rewritten
as
τSF2 =
√
2 (2− γ2)
(
2
(
2− γ λ2
λ1
)
+ λ2
λ1
(
4λ2
λ1
− γ2 λ2
λ1
− 2γ
))
−
(
4λ2
λ1
− γ2 λ2
λ1
− 2γ
)
2
(
2− γ λ2
λ1
) .
Within Proposition 4.2 we analyze the scenarios for which the input supplier’s
profit when serving a monopoly is higher than when serving a duopoly, given interme-
diary 2 is more competitive than intermediary 1. If product qualities are sufficiently
asymmetric with α1 < α2τ
SF
2 the input supplier selects the input price c
S = α2
2λ2
,
which excludes intermediary 1 from the market and therefore results in a monopoly
with only intermediary 2 producing. Supposing the opposite case with α1 ≥ α2τSF2 ,
the input supplier prefers to serve a duopoly and selects the duopoly input price of
cS =
2λ1(2α1−γα2)+λ2(4α2−γ2α2−2γα1)
2(2λ1(2λ1−γλ2)+λ2(4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1)) .
Notice that by choosing his input price c, the input supplier is not able to impact
whether intermediary 1 or intermediary 2 is producing in a monopoly. This is solely
determined by the intermediaries’ competitiveness, which can be increased by investing
in product innovation.
4.2.4 Comparison between Stackelberg leader and Stackel-
berg follower
In this section we compare the equilibrium quantities of a Stackelberg leader and a
Stackelberg follower. Moreover, we analyze the input supplier’s incentives for driving
a Stackelberg follower and a Stackelberg leader out of the market.
In the previous sections we considered intermediary 1 to be the Stackelberg leader
and intermediary 2 to be the Stackelberg follower. For the upcoming analysis the equi-
librium outcome for the reversed role distribution, i.e., intermediary 1 as the Stack-
elberg follower and intermediary 2 as the Stackelberg leader, is required. We have a
focus on intermediary 1 and compare his equilibrium quantity qSL1 when being in the
leading and qSF1 when being in the following position. A similar comparison will be
done between τSL1 and τ
SF
1 .
For the above analysis, supposing intermediary 1 to be the follower, we derive his
equilibrium quantities qSF1 for a duopoly and monopoly market which are analogous
to the quantities qSF2 displayed in Eq. (4.5). Furthermore, we determine the multiplier
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τSF1 which is closely related to τ
SF
2 of Proposition 4.2. Note that a similar analysis
can be carried out when considering intermediary 2.
As the customer’s utility function is symmetric in the product quantities of inter-
mediary 1 and intermediary 2, intermediary 1’s equilibrium quantity when being the
Stackelberg follower is similar to the quantity in which intermediary 2 is the follower,
as displayed in Eq. (4.6). Thus, it is given by
qSF1 =

(4α1−γ2α1−2γα2)−(4λ1−γ2λ1−2γλ2)c
2(4−2γ2) if c < min{2α2−γα12λ2−γλ1 ,
4α1−γ2α1−2γα2
4λ1−γ2λ1−2γλ2 }
α1−λ1c
2
if 2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 ≤ c < α1λ1
0 otherwise.
(4.33)
Analogous to the previous section, we need to impose technical assumptions for in-
termediary 1’s equilibrium quantities qSF1 and for intermediary 2’s equilibrium quanti-
ties qSL2 to increase in “weighted” qualities and decrease in the input price c. Therefore
we obtain Assumption 4.2.
Assumption 4.2. Given intermediary 1 is the Stackelberg follower and intermediary
2 the Stackelberg leader, we assume α1
α2
, λ1
λ2
∈
[
2γ
4−γ2 ,
2
γ
]
for γ > 0.
When comparing intermediary 1’s equilibrium quantities as a Stackelberg leader
with his equilibrium quantities as a Stackelberg follower, we get Proposition 4.3.
Proposition 4.3.
(i) Suppose intermediary i to be more competitive than intermediary 3 − i for i =
{1, 2}. Within a duopoly, intermediary i’s equilibrium quantities are always
higher as a Stackelberg leader than as a Stackelberg follower: qSLi > q
SF
i .
(ii) Suppose intermediary 3 − i to be more competitive than intermediary i for i =
{1, 2}. Within a duopoly, if goods are substitutes, intermediary i’s equilibrium
quantities are always higher as a Stackelberg leader than as a Stackelberg follower:
qSLi > q
SF
i .
(iii) Suppose intermediary 3 − i to be more competitive than intermediary i for i =
{1, 2}. Within a duopoly, if goods are complements, there may exist asymme-
tries such that intermediary i’s equilibrium quantities are higher as a Stackelberg
follower than as a Stackelberg leader with qSLi < q
SF
i .
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Part (i) of Proposition 4.3 shows that in a duopoly intermediary i’s equilibrium
quantities when being the more competitive Stackelberg leader are higher than his
equilibrium quantities when being the more competitive Stackelberg follower. The
outcome holds for substitutes, complements as well as for mutually independent prod-
ucts and confirms the classic results for homogenous products of Von Stackelberg
(1934). Part (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 4.3 consider the opposite case in which for
both positions intermediary i is less competitive. Thus, intermediary 3− i will be the
potential monopolist. For (ii), given goods are substitutes with γ > 0 the same result
as in (i) holds. Thus, within a duopoly the equilibrium quantities of intermediary i
as the less competitive Stackelberg leader are higher than his equilibrium quantities
as the less competitive Stackelberg follower. According to (iii), if goods are comple-
ments, this must not necessarily be true. For a duopoly, if asymmetries are chosen
accordingly, the equilibrium quantity of the Stackelberg follower is higher than the
equilibrium quantity of the Stackelberg leader. An explanation for this outcome might
be that when having complements, competition between intermediaries is rather low.
Hence, the first-mover advantage of the Stackelberg leader which is indeed present for
substitutes vanishes.
Within the next section we compare the input supplier’s incentives to exclude a
less competitive Stackelberg follower with his incentives to exclude a less competitive
Stackelberg leader from the market. For the upcoming analysis, we assume intermedi-
ary 1 to be more competitive than intermediary 2 with α1
λ1
> α2
λ2
. Therefore, if the input
supplier has an incentive to exclude an intermediary, it will always be intermediary 2
leaving the market.
Analogous to Ineq. (4.28), the condition ensuring an interior monopoly solution is
given by
α2 < α1
2λ2 + γλ1
4λ1
, (4.34)
whereas related to Ineq. (4.21) the condition yielding an interior duopoly solution is
denoted by
α2 > α1
(2λ2 − γλ1) (4λ1 − γ2λ1 + 2γλ2) + 2γλ1 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ2)
2 ((2λ2 − γλ1) (2λ2 + γλ1) + 2λ1 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ2)) . (4.35)
Related to Proposition 4.2, supposing an interior solution within monopoly and duopoly
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market, the input supplier prefers to only serve intermediary 1, the Stackelberg fol-
lower, if his product quality α1 is sufficiently high compared to intermediary 2’s product
quality α2. More precisely, if
α2 < α1τ
SF
1 (4.36)
with
τSF1 =
√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1) + λ1 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ2))− (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ2)
2 (2λ2 − γλ1)
(4.37)
holds, the input supplier has an incentive to exclude intermediary 2, the Stackelberg
leader, from the market.
In the following analysis we compare τSL1 and τ
SF
1 for a given range of asymmetries
and degree of horizontal product differentiation. We get the following Proposition 4.4.
Proposition 4.4.
(i) Given intermediaries have the same productivity with λ1 = λ2 and products are
mutually independent with γ = 0, the input supplier’s incentive to exclude an
intermediary from the market is the same for the Stackelberg leader and for the
Stackelberg follower. More precisely:
τSL1 = τ
SF
1
holds.
(ii) Given intermediaries have the same productivity with λ1 = λ2 the input supplier’s
incentive to exclude the less competitive Stackelberg leader from the market is
higher than his incentive to exclude the less competitive Stackelberg follower.
More precisely:
τSL1 ≤ τSF1
holds.
Proposition 4.4 makes clear, that for given characteristics of (γ, α1, α2, λ1, λ2) the
input supplier rather prefers to exclude a less competitive Stackelberg leader over
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For intermediary 1 as ..., the input supplier charges an input price to sell to ...
Stackelberg leader :
intermediary 1.
Stackelberg follower :
intermediary 1.
large asymmetries
Stackelberg leader :
intermediary 1 and 2.
intermediate
asymmetries
Stackelberg follower :
intermediary 1.
Stackelberg leader :
intermediary 1 and 2.
Stackelberg follower :
intermediary 2 and 2.
small asymmetries
Figure 4.2: The input market for α2 ≤ α1 λ2λ1
excluding a less competitive Stackelberg follower from the market. The described
scenario is illustrated in Fig. 4.2. When considering the area of large asymmetries
in which intermediary 2’s product quality α2 is smaller than α1τ
SL
1 and smaller than
α1τ
SF
1 , he will be excluded from the market, no matter if he is the Stackelberg leader
or follower. For the most interesting case of intermediate asymmetries with α1τ
SL
1 <
α2 < α1τ
SF
1 , intermediary 2 will produce in equilibrium as a Stackelberg follower,
but will be driven out of the market as a Stackelberg leader. For the case of small
asymmetries, the input supplier selects his input price c sufficiently small such that
both intermediaries produce in equilibrium, independently of whether intermediary 2
is the Stackelberg leader or follower.
The input supplier’s behavior when facing intermediate asymmetries may be ex-
plained by his equilibrium profits that he is able to achieve with intermediary 1 in
the leading and in the following position. A comparison of input prices and resulting
profits for intermediary 1 as a Stackelberg leader and as a Stackelberg follower results
in Proposition 4.5.
Proposition 4.5. Suppose intermediary 1 is more competitive than intermediary 2,
with equal productivities λ1 = λ2 as well as the conditions for interior solutions being
satisfied.
(i) The input supplier’s equilibrium duopoly input price cS = c∗ is higher when
intermediary 1 is the Stackelberg leader than the duopoly equilibrium input price
when intermediary 1 is the Stackelberg follower.
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(ii) The input supplier’s equilibrium duopoly profit is higher when intermediary 1 is
the Stackelberg leader than his duopoly profit when intermediary 1 is the Stack-
elberg follower.
As the input supplier’s equilibrium duopoly profit is higher if intermediary 1 is
in the leading and intermediary 2 in the following position he is willing to accept
higher asymmetries between product qualities and select an input price c such that
intermediary 2 may stay in the market.
Something similar as described for the supplier’s profits can be observed for the
interior solution equilibrium input price. The input price c∗ is higher, if the more
competitive intermediary 1 is the Stackelberg leader compared to the case in which he
is the more competitive Stackelberg follower.
Within the upcoming section, we will give a first analysis of the intermediaries’
incentives to invest in product quality. To do so, we need to verify the intermediaries’
profits.
Suppose intermediary 1 to be the more competitive Stackelberg leader. With the
equilibrium quantities qSL1 and q
SF
2 , the input supplier’s optimal interior solution-input
price cS as well as the results of Proposition 4.1 and Proposition 4.2, intermediaries’
equilibrium profits are given by
piSL1
(
q1, q2, c
S, α1, α2
)
=

((2α1−γα2)−(2λ1−γλ2)cS)2
8(2−γ2) for α1τ
SL
1 < α2 < α1
λ2
λ1
,
α21
16
for α2 < α1τ
SL
1 ,
(4.38)
piSF2
(
q1, q2, c
S, α1, α2
)
=

((4α2−2γα1−γ2α1)−(4λ2−2γλ1−γ2λ2)cS)2
16(2−γ2)2 for α1τ
SL
1 < α2 < α1
λ2
λ1
,
0 for α2 < α1τ
SL
1 ,
(4.39)
with
cS =
2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)
2 (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) .
Note, that the condition α1τ
SL
1 < α2 < α1
λ2
λ1
implies a duopoly market whereas α2 <
α1τ
SL
1 results in a monopoly market in which intermediary 1 is the monopolist.
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For the opposite case, suppose intermediary 1 to be the more competitive Stackel-
berg follower. With qSF1 and q
SL
2 , the input supplier’s optimal interior solution-input
price cS as well as the results of Propositions 4.1 and Proposition 4.2, intermediaries’
equilibrium profits are denoted by
piSF1
(
q1, q2, c
S, α1, α2
)
=

((4α1−2γα2−γ2α2)−(4λ1−2γλ2−γ2λ1)cS)2
16(2−γ2)2 for α1τ
SF
1 < α2 < α1
λ2
λ1
,
α21
16
for α2 < α1τ
SF
1 ,
(4.40)
piSL2
(
q1, q2, c
S, α1, α2
)
=

((2α2−γα1)−(2λ2−γλ1)cS)2
8(2−γ2) for α1τ
SF
1 < α2 < α1
λ2
λ1
0 for α2 < α1τ
SF
1 ,
(4.41)
with
cS =
2λ2 (2α2 − γα1) + λ1 (4α1 − γ2α1 − 2γα2)
2 (2λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1) + λ1 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ2)) .
Similar to the previous case, α1τ
SF
1 < α2 < α1
λ2
λ1
results in a duopoly market and
α2 < α1τ
SF
1 implies a monopoly market in which intermediary 1 is the monopolist.
4.3 Product Innovation
4.3.1 Basic setup
Within this section we assume intermediaries being able to simultaneously choose a
level of investment to foster product quality. The product quality is given by αi ∈
[αi, αi], with 0 < αi < αi for i = 1, 2. If intermediary i decides not to invest, his
product quality is assumed to be αi, whereas a full investment results in αi. We
assume the costs of investment k > 0 to be identical for both intermediaries.
An investment in product quality may have two positive effects for the interme-
diary investing. First, it increases the own product’s demand on the sales side and
depending on the costs of investment may result in higher profits. Second, there is also
a strategic component when deciding about investing in product innovation. Suppose
one intermediary is excluded from the market. An investment may reduce asymmetries
between the own and the other intermediary’s product quality. If the resulting asym-
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metries are sufficiently small, the input supplier has an incentive to reduce the input
price and allow for a duopoly in the market. In another scenario in which a duopoly
is present, an intermediary may strategically increase his product quality such that
asymmetries arise. If those asymmetries are sufficiently large, the supplier increases
his input price and thus excludes the less competitive intermediary from the market.
Although suffering a higher input price, the fact of being the monopolist may result
in higher profits for the more competitive intermediary.
When analyzing the intermediaries’ profit functions piSLi
(
qi, q3−i, cS, αi, α3−i
)
and
piSF3−i
(
qi, q3−i, cS, αi, α3−i
)
with respect to product quality αi we obtain the following
Lemma 4.1 as well as Proposition 4.6.
Lemma 4.1. The Stackelberg leader’s profit piSLi
(
qi, q3−i, cS, αi, α3−i
)
and the Stack-
elberg follower’s profit piSF3−i
(
qi, q3−i, cS, αi, α3−i
)
(for i = 1, 2) are piecewise strictly
convex in its own qualities.
Due to the result of Lemma 4.1 we obtain the Proposition 4.6 which is similar to
the result established in Chapter 3.
Proposition 4.6. Nash equilibrium strategies of the investment game with linear costs
are in {αi, αi} ⊂ [αi, αi] for i = 1, 2.
Proposition 4.6 shows that when determining Nash equilibrium investment lev-
els with linear costs of investment, attention can be restricted to the minimum and
maximum quality levels αi and αi. Due to piecewise strict convexity of the intermedi-
aries’ profit function in own qualities, there exists a profit-minimizing product quality.
Therefore the product quality level that delivers an intermediary’s maximal profit will
be obtained at one of the end points of the interval [αi, αi]. This is true for the case
in which the profit minimizing product quality is within as well as outside the inter-
val [αi, αi]. Thus, given a certain minimum quality level of αi must be provided for
instance due to legal requirements we are able to simplify the intermediaries’ decision
of either investing or not investing.
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4.3.2 Outlook
In the previous sections we have seen that given intermediary 1 is more competitive
than intermediary 2, it is indeed crucial whether intermediary 1 is the Stackelberg
leader or Stackelberg follower. Proposition 4.4 yielded that there exist product qual-
ities α = (α1, α2) for which the input supplier drives a Stackelberg leader out of the
market, but prefers to accept a Stackelberg follower, ceteris paribus. Moreover, Propo-
sition 4.5 has established that for equal productivities the input supplier’s duopoly
profit is higher if the more competitive intermediary is in the leading position.
-
α1τ
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1 α1τ
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1
α2
α1
λ2
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Figure 4.3: Example for investments in product quality
Consider the example displayed in Figure 4.3 in which intermediary 1 is always more
competitive than intermediary 2. This is true even if intermediary 2 has invested with
α2 and intermediary 1 has not invested with α1. Therefore, α2 < α1
λ2
λ1
or equivalently
α1
λ1
> α2
λ2
is satisfied and intermediary 2 never has the chance to be more competitive
than intermediary 1. This setting implies that when having a monopoly, intermediary
1 will be the monopolist.
Suppose intermediary 2 does not invest and therefore offers a product quality of α2.
As displayed in Figure 4.3 intermediary 2’s product quality with α2 < α1τ
SL
1 < α1τ
SF
1
is too small such that in equilibrium the input supplier selects an input price which
drives him out of the market. Note that intermediary 2 will be excluded in both cases,
i.e., when being the leader and when being the follower. Now assume intermediary 2
decides to invest in product quality which results in α2. Figure 4.3 shows that given
intermediary 1 is the Stackelberg leader, the input supplier has no incentive to drive
intermediary 2 out of the market which results in a duopoly. This is true as α2 > α1τ
SL
1
holds. Even if intermediary 1 also invests in product quality with α1, the asymmetries
between α1 and α2 are sufficiently low such that the input supplier prefers to serve a
duopoly. However, is intermediary 1 in the position of the follower and intermediary 2
in the position of the leader, we observe α2 < α1τ
SF
1 . Hence, the input supplier selects
an input price c such that intermediary 2 has no incentive to produce in equilibrium
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and we have a monopoly market. This result is independent on whether intermediary
1 decides to invest or not to invest.
For the given example, when determining the Nash equilibrium investment deci-
sion, the cost of investment k also needs to be considered. We have seen that when
being the Stackelberg follower, the investment of intermediary 2 and the according
reduction of asymmetries in product quality led to an input price reduction of the
supplier. However, whether an investment has a positive or negative effect on inter-
mediary 2’s profit is always dependent on the costs of investment. In case that the
costs of investment are too high such that an investment results in a loss, investing
will never be a Nash equilibrium strategy.
A simplified example which describes the strategic component of investing in prod-
uct quality can be given as follows: Within a monopoly market there is only one highly
competitive firm procuring his inputs from a monopolistic input supplier and offering
his products to his customers. Besides this, there exists a firm, let’s say an innovator
thinking about entering the market. Without an investment in product quality the
firm is not able to overcome market entry barriers. If and only if the potential entrant
firm is able to decrease asymmetries between product qualities of the incumbent firm
and itself, it will be able to enter the market and, under certain circumstances, make
positive profits. By investing itself, the incumbent firm tries to prevent the other firm
to enter the market defending its positions as a monopolist. Are the costs of invest-
ment higher for the incumbent than for the entrant firm, it can be expected that in
long-term, a duopoly or even a monopoly with the entering innovator will arise.
4.4 Conclusion
We studied a differentiated duopoly in which two intermediaries compete for the cus-
tomer’s demand on the sales side and for input goods on the procurement side. In a first
stage of competition we determined the equilibrium outcome of intermediaries when
choosing production quantities sequentially. We were interested in decisions taken by
the first moving Stackelberg leader and by the second moving Stackelberg follower,
whereas positions of intermediaries were exogenously given. Besides this we focused
on optimal input prices selected by a strategic input supplier. In a second stage that
had a focus on innovation we gave a first investigation on the intermediaries’ incentives
to invest in product quality. Hereby, our analysis was primarily discussed by means of
a simplifying example.
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Similar to Chapter 3, we have seen that the presence of a strategic input supplier
may lead to an exclusion of one or both intermediaries resulting in a monopoly inter-
mediate goods market or no production. It turned out that given intermediaries are
sufficiently asymmetric, the input supplier has an incentive to exclude the less compet-
itive player from the market. Furthermore, we derived that there exists asymmetries
between intermediaries such that the input supplier is willing to exclude a less com-
petitive Stackelberg leader whereas within the same environment a less competitive
Stackelberg follower is accepted in the market (Proposition 4.4).
When comparing the equilibrium output quantities of intermediaries, we estab-
lished that given the Stackelberg leader is more competitive than the Stackelberg
follower, he always delivers higher production quantities. However, if the Stackelberg
follower is more competitive than his opponent, the above is only true for substitutes.
If goods are complements, there may arise scenarios in which the more competitive
Stackelberg follower delivers higher output quantities (Proposition 4.3) than his com-
petitor.
When considering the input supplier’s equilibrium price choices, it turned out that
if the Stackelberg leader is the more competitive intermediary, the input supplier
selects higher equilibrium prices and achieves higher profits than in the opposite case
(Proposition 4.5).
When analyzing intermediaries’ incentives to invest in product innovation, we found
that given costs of investment are linear, attention can be restricted to the investments
resulting in a minimum and maximum level of product quality (Proposition 4.6). By
giving an example we have seen that an intermediary’s investment in innovation does
not just foster the customer’s demand, but also has a strategic component as asym-
metries may be established or increased. Furthermore, we verified the impact of the
role of an intermediary on the incentives to invest in product quality.
Beyond the above analysis, future research should be focusing on the investigation
of intermediaries’ incentives to invest in product innovation. For such an analysis, we
have a simultaneous two-player non-cooperative investment game in mind as it was
already discussed in Chapter 3. Moreover, within our current work we made a rather
restrictive assumption allowing the input supplier only to charge a uniform price for
both intermediaries. In order to further corroborate the input supplier’s market power
and strategic behavior when selecting prices, a further approach needs to allow for
price discrimination in which the robustness of recent results is checked.
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Besides this, literature has shown that beyond Von Stackelberg (1934) who con-
siders a sequential game in which quantities are selected by duopolists, it can also
be thought of a setting in which players set prices as in Gal-Or (1985), for instance.
Going in this direction and determining equilibrium outcomes for price competition,
a comparison between the according results can be undertaken.
In our current work, positions of players were exogenously given. A consequent
next step goes in the direction of an intermediate goods market in which the role of
a player, i.e., whether to move first or second, is endogenously chosen, as for instance
in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). Due to the fact that the approach of Chapter 3 is
quite similar to our setting, it is obvious that a further consideration will compare the
outcomes of the game in which decisions are take simultaneously with the results when
decisions are taken sequentially.
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4.5 Appendix A: Proofs
4.5.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Suppose intermediary 1 is more competitive than interme-
diary 2 with α1
λ1
> α2
λ2
. When determining τSL1 , we are aiming for conditions on asym-
metries between α1 and α2 such that the input supplier’s profit when serving interme-
diary 1 (monopoly) is at least as high as his profit when serving both intermediaries
(duopoly). Therefore we obtain
(2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1))2
16 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) ≤
α21
8
⇔ α2 ≤ α1
√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1))− 2 (2λ1 − γλ2)
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
= α2 ≤ α1τ1.
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4.5.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Suppose intermediary 2 is more competitive than interme-
diary 1 with α1
λ1
< α2
λ2
. When determining τSF2 we are aiming for conditions on asymme-
tries between α1 and α2 such that the input supplier’s monopoly profit when serving
intermediary 2 (monopoly) is at least as high as his profit when serving both interme-
diaries (duopoly). Therefore we obtain
(2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1))2
16 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) ≤
α22
8
⇔ α1 ≤ α2
(√2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1))
2 (2λ1 − γλ2)
− (4λ2 − γ
2λ2 − 2γλ1)
2 (2λ1 − γλ2)
)
= α1 ≤ α2τ2.
4.5.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proof of Proposition 4.3. From Eq. (4.5) we know that intermediary i’s equilibrium
quantity as a Stackelberg leader within a duopoly is given by
qSLi =
(2αi − γ3−i)− (2λi − γλ3−i) c
2 (2− γ2)
if
c < min
{
2αi − γα3−i
2λi − γλ3−i ,
4α3−i − γ2α3−i − 2γαi
4λ3−i − γ2λ3−i − 2γλi
}
. (4.42)
From Eq. (4.33) we know that intermediary i’s equilibrium quantity as a Stackelberg
follower is given by
qSFi =
(4αi − γ2αi − 2γα3−i)− (4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i) c
4 (2− γ2)
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if
c < min
{
2α3−i − γαi
2λ3−i − γλi ,
4αi − γ2αi − 2γα3−i
4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i
}
. (4.43)
The equilibrium quantity of intermediary i as a Stackelberg leader qSLi is larger than
his equilibrium quantity as a Stackelberg follower qSFi if and only if
αi
λi
> c. This can
be seen as follows:
(2αi − γα3−i)− (2λi − γλ3−i) c
4− 2γ2
>
(4αi − γ2αi − 2γα3−i)− (4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i) c
2 (4− 2γ2)
⇔ αi
λi
> c.
First, suppose that intermediary i is more competitive than intermediary 3 − i and
therefore αi
λi
> α3−i
λ3−i
. Thus, independently of whether he is the Stackelberg leader or
the Stackelberg follower, intermediary i’s critical input price is larger than the critical
input price of intermediary 3 − i and he will always be the potential monopolist.
Therefore, if intermediary i is in the leading position, we have
2αi − γα3−i
2λi − γλ3−i >
4α3−i − γ2α3−i − 2γαi
4λ3−i − γ2λ3−i − 2γλi ,
whereas if intermediary i takes the role of the follower we get
2α3−i − γαi
2λ3−i − γλi <
4αi − γ2αi − 2γα3−i
4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i .
The conditions on the input price c that ensure a duopoly market are therefore given
by
c <
4α3−i − γ2α3−i − 2γαi
4λ3−i − γ2λ3−i − 2γλi
for the first and
c <
2α3−i − γαi
2λ3−i − γλi
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for the second case. It can easily be seen that the following always holds:
α3−i
λ3−i
<
αi
λi
⇔ 4α3−i − γ
2α3−i − 2γαi
4λ3−i − γ2λ3−i − 2γλi <
αi
λi
as well as
α3−i
λ3−i
<
αi
λi
⇔ 2α3−i − γαi
2λ3−i − γλi <
αi
λi
.
Therefore the conditions which ensure a duopoly market also imply the condition for
qSLi > q
SF
i . The input price c satisfies
c <
4α3−i − γ2α3−i − 2γαi
4λ3−i − γ2λ3−i − 2γλi <
αi
λi
for the case in which intermediary i is in the leading and
c <
2α3−i − γαi
2λ3−i − γλi <
αi
λi
for the case intermediary i is in the following position. Hence, if the conditions for a
duopoly market with a sufficiently small c are satisfied, qSLi > q
SF
i holds.
Now suppose intermediary 3 − i to be more competitive than intermediary i and
therefore α3−i
λ3−i
> αi
λi
. Independently of whether he is the leader or the follower, interme-
diary i’s critical input price is smaller than the critical input price of intermediary 3−i.
Thus intermediary 3− i is the potential monopolist in both cases. Supposing interme-
diary i is the Stackelberg leader, we have
2αi − γα3−i
2λi − γλ3−i <
4α3−i − γ2α3−i − 2γαi
4λ3−i − γ2λ3−i − 2γλi ,
given he is the Stackelberg follower we get
2α3−i − γαi
2λ3−i − γλi >
4αi − γ2αi − 2γα3−i
4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i .
The conditions that ensure a sufficiently low input price c for a duopoly therefore
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demand
c <
2αi − γα3−i
2λi − γλ3−i
for the first and
c <
4αi − γ2αi − 2γα3−i
4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i
for the second case. It can be seen that for the given scenario, if goods are substitutes
with γ > 0 the following inequalities are true:
α3−i
λ3−i
>
αi
λi
⇔ 2αi − γα3−i
2λi − γλ3−i <
αi
λi
and
α3−i
λ3−i
>
αi
λi
⇔ 4αi − γ
2αi − 2γα3−i
4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i <
αi
λi
.
Therefore, given the conditions that guarantee a duopoly market are satisfied, qSLi >
qSFi also holds. This is true as
c <
2αi − γα3−i
2λi − γλ3−i <
αi
λi
and
c <
4αi − γ2αi − 2γα3−i
4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i <
αi
λi
are satisfied. However, when considering complements with γ < 0, the duopoly condi-
tion is not necessarily sufficient for c < αi
λi
. It is obvious that
α3−i
λ3−i
>
αi
λi
⇔ 2αi − γα3−i
2λi − γλ3−i >
αi
λi
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and
α3−i
λ3−i
>
αi
λi
⇔ 4αi − γ
2αi − 2γα3−i
4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i >
αi
λi
.
holds. Given intermediary i is the Stackelberg leader with an input price satisfying
αi
λi
< c <
2αi − γα3−i
2λi − γλ3−i
as well as intermediary i as the Stackelberg follower with an input price satisfying
αi
λi
< c <
4αi − γ2αi − 2γα3−i
4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i ,
the equilibrium quantity of the follower will be higher than the equilibrium quantity
of the leader with qSFi > q
SL
i . Thus, there exist input prices for which the equilibrium
quantities of a more competitive Stackelberg leader must not necessarily be higher
than the equilibrium quantities of a more competitive Stackelberg follower.
4.5.4 Proof of Proposition 4.4 (i)
Proof of Proposition 4.4. Suppose intermediaries’ productivities are identical with
λ1 = λ2. When comparing τ
SL
1 and τ
SF
1 we obtain√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ1) + λ1 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1))− 2 (2λ1 − γλ1)
4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1
−
√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ1) + λ1 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1))− (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1)
2 (2λ1 − γλ1)
= 0
⇔
√
2 (2− γ2) (2 (2− γ) + (4− γ2 − 2γ))− 2 (2− γ)
(4− γ2 − 2γ)
−
√
2 (2− γ2) (2 (2− γ) + (4− γ2 − 2γ))− (4− γ2 − 2γ)
2 (2− γ)
= 0,
which is true for mutually independent goods (γ = 0). Thus, τSL1 = τ
SF
1 holds.
163 Chapter 4. Sequential Competition of Intermediaries
4.5.5 Proof of Proposition 4.4 (ii)
Proof of Proposition 4.4. Suppose intermediary 1 is more competitive than interme-
diary 2 with α1
λ1
> α2
λ2
, where both intermediaries have the same productivity with
λ1 = λ2. When comparing τ
SL
1 with intermediary 1 as the leader and τ
SF
1 with inter-
mediary 1 as the follower, we get
τSL1 − τSF1 ≤ 0
⇒
√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ1) + λ1 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1))− 2 (2λ1 − γλ1)
4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1
−
√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ1) + λ1 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1))− (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1)
2 (2λ1 − γλ1)
≤ 0
⇔
√
2 (2− γ2) (2 (2− γ) + (4− γ2 − 2γ))− 2 (2− γ)
4− γ2 − 2γ
−
√
2 (2− γ2) (2 (2− γ) + (4− γ2 − 2γ))− (4− γ2 − 2γ)
2 (2− γ) ≤ 0
⇔ γ2
√
2 (2− γ2) (8− 4γ − γ2) ≤ γ2 (8− γ2 − 4γ)
⇔
√
2 (2− γ2) (8− 4γ − γ2) ≤ (8− γ2 − 4γ)
⇔ 0 ≤ 4 (1− γ) + γ2,
which is always true. Hence, given intermediary 1 is more competitive than interme-
diary 2 and productivities are equal
τSL1 ≤ τSF1
always holds.
4.5.6 Proof of Proposition 4.5
Proof of Proposition 4.5. Within Proposition 4.5 we suppose that intermediaries have
identical productivities with λ1 = λ2 and intermediary 1 being more competitive than
intermediary 2. Additionally, we assume the conditions for interior solution input
prices to be satisfied.
Given intermediary 1 is the Stackelberg leader and intermediary 2 the Stackelberg
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follower, we demand condition (4.19)
α2 > α1
2 ((4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) (2λ1 + γλ2) + 4γλ1 (2λ1 − γλ2))
(4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) (4λ2 − γ2λ2 + 2γλ1) + 4λ1 (4− γ2) (2λ1 − γλ2)
which for a duopoly yields the interior solution equilibrium input price
cS = c∗ =
2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)
2 (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1))
and the input supplier’s equilibrium profit of
piI
(
cS
)
=
λ1 (2α1 − γα2) cS
4 (2− γ2)
=
(2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1))2
16 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) .
If intermediary 1 is the Stackelberg follower and intermediary 2 the Stackelberg leader
an interior solution will, analogous to condition (4.21), be obtained if
α1 > α2
2 ((4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ2) (2λ2 + γλ1) + 4γλ2 (2λ2 − γλ1))
(4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ2) (4λ1 − γ2λ1 + 2γλ2) + 4λ2 (4− γ2) (2λ2 − γλ1)
holds. This results in the duopoly equilibrium input price of
cS = c∗ =
2λ2 (2α2 − γα1) + λ1 (4α1 − γ2α1 − 2γα2)
2 (2λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1) + λ1 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ2))
and the input supplier’s equilibrium profit within a duopoly of
piI
(
cS
)
=
λ2 (2α2 − γα1) cS
2 (4− 2γ2)
=
(2λ2 (2α2 − γα1) + λ1 (4α1 − γ2α1 − 2γα2))2
16 (2− γ2) (2λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1) + λ1 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ2)) .
Part (i) of Proposition 4.5 yields that for a duopoly the input supplier’s equilibrium
input price is higher if the more competitive intermediary 1 is the Stackelberg
leader. When comparing the above displayed input prices with identical produc-
tivities for both intermediaries with λ1 = λ2, this can be seen by
2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ1 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)
2 (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ1) + λ2 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1))
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>
2λ1 (2α2 − γα1) + λ1 (4α1 − γ2α1 − 2γα2)
2 (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ1) + λ1 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1))
⇔ α1 > α2,
which is true for α1
λ1
> α2
λ2
.
Part (ii) of Proposition 4.5 claims that the input supplier’s duopoly equilibrium prof-
its are higher when the more competitive intermediary 1 is the Stackelberg leader
compared to the scenario in which he is the Stackelberg follower. This can be
seen in the following. With λ1 = λ2 we get
(2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ1 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1))2
16 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ1) + λ1 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1))
>
(2λ2 (2α2 − γα1) + λ1 (4α1 − γ2α1 − 2γα2))2
16 (2− γ2) (2λ2 (2λ2 − γλ1) + λ1 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ2))
⇔ α1 > α2,
which is true for α1
λ1
> α2
λ2
.
4.5.7 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof of Lemma 4.1. When analyzing the characteristics of the intermediaries’ profit
functions, we will discuss the areas of large, intermediate and small asymmetries as
displayed in figure 4.2.
Case 1 (large asymmetries): α3−i < αiτSLi (or αi < α3−iτ
SL
3−i).
We obtain
piSLi (αi, α3−i) = pi
SF
i (αi, α3−i) =
α2i
16
.
Hence, for all αi ∈ [αi, αi] we get
∂2piSLi (αi, α3−i)
∂α2i
=
∂2piSFi (αi, α3−i)
∂α2i
=
1
8
> 0.
Case 2 (intermediate asymmetries): αiτ
SL
i < α3−i < αiτ
SF
i (or α3−iτ
SL
3−i < αi <
α3−iτSF3−i).
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The profit of the more competitive monopolistic Stackelberg follower was already
considered in the previous case, the profit of the Stackelberg leader as a duopolist
will be determined in Case 3.
Case 3 (small asymmetries): αiτ
SF
i < α3−i < αi
λ3−i
λi
(or α3−iτSF3−i < αi < α3−i
λi
λ3−i
).
For the Stackelberg leader we obtain
∂2piSLi (αi, α3−i)
∂α2i
=
∂2
[(
pSLi (αi, α3−i)− λicS (αi, α3−i)
)
qSLi (αi, α3−i)
]
∂α2i
=
(
2− γ2)(∂qi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
)2
=
1
4 (2− γ2)
(
2− (2λi − γλ3−i)
2
(2λi (2λi − γλ3−i) + λ3−i (4λ3−i − γ2λ3−i − 2γλi))
)2
> 0,
for all αi ∈
[
αi, αi
]
for i = 1, 2.
For the Stackelberg follower within a duopoly we have
∂2piSFi (αi, α3−i)
∂α2i
=
∂2
[(
pSFi (αi, α3−i)− λicS (αi, α3−i)
)
qSFi (αi, α3−i)
]
∂α2i
2
(
∂qSFi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
)2
=
1
8 (2− γ2)2
((
4− γ2)− (4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i)2
2 (2λ3−i (2λ3−i − γλi) + λi (4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i))
)2
> 0,
for all αi ∈
[
αi, αi
]
for i = 1, 2.
4.5.8 Proof of Proposition 4.6
Proof of Proposition 4.6. It follows directly from Lemma 4.1.
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4.6 Appendix B: Computations
Computations of Equation 4.2 and of Equation 4.3
The demand function of the customer displayed in Eq. (4.2) can be determined by
taking the first derivative of the customer’s utility function U with respect to qi for
i = 1, 2. We obtain
max
qi
U(qi, q3−i) s.t. m ≥ piqi + p3−iq3−i + I for i = 1, 2,
which yields
∂U
∂qi
= αi − qi − γq3−i − pi != 0
⇔ pi = αi − qi − γq3−i.
Computations of Equations 4.5 and Equation 4.6
In order to determine the equilibrium quantities qSL1 and q
SF
2 for a duopoly with a suf-
ficiently small input price with c < min{2α2−γα1
2λ2−γλ1 ,
4α1−γ2α1−2γα2
4λ1−γ2λ1−2γλ2 }, we need to maximize
the intermediaries’ profit functions and establish the best reply function of intermedi-
ary 2. A profit maximization of intermediary i results in
∂pii (qi, q3−i, c, αi, α3−i)
∂qi
= αi − 2qi − γq3−i − λic != 0
⇔ qi = αi − γq3−i − λic
2
.
As negative profits can be avoided by not producing, intermediary 2’s best reply func-
tion is given by
q2 (q1) = max
{
α2 − γq1 − λ2c
2
, 0
}
.
When considering the case in which intermediary 2 produces a positive quantity and
therefore α2−γq1−λ2c
2
> 0, intermediary 1’s profit function when considering intermedi-
ary 2’s best reply is given as:
pi1 (q1, q2, c, α1, α2) = (p1 − λ1c) q1
= (α1 − q1 − γq2 − λ1c) q1
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=
(
α1 − q1 − γ
(
α2 − γq1 − λ2c
2
)
− λ1c
)
q1
= α1q1 − q21 −
1
2
(
γα2q1 − γ2q21 − γλ2q1c
)− λ1q1c.
A maximization of pi1 with respect to q1 yields intermediary 1’s equilibrium quantity
choice
∂pi1 (q1, q2, c, α1, α2)
∂q1
=
α1 − 2qSL1 −
1
2
γα2 + γ
2qSL1 +
1
2
γλ2c− λ1c != 0
⇔ 2qS1 − γ2qSL1 = α1 −
1
2
γα2 +
1
2
γλ2c− λ1c
⇔ qSL1
(
2− γ2) = α1 − 1
2
γα2 +
1
2
γλ2c− λ1c
⇔ 2qSL1 =
2α1 − γα2 + γλ2c− 2λ1c
2− γ2
⇔ 2qSL1 =
2 (α1 − λ1c)− γ (α2 − λ2c)
2− γ2
⇔ qSL1 =
2 (α1 − λ1c)− γ (α2 − λ2c)
4− 2γ2
⇔ qSL1 =
2α1 − γα2 − 2λ1c+ γλ2c
4− 2γ2
⇔ qSL1 =
(2α1 − γα2)− (2λ1 − γλ2) c
2 (2− γ2) .
With qSL1 and intermediary 2’s best reply function R
2 (q1) = q2 (q1) we are now able
to determine intermediary 2’s equilibrium quantity, which is denoted by
qSF2 =
α2 − γ
(
2(α1−λ1c)−γ(α2−λ2c)
4−2γ2
)
− λ2c
2
= R2
(
qSL1
)
⇔ qSF2 =
α2 (4− 2γ2)− 2γ (α1 − λ1c) + γ2 (α2 − λ2c)− λ2c (4− 2γ2)
8− 4γ2
⇔ qSF2 =
4α2 − 2γ2α2 − 2γ (α1 − λ1c) + γ2 (α2 − λ2c)− 4λ2c+ 2γ2λ2c
8− 4γ2
⇔ qSF2 =
4 (α2 − λ2c)− 2γ2 (α2 − λ2c)− 2γ (α1 − λ1c) + γ2 (α2 − λ2c)
8− 4γ2
⇔ qSF2 =
4 (α2 − λ2c)− γ2 (α2 − λ2c)− 2γ (α1 − λ1c)
8− 4γ2
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⇔ qSF2 =
4 (α2 − λ2c)− γ (γ (α2 − λ2c) + 2 (α1 − λ1c))
8− 4γ2
⇔ qSF2 =
(4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)− (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) c
4 (2− γ2) .
When considering the case of the best reply function with α2−γq1−λ2c
2
> 0, intermediary
2 chooses not to produce a positive quantity and we obtain a monopoly scenario with
intermediary 1 as the monopolist.
Suppose the case of monopoly in which in the input price satisfies 4α2−γ
2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 ≤
c < α1
λ1
for a more competitive Stackelberg leader with (α1
λ1
> α2
λ2
). Fur such an input
price c, intermediary 2 as the Stackelberg follower will not produce in equilibrium and
therefore qSF2 = 0. By using the best reply function of intermediary 1
q1 =
α1 − γq2 − λ1c
2
we obtain with qSF2 = 0 intermediary 1’s equilibrium quantity within a monopoly
qSL1 =
α1 − λ1c
2
.
Assuming intermediary 2 to be more competitive than intermediary 1 and the input
price satisfies 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ≤ c < α2λ2 , by using the best reply function of intermediary 2
with qSL1 = 0 we get
qSL2 =
α2 − λ2c
2
.
Computations of Equation 4.11
Suppose intermediary 1 is more competitive than intermediary 2 and therefore α1
λ1
> α2
λ2
.
It can easily be seen that the critical input price of the less competitive intermediary
2 is smaller than the critical input price of the more competitive intermediary 2.
Remember that the critical input price of intermediary 1 as the Stackelberg leader is
given by 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 , the critical input price of intermediary 2 as the Stackelberg follower
is denoted by 4α2−γ
2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 .
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We get
α2
λ2
<
α1
λ1
⇔ α2λ1 < α1λ2
⇔ α2λ1 − α1λ2 < 0
⇔ (α2λ1 − α1λ2)
(
4
(
2− γ2)) < 0
⇔ 4α2λ1
(
2− γ2)− 4α1λ2 (2− γ2) < 0
⇔ 8α2λ1 − 8α1λ2 + 4γ2α1λ2 − 4γ2α2λ1 < 0
⇔ 8α2λ1 − 4γα2λ2 − 2γ2α2λ1 + γ3α2λ2 − 4γα1λ1 + 2γ2α1λ2
<8α1λ2 − 4γα2λ2 − 2γ2α1λ2 + γ3α2λ2 − 4γα1λ1 + 2γ2α2λ1
⇔ (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1) (2λ1 − γλ2) < (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) (2α1 − γα2)
⇔ 4α2 − γ
2α2 − 2γα1
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1 <
2α1 − γα2
2λ1 − γλ2 .
Computations of Equation 4.10
We now derive conditions on the input price c such that both intermediaries have
incentives to demand inputs on the procurement side and offer positive quantities on
the sales side. For the Stackelberg leader, with qSL1 > 0 and rearranging towards c we
get
qSL1 =
(2α1 − γα2)− (2λ1 − γλ2) c
4− 2γ2 > 0
⇔ (2α1 − γα2)− (2λ1 − γλ2) c > 0
⇔ − (2λ1 − γλ2) c > − (2α1 − γα2)
⇔ c < 2α1 − γα2
2λ1 − γλ2 .
and for intermediary 2 with qSF2 > 0 we obtain
qSF2 =
(4α2 − 2γα1 − γ2α2)− (4λ2 − 2γλ1 − γ2λ2) c
8− 4γ2 > 0
⇔ (4α2 − 2γα1 − γ2α2)− (4λ2 − 2γλ1 − γ2λ2) c > 0
⇔ − (4λ2 − 2γλ1 − γ2λ2) c > −4α2 − 2γα1 − γ2α2
⇔ c < 4α2 − γ
2α2 − 2γα1
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1 .
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Thus, if the input price satisfies
c < min
{
2α1 − γα2
2λ1 − γλ2 ,
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
}
,
both intermediaries procure inputs and offer positive quantities at the market.
Computations of Assumption 4.1
Assumption (4.1) demands that given intermediary 1 is the Stackelberg leader and
intermediary 2 the Stackelberg follower, we assume α1
α2
, λ1
λ2
> γ
2
for all γ, α1
α2
, λ1
λ2
> 4−γ
2
2γ
for γ < 0 and α1
α2
, λ1
λ2
< 4−γ
2
2γ
for γ ≥ 0.
Assumption (4.1) is derived in the following. First, suppose γ < 0. For qS1 to
increase in “weighted” qualities we need
2α1 − γα2 > 0
⇔ 2α1 > γα2
⇔ α1
α2
>
γ
2
,
for qS2 to increase in “weighted” qualities we demand
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1 > 0
⇔ − 2γα1 > −α2
(
4− γ2)
⇔ α1
α2
>
4− γ2
2γ
.
Furthermore, in order to assure that qS1 is decreasing in c we have
2λ1 − γλ2 > 0
⇔ 2λ1 > γλ2
⇔ λ1
λ2
>
γ
2
,
for qS2 decreasing in c we need
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1 > 0
Chapter 4. Sequential Competition of Intermediaries 172
⇔ λ2
(
4− γ2)− 2γλ1 > 0
⇔ − 2γλ1 > −λ2
(
4− γ2)
⇔ λ1
λ2
>
4− γ2
2γ
.
Note that the above inequalities are always satisfied. For γ < 0 we know that γ
2
< 0
and 4−γ
2
2γ
< 0. As α1, α2, λ1, λ2 > 0 holds,
α1
α2
, λ1
λ2
> 0 is always true.
Now suppose γ ≥ 0. The assumptions for qS1 to increase in “weighted” qualities
and decrease in c are given as above with
α1
α2
>
γ
2
and
λ1
λ2
>
γ
2
.
In order to assure that qS2 increases in “weighted” qualities we demand
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1 > 0
⇔ − 2γα1 > −α2
(
4− γ2)
⇔ 2γα1 < α2
(
4− γ2)
⇔ α1
α2
<
4− γ2
2γ
,
and to decrease in c we impose
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1 > 0
⇔ − 2γλ1 > −λ2
(
4− γ2)
⇔ 2γλ1 < λ2
(
4− γ2)
⇔ λ1
λ2
<
4− γ2
2γ
.
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Computations of Equation 4.15 and Equation 4.16
The intermediaries’ equilibrium prices within a duopoly are determined by using inter-
mediary 1’s and intermediary 2’s inverse demand function as well as the equilibrium
quantities qSL1 and q
SF
2 . Intermediary 1’s equilibrium price is denoted by
pSL1 = α1 − qSL1 − γqSF2
=α1 −
(
(2α1 − γα2)− (2λ1 − γλ2) c
4− 2γ2
)
− γ
(
(4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)− (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) c
2 (4− 2γ2)
)
=
α1 (8− 4γ2)− 2 (2α1 − γα2) + 2 (2λ1 − γλ2) c
2 (4− 2γ2)
+
−γ (4α2 − 2γα1 − γ2α2) + γ (4λ2 − 2γλ1 − γ2λ2) c
2 (4− 2γ2)
=
8α1 − 4γ2α1 − 4α1 + 2γα2 + 4λ1c− 2γλ2c− 4γα2
2 (4− 2γ2)
+
2γ2α1 + γ
3α2 + 4γλ2c− 2γ2λ1c− γ3λ2c
2 (4− 2γ2)
=
4α1 − 2γ2α1 − 2γα2 + 4λ1c+ 2γλ2c+ γ3α2 − 2γ2λ1c− γ3λ2c
2 (4− 2γ2)
=
4 (α1 + λ1c)− 2γ2 (α1 + λ1c)− 2γ (α2 − λ2c) + γ3 (α2 − λ2c)
2 (4− 2γ2)
=
2 (2− γ2) (α1 + λ1c)− γ (2− γ2) (α2 − λ2c)
4 (2− γ2)
=
2 (α1 + λ1c)− γ (α2 − λ2c)
4
=
(2α1 − γα2) + (2λ1 + γλ2) c
4
.
It can easily be seen that
pSL1 =
(
2− γ2
2
)
qSL1 + λ1c
=
2− γ2
2
(
(2α1 − γα2)− (2λ1 − γλ2) c
2 (2− γ2)
)
+ λ1c
=
(2α1 − γα2)− (2λ1 − γλ2) c
4
+ λ1c
=
(2α1 − γα2)− (2λ1 − γλ2) c
4
+
4λ1c
4
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=
(2α1 − γα2)− (2λ1 − γλ2) c+ 4λ1c
4
=
(2α1 − γα2) + (2λ1 + γλ2) c
4
holds. Intermediary 2’s equilibrium price is given by:
pSF2 =α2 − qSF2 − γqSL1
=α2 −
(
(4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)− (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) c
4 (2− γ2)
)
− γ
(
(2α1 − γα2)− (2λ1 − γλ2) c
2 (2− γ2)
)
=α2 −
(
(4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)− (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) c
4 (2− γ2)
)
− 2γ
(
(2α1 − γα2)− (2λ1 − γλ2) c
2 (4− 2γ2)
)
=
2α2 (4− 2γ2)− (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1) + (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) c
4 (2− γ2)
+
−2γ (2α1 − γα2) + 2γ (2λ1 − γλ2) c
2 (4− 2γ2)
=
8α2 − 4γ2α2 − 4α2 + γ2α2 + 2γα1 + 4λ2c− γ2λ2c− 2γλ1c− 4γα1
4 (2− γ2)
+
2γ2α2 + 4γλ1c− 2γ2λ2c
4 (2− γ2)
=
4α2 − γ2α2 + 4λ2c− 3γ2λ2c− 2γα1 + 2γλ1c
4 (2− γ2)
=
(4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1) + (4λ2 − 3γ2λ2 + 2γλ1) c
4 (2− γ2)
=
(4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1) + ((4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) + 2γ (2λ1 − γλ2)) c
4 (2− γ2) .
It can be seen that
pSF2 = q
SF
2 + λ2c
=
(4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)− (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) c
4 (2− γ2) + λ2c
=
(4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)− (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) c+ 4λ2 (2− γ2) c
4 (2− γ2)
=
(4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)− (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1 − 8λ2 + 4γ2λ2) c
4 (2− γ2)
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=
(4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1) + (−4λ2 + γ2λ2 + 2γλ1 + 8λ2 − 4γ2λ2) c
4 (2− γ2)
=
(4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1) + ((4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) + 2γ (2λ1 − γλ2)) c
4 (2− γ2)
is satisfied.
The equilibrium price of intermediary 1 within a monopoly with α1
λ1
> α2
λ2
and
4α2−γ2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 ≤ c < α1λ1 is determined by using the customer’s inverse demand function
for intermediary 1’s product as well as the according monopolist equilibrium produc-
tion quantity qSL1 . Therefore we get
pSL1 = α1 −
(
α1 − λ1c
2
)
=
2α1 − α1 + λ1c
2
=
α1 + λ1c
2
,
and for intermediary 2 with α1
λ1
> α2
λ2
and 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ≤ c < α2λ2 and using the according
monopolist equilibrium quantity qSF2 :
pSF2 = α2 −
(
α2 − λ2c
2
)
=
2α2 − α2 + λ2c
2
=
α2 + λ2c
2
.
Computations of Equation 4.17
The total equilibrium demand for input products is dependent on the intermediaries’
equilibrium production quantities qSL1 and q
SF
2 as displayed in Eq. (4.5) and Eq. (4.6)
as well as their according productivities λi for i = 1, 2. The total quantity demanded
at the input market in the duopoly scenario with a sufficiently low input price c is
given as
qSI =λ1q
SL
1 + λ2q
SF
2
qSI =λ1
(
(2α1 − γα2)− (2λ1 − γλ2) c
(4− 2γ2)
)
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+ λ2
(
(4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)− (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) c
2 (4− 2γ2)
)
=
2λ1 (2α1 − γα2)− 2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) c+ λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)
4 (2− γ2)
+
−λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) c
4 (2− γ2)
=
(2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1))−
(
2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
4 (2− γ2)
+λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)
)
c
4 (2− γ2) .
The input demand within a monopoly in which only intermediary 1 or intermediary 2
is producing, is straightforward.
Computations of Equation 4.18
When using the input supplier’s profit function piI (c) as well as the total equilibrium
input demand of Eq. (4.17) for a duopoly, we get the following profit maximizing input
price:
∂piI (c)
∂c
=
λ2 ((γ
2λ2 + 2γλ1 − 4λ2) c+ 4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)
4γ2 − 8
!
= 0
c∗ =
2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)
2 (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) .
which can be seen as follows:
piI (c) =
(2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)) c
4 (2− γ2)
− (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ
2λ2 − 2γλ1)) c2
4 (2− γ2)
∂piI (q1, q2, c, α1, α2)
∂c
!
= 0
⇒ (2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ
2α2 − 2γα1))
4 (2− γ2)
177 Chapter 4. Sequential Competition of Intermediaries
− 2 (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ
2λ2 − 2γλ1)) c∗
4 (2− γ2)
!
= 0
⇔ 2 (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ
2λ2 − 2γλ1)) c∗
2 (4− 2γ2)
=
(2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1))
2 (4− 2γ2)
⇔ 2 (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) c∗
=2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2
(
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1
)
⇔ c∗ = 2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ
2α2 − 2γα1)
2 (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) .
The input price c∗ is a unique maximizer as, due to Assumption 4.1, piI (c) is concave
in c with
∂2
[
qSI (c)c
]
∂c2
= −2 (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ
2λ2 − 2γλ1))
2 (4− 2γ2) ≤ 0.
Computations of Equation 4.19
First, suppose intermediary 1 to be more competitive with α1
λ1
> α2
λ2
where
2α1 − γα2
2λ1 − γλ2 >
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
holds. When charging an input price of c∗ a duopoly arises if c∗ < 4α2−γ
2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 is
satisfied. Therefore, we need
2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)
2 (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) <
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
⇔ 2α1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + α2 (4λ2 − γ
2λ2 − 2γλ1)
2 (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) <
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
⇔ (2α1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + α2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)
<
(
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1
) (
4λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + 2λ2
(
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
))
⇔ 2α1 (2λ1 − γλ2)
(
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
)
+ α2
(
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
)2
<
(
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1
) (
4λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + 2λ2
(
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
))
⇔ 2α1
(
(2λ1 − γλ2)
(
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
)
+ γ
(
4λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + 2λ2
(
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
)) )
<α2
( (
4− γ2) (4λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + 2λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1))
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− (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)2 )
⇔ α2 > α1 2 ((4λ2 − γ
2λ2 − 2γλ1) (2λ1 + γλ2) + 4γλ1 (2λ1 − γλ2))
(4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) (4λ2 − γ2λ2 + 2γλ1) + 4λ1 (4− γ2) (2λ1 − γλ2) .
Computation of Equation 4.21
Suppose intermediary 2 is more competitive with α1
λ1
< α2
λ2
where
2α1 − γα2
2λ1 − γλ2 <
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
holds. For c∗ being the maximizing input price within a duopoly c∗ < 2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 must
be satisfied. Hence, we need
2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)
2 (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) <
2α1 − γα2
2λ1 − γλ2
⇔ 2α1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + α2 (4λ2 − γ
2λ2 − 2γλ1)
4λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + 2λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) <
2α1 − γα2
2λ1 − γλ2
⇔ (2α1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + α2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) (2λ1 − γλ2)
<
(
4λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + 2λ2
(
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
))
(2α1 − γα2)
⇔ 2α1
(
(2λ1 − γλ2)2 − 4λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2)− 2λ2
(
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
))
< −α2
( (
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
)
(2λ1 − γλ2)
+ γ
(
4λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + 2λ2
(
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
)) )
⇔ 2α1
(
4λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + 2λ2
(
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
)− (2λ1 − γλ2)2) >
α2
( (
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
)
(2λ1 − γλ2)
+ γ
(
4λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + 2λ2
(
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
)) )
⇔ α1 > α2 (2λ1 − γλ2) (4λ2 − γ
2λ2 + 2γλ1) + 2γλ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)
2 ((2λ1 − γλ2) (2λ1 + γλ2) + 2λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) .
Computations of Equation 4.23
Given the duopoly interior solution with cS = c∗ the input supplier’s profit is denoted
by:
piI
(
cS
)
= qSI
(
cS
)
cS
=
(2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1))
4 (2− γ2)
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+
− (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) cS
4 (2− γ2) · c
S
=
2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)
4 (2− γ2)
+
−λ1 (2α1 − γα2)− λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)
4 (2− γ2) · c
S
=
λ1 (2α1 − γα2) cS
2 (4− 2γ2) .
For the corner solution in which intermediary 1 is the potential monopolist with
α1
λ1
>
α2
λ2
and
c∗ >
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
the input supplier’s profit is given by:
piI
(
cS
)
= qSI
(
cS
)
cS
=
α1 (4λ1 − 2γλ2) + α2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)
4 (2− γ2)
+
− (4λ21 + 4λ22 − 4γλ1λ2 − γ2λ22) cS
4 (2− γ2) · c
S
=
α1 (4λ1 − 2γλ2) + α2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)
4 (2− γ2)
+
− (4λ21 + 4λ22 − 4γλ1λ2 − γ2λ22) · 4α2−γ
2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1
4 (2− γ2) · c
S
=
(4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) (α1 (4λ1 − 2γλ2) + α2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1))
4 (2− γ2) (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)
+
− (4λ21 + 4λ22 − 4γλ1λ2 − γ2λ22) (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)
4 (2− γ2) (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) · c
S
=
16α1λ1λ2 + 8γ
2α2λ
2
1 − 16α2λ21 − 8γ2α1λ1λ2
(8− 4γ2) (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) · c
S
=
2α1λ1λ2 (8− 4γ2)− 2α2λ21 (8− 4γ2)
(8− 4γ2) (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) · c
S
=
2λ1 (α1λ2 − α2λ1)
(4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) · c
S.
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For the corner solution in which intermediary 2 is the potential monopolist with
α1
λ1
<
α2
λ2
and
c∗ >
2α1 − γα2
2λ1 − γλ2
the input supplier’s profit is given by:
piI
(
cS
)
= qSI
(
cS
)
cS
=
(2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1))
4 (2− γ2)
+
− (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) cS
4 (2− γ2) · c
S
=
(2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1))
4 (2− γ2)
+
− (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) 2α1−γα22λ1−γλ2
4 (2− γ2) · c
S
=
(2λ1 − γλ2) (2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1))
2 (4− 2γ2) (2λ1 − γλ2) · c
S
− (2α1 − γα2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ
2λ2 − 2γλ1))
2 (4− 2γ2) (2λ1 − γλ2) · c
S
=
8α2λ1λ2 − 4γ2α2λ1λ2 − 8α1λ22 + 4γ2α1λ22
2 (4− 2γ2) (2λ1 − γλ2) · c
S
=
2α2λ1λ2 (4− 2γ2)− 2α1λ22 (4− 2γ2)
2 (4− 2γ2) (2λ1 − γλ2) · c
S
=
α2λ1λ2 − α1λ22
(2λ1 − γλ2) · c
S
=
λ2 (α2λ1 − α1λ2)
(2λ1 − γλ2) · c
S.
Computations of Equation 4.24
For a monopoly in which the more competitive intermediary 1 produces, the input
supplier’s profit maximizing input price is given by
∂
[
λ1(α1−λ1)
2
c
]
∂c
!
= 0
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⇒ α1λ1 − 2λ
2
1c
∗
2
!
= 0
⇔ α1λ1 = 2λ21c∗
⇔ c∗ = α1
2λ1
.
Computations of Equation 4.25
For c∗ to create a monopoly market in which intermediary 1 is more competitive, we
need c∗ = α1
2λ1
> 4α2−γ
2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 . Thus,
α1
2λ1
>
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
⇔ α1
(
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
)
> 2λ1
(
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1
)
⇔ α1λ2
(
4− γ2)− 2γα1λ1 + 4γα1λ1 > 2α2λ1 (4− γ2)
⇔ α1λ2
(
4− γ2)+ 2γα1λ1 > 2α2λ1 (4− γ2)
⇔ α1
(
4λ2 − γ2λ2 + 2γλ1
)
< α2
(
2λ1
(
4− γ2))
⇔ α1 > α2 2λ1 (4− γ
2)
λ2 (4− γ2) + 2γλ1
⇔ α2 < α14λ2 − γ
2λ2 + 2γλ1
2λ1 (4− γ2)
must hold.
Computation of Equation 4.26
Suppose a monopoly with intermediary 1 producing and the optimal input price of
cS = max
{
4α2−γ2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1 ,
α1
2λ1
}
. The input supplier’s equilibrium profits with the input
price of
cS =
α1
2λ1
is denoted by:
piI (q1, q2, c, α1, α2) = q
S
I (c
S)cS
=
α1λ1 − λ21cS
2
cS
=
α1λ1 − λ21 · α12λ1
2
· α1
2λ1
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=
2α1λ
2
1 − α1λ21
4λ1
· α1
2λ1
=
α21λ
2
1
8λ21
=
α21
8
.
The input supplier’s equilibrium profit for the corner monopoly solution with interme-
diary 1 as the monopolist and the input price
cS =
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
is denoted by:
piI
(
cS
)
= qSI (c
S)cS
=
α1λ1 − λ21 · cS
2
· cS
=
α1λ1 − λ21 · 4α2−γ
2α2−2γα1
4λ2−γ2λ2−2γλ1
2
· cS
=
α1λ1 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)− λ21 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)
2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) · c
S
=
4α1λ1λ2 − γ2α1λ1λ2 − 2γα1λ21 − 4α2λ21 + γ2α2λ21 + 2γα1λ21
2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) · c
S
=
4α1λ1λ2 − γ2α1λ1λ2 − 4α2λ21 + γ2α2λ21
2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) · c
S
=
α1λ1λ2 (4− γ2)− α2λ21 (4− γ2)
2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) · c
S
=
λ1 (α1λ2 − α2λ21) (4− γ2)
2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) · c
S.
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Computation of Equation 4.27
The input price that maximizes the supplier’s profit function, given intermediary 2 is
the monopolist, is given by
∂
[
λ2(α2−λ2)
2
c
]
∂c
!
= 0
⇒ λ2α2 − 2λ
2
2c
∗
2
= 0
⇔ λ2α2 = 2λ22c∗
⇔ c∗ = α2
2λ2
.
Computation of Equation 4.28
For c∗ to be the optimal input price for a monopoly in which intermediary 2 produces,
we need
α2
2λ2
>
2α1 − γα2
2λ1 − γλ2
⇔ α2 (2λ1 − γλ2) > 2λ2 (2α1 − γα2)
⇔ 2α2λ1 − γα2λ2 > 4α1λ2 − 2γα2λ2
⇔ 2α2λ1 + γα2λ2 > 4α1λ2
⇔ α1 < α22λ1 + γλ2
4λ2
.
Computations of Equation 4.26
Suppose a monopoly with intermediary 2 producing and the optimal input price of cS =
max
{
2α1−γα2
2λ1−γλ2 ,
α2
2λ2
}
. The input supplier’s equilibrium profit for the interior monopoly
solution with intermediary 2 as the monopolist and the input price
cS =
α2
2λ2
is denoted by:
piI
(
cS
)
= qSI (c
S)cS
=
λ2
(
α2 − λ2cS
)
2
· cS
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=
λ2
(
α2 − λ2 · α22λ2
)
2
· α2
2λ2
=
α2λ2 − α2λ22
2
· α2
2λ2
=
α2λ2
4
· α2
2λ2
=
α22
8
.
The input supplier’s equilibrium profit for the corner monopoly solution with interme-
diary 2 as the monopolist and the input price
cS =
2α1 − γα2
2λ1 − γλ2
is given by:
piI
(
cS
)
= qSI (c
S)cS
=
λ2
(
α2 − λ2cS
)
2
· cS
=
λ2
(
α2 − λ2 · 2α1−γα22λ1−γλ2
)
2
· cS
=
λ2 (2α2λ1 − γα2λ2 − 2α1λ2 + γα2λ2)
2 (2λ1 − γλ2) · c
S
=
λ2 (α2λ1 − α1λ2)
2λ1 − γλ2 c
S.
Computations of Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof of Proposition 4.1. When determining the multiplier τSL1 for
α1
λ1
> α2
λ2
we inves-
tigate for conditions on α2 for which the input supplier’s monopoly profit is at least
as high as his duopoly profit. Therefore we get
(2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1))2
16 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) ≤
α21
8
⇔ (2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ
2α2 − 2γα1))2
2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) ≤ α
2
1
⇔ (2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1))2
≤ 2α21
(
2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1))
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⇔ 2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2
(
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1
)
≤ α1
√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1))
⇔ 4α1λ1 − 2γα2λ1 + 4α2λ2 − γ2α2λ2 − 2γα1λ2
≤ α1
√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1))
⇔ 2α1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + α2
(
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
)
≤ α1
√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1))
⇔ α2 ≤ α1
√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1))− 2 (2λ1 − γλ2)
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
= α2 ≤ α1τ1
with
τSL1 =
√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1))− 2 (2λ1 − γλ2)
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1 .
Computations of Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof of Proposition 4.2. When determining the multiplier τSF2 for
α1
λ1
< α2
λ2
we inves-
tigate for conditions for which the input supplier’s monopoly profit is at least as high
as his duopoly profit. Therefore we get
(2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1))2
16 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) ≤
α22
8
⇔ (2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ
2α2 − 2γα1))2
2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1)) ≤ α
2
2
⇔ (2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1))2
≤ 2α22
(
2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1))
⇔ 2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ2
(
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1
)
≤ α2
√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1))
⇔ 2α1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + α2
(
4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1
)
≤ α2
√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1))
⇔ α1 ≤ α2
(√2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1))
2 (2λ1 − γλ2)
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− (4λ2 − γ
2λ2 − 2γλ1)
2 (2λ1 − γλ2)
)
= α1 ≤ α2τ2
with
τSF2 =
√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ2) + λ2 (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1))
2 (2λ1 − γλ2)
− (4λ2 − γ
2λ2 − 2γλ1)
2 (2λ1 − γλ2) .
Computations of Assumption 4.2
Given intermediary 1 is the Stackelberg follower and intermediary 2 the Stackelberg
leader, we assume α1
α2
, λ1
λ2
> 2γ
4−γ2 for all γ,
α1
α2
, λ1
λ2
< 2
γ
for γ ≥ 0 and α1
α2
, λ1
λ2
> 2
γ
for
γ < 0.
For qSF1 to increase in “weighted” qualities we get:
4α1 − γ2α1 − 2γα2 > 0
α1
(
4− γ2) > 2γα2
α1
α2
>
2γ
4− γ2
and for qSF1 to decrease in the input price c we need:
4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ2 > 0
λ1
(
4− γ2) > 2γλ2
λ1
λ2
>
2γ
4− γ2 .
For intermediary 2’s equilibrium quantity qSL2 to increase in “weighted” qualities we
need
2α2 − γα1 > 0
2α2 > γα1
α1
α2
<
2
γ
,
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if γ ≥ 0 and
2α2 − γα1 > 0
2α2 > γα1
α1
α2
>
2
γ
,
if γ < 0. Furthermore, for qSL2 to decrease in the input price c we demand
2λ2 − γλ1 > 0
2λ2 > γλ1
λ1
λ2
<
2
γ
for γ ≥ 0 and
2λ2 − γλ1 > 0
2λ2 > γλ1
λ1
λ2
>
2
γ
for γ < 0.
Computations of Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proof of Proposition 4.3. From Eq. (4.5) we know that intermediary i’s equilibrium
quantity as a Stackelberg leader within a duopoly is given by
qSLi =
(2αi − γ3−i)− (2λi − γλ3−i) c
4− 2γ2
if
c < min
{
2αi − γα3−i
2λi − γλ3−i ,
4α3−i − γ2α3−i − 2γαi
4λ3−i − γ2λ3−i − 2γλi
}
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and from equation (4.33) we know that intermediary i’s equilibrium quantity as a
Stackelberg follower is given by
qSFi =
(4αi − γ2αi − 2γα3−i)− (4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i) c
2 (4− 2γ2)
if
c < min
{
2α3−i − γαi
2λ3−i − γλi ,
4αi − γ2αi − 2γα3−i
4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i
}
.
The equilibrium quantity of intermediary i as a leader qSLi is larger than his equilibrium
quantity as a follower qSFi if and only if
αi
λi
> c, which can be seen as follows:
(2αi − γα3−i)− (2λi − γλ3−i) c
4− 2γ2
>
(4αi − γ2αi − 2γα3−i)− (4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i) c
2 (4− 2γ2)
⇔ 2 (2αi − γα3−i)− 2 (2λi − γλ3−i) c
2 (4− 2γ2)
>
(4αi − γ2αi − 2γα3−i)− (4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i) c
2 (4− 2γ2)
⇔ 2 (2αi − γα3−i)− 2 (2λi − γλ3−i) c
>
(
4αi − γ2αi − 2γα3−i
)− (4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i) c
⇔ 2 (2αi − γα3−i)−
(
4αi − γ2αi − 2γα3−i
)
− 2 (2λi − γλ3−i) c+
(
4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i
)
c > 0
⇔ γ2αi − γ2λic > 0
⇔ γ2αi > γ2λic
⇔ αi > λic
⇔ αi
λi
> c.
First, suppose that intermediary i is more competitive than intermediary 3 − i and
therefore αi
λi
> α3−i
λ3−i
. Thus, independently of whether he is the Stackelberg leader or
the Stackelberg follower, intermediary i’s critical input price is larger than the critical
input price of intermediary 3− i. If intermediary i is in the leading position, we have
2αi − γα3−i
2λi − γλ3−i >
4α3−i − γ2α3−i − 2γαi
4λ3−i − γ2λ3−i − 2γλi ,
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if he takes the role of the follower we get
2α3−i − γαi
2λ3−i − γλi <
4αi − γ2αi − 2γα3−i
4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i .
Thus, intermediary i is the potential monopolist when being the Stackelberg leader
and follower. The conditions that ensure a sufficiently low input price c for a duopoly
therefore demand
c <
4α3−i − γ2α3−i − 2γαi
4λ3−i − γ2λ3−i − 2γλi
and
c <
2α3−i − γαi
2λ3−i − γλi .
It can easily be seen that the following always holds:
α3−i
λ3−i
<
αi
λi
⇔ α3−iλi < αiλ3−i
⇔ α3−iλi
(
4− γ2) < αiλ3−i (4− γ2)
⇔ 4α3−iλi − γ2α3−iλi − 2γαiλi < 4αiλ3−i − γ2αiλ3−i − 2γαiλi
⇔ 4α3−i − γ
2α3−i − 2γαi
4λ3−i − γ2λ3−i − 2γλi <
αi
λi
as well as
α3−i
λ3−i
<
αi
λi
⇔ α3−iλi < αiλ3−i
⇔ 2α3−iλi − γαiλi < 2αiλ3−i − γαiλi
⇔ 2α3−i − γαi
2λ3−i − γλi <
αi
λi
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Therefore the conditions which ensure a duopoly market also imply the condition for
qSLi > q
SF
i :
c <
4α3−i − γ2α3−i − 2γαi
4λ3−i − γ2λ3−i − 2γλi <
αi
λi
and
c <
2α3−i − γαi
2λ3−i − γλi <
αi
λi
.
Now suppose intermediary 3 − i to be more competitive than intermediary i and
therefore α3−i
λ3−i
> αi
λi
. Independently of whether he is the Stackelberg leader or the
Stackelberg follower, intermediary i’s critical input price is smaller than the critical
input price of intermediary 3− i. If intermediary i is in the leading position, we have
2αi − γα3−i
2λi − γλ3−i <
4α3−i − γ2α3−i − 2γαi
4λ3−i − γ2λ3−i − 2γλi ,
if intermediary i takes the role of the follower we get
2α3−i − γαi
2λ3−i − γλi >
4αi − γ2αi − 2γα3−i
4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i .
Therefore, in both scenarios intermediary 3 − i is the potential monopolist. The
conditions that ensure a sufficiently low input price c for a duopoly therefore demand
c <
2αi − γα3−i
2λi − γλ3−i
for the first case and
c <
4αi − γ2αi − 2γα3−i
4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i
for the second case. It can be seen that for the given scenario with γ > 0 the following
inequalities are true:
α3−i
λ3−i
>
αi
λi
⇔ α3−iλi > αiλ3−i
⇔ γα3−iλi > γαiλ3−i
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⇔ − γα3−iλi < −γαiλ3−i
⇔ 2αiλi − γα3−iλi < 2αiλi − γαiλ3−i
⇔ 2αi − γα3−i
2λi − γλ3−i <
αi
λi
and
α3−i
λ3−i
>
αi
λi
⇔ α3−iλi > αiλ3−i
⇔ − 2γα3−iλi < −2γαiλ3−i
⇔ 4αiλi − γ2αiλi − 2γα3−iλi < 4αiλi − γ2αiλi − 2γαiλ3−i
⇔ 4αi − γ
2αi − 2γα3−i
4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i <
αi
λi
.
Therefore, given the conditions that guarantee a duopoly market are satisfied, qSLi >
qSFi also holds:
c <
2αi − γα3−i
2λi − γλ3−i <
αi
λi
and
c <
4αi − γ2αi − 2γα3−i
4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i <
αi
λi
.
With γ < 0, however, the duopoly condition is not necessarily sufficiently for
c < αi
λi
. It is obvious that
α3−i
λ3−i
>
αi
λi
⇔ α3−iλi > αiλ3−i
⇔ γα3−iλi < γαiλ3−i
⇔ 2αi − γα3−i
2λi − γλ3−i >
αi
λi
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and
α3−i
λ3−i
>
αi
λi
⇔ α3−iλi > αiλ3−i
⇔ γα3−iλi < γαiλ3−i
⇔ − 2γα3−iλi > −2γαiλ3−i
⇔ 4αi − γ
2αi − 2γα3−i
4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i >
αi
λi
.
Given intermediary i is the Stackelberg leader with an input price satisfying
αi
λi
< c <
2αi − γα3−i
2λi − γλ3−i
as well as intermediary i as the Stackelberg follower with an input price satisfying
αi
λi
< c <
4αi − γ2αi − 2γα3−i
4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i
the equilibrium quantity of the Stackelberg leader will be higher than the equilibrium
of the Stackelberg follower.
Computations of Proof of Proposition 4.4
Part (i) of Proposition 4.4 shows that when assuming λ1 = λ2, we obtain√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ1) + λ1 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1))− 2 (2λ1 − γλ1)
4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1
−
√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ1) + λ1 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1))
2 (2λ1 − γλ1)
− (4λ1 − γ
2λ1 − 2γλ1)
2 (2λ1 − γλ1) = 0
⇔
√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ21 (2− γ) + λ21 (4− γ2 − 2γ))− 2λ1 (2− γ)
λ1 (4− γ2 − 2γ)
−
√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ21 (2− γ) + λ21 (4− γ2 − 2γ))− λ1 (4− γ2 − 2γ)
2λ1 (2− γ) = 0
⇔ λ1
√
2 (2− γ2) (2 (2− γ) + (4− γ2 − 2γ))− 2λ1 (2− γ)
λ1 (4− γ2 − 2γ)
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− λ1
√
2 (2− γ2) (2 (2− γ) + (4− γ2 − 2γ))− λ1 (4− γ2 − 2γ)
2λ1 (2− γ) = 0
⇔
√
2 (2− γ2) (2 (2− γ) + (4− γ2 − 2γ))− 2 (2− γ)
(4− γ2 − 2γ)
−
√
2 (2− γ2) (2 (2− γ) + (4− γ2 − 2γ))− (4− γ2 − 2γ)
2 (2− γ) = 0.
With products being mutually independent and therefore γ = 0 we get
√
20− 4
4
−
√
20− 4
4
= 0,
which is true.
Part (ii) of Proposition 4.4 compares the input supplier’s incentives to exclude either
a Stackelberg leader or a Stackelberg follower. Suppose intermediary 1 is more
competitive than intermediary 2 with α1
λ1
> α2
λ2
, where both intermediaries have
the same productivity with λ1 = λ2. When comparing τ
SL
1 with intermediary 1
as the Stackelberg leader and τSF1 with intermediary 1 as the Stackelberg follower
we obtain√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ1) + λ1 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1))− 2 (2λ1 − γλ1)
4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1
−
√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ1) + λ1 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1))
2 (2λ1 − γλ1)
+
− (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1)
2 (2λ1 − γλ1) < 0
⇔
√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ21 (2− γ) + λ21 (4− γ2 − 2γ))− 2λ1 (2− γ)
λ1 (4− γ2 − 2γ)
−
√
2 (2− γ2) (2λ21 (2− γ) + λ21 (4− γ2 − 2γ))− λ1 (4− γ2 − 2γ)
2λ1 (2− γ) < 0
⇔ λ1
√
2 (2− γ2) (2 (2− γ) + (4− γ2 − 2γ))− 2λ1 (2− γ)
λ1 (4− γ2 − 2γ)
− λ1
√
2 (2− γ2) (2 (2− γ) + (4− γ2 − 2γ))− λ1 (4− γ2 − 2γ)
2λ1 (2− γ) < 0
⇔
√
2 (2− γ2) (2 (2− γ) + (4− γ2 − 2γ))− 2 (2− γ)
(4− γ2 − 2γ)
−
√
2 (2− γ2) (2 (2− γ) + (4− γ2 − 2γ))− (4− γ2 − 2γ)
2 (2− γ) < 0
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⇔ 2 (2− γ)
√
2 (2− γ2) (2 (2− γ) + (4− γ2 − 2γ))− 4 (2− γ)2
2 (4− γ2 − 2γ) (2− γ)
− (4− γ
2 − 2γ)√2 (2− γ2) (2 (2− γ) + (4− γ2 − 2γ))
2 (4− γ2 − 2γ) (2− γ)
− (4− γ
2 − 2γ)2
2 (4− γ2 − 2γ) (2− γ) < 0
⇔ 2 (2− γ)
√
2 (2− γ2) (2 (2− γ) + (4− γ2 − 2γ))− 4 (2− γ)2
− (4− γ2 − 2γ)√2 (2− γ2) (2 (2− γ) + (4− γ2 − 2γ))
+
(
4− γ2 − 2γ)2 < 0
⇔
√
2 (2− γ2) (2 (2− γ) + (4− γ2 − 2γ)) (2 (2− γ)− (4− γ2 − 2γ))
− 4 (2− γ)2 + (4− γ2 − 2γ)2 < 0
⇔ γ2
√
2 (2− γ2) (8− 4γ − γ2)− 4 (2− γ)2 + (4− γ2 − 2γ)2 < 0
⇔ γ2
√
2 (2− γ2) (8− 4γ − γ2)− γ2 (8− γ2 − 4γ) < 0
⇔ γ2
√
2 (2− γ2) (8− 4γ − γ2) < γ2 (8− γ2 − 4γ)
⇔
√
2 (2− γ2) (8− 4γ − γ2) < (8− γ2 − 4γ)
⇔ 2 (2− γ2) (8− 4γ − γ2) < (8− γ2 − 4γ)2
⇔ 2 (2− γ2) < 8− γ2 − 4γ
⇔ 4− 2γ2 < 8− γ2 − 4γ
⇔ 0 < 4 + γ2 − 4γ
⇔ 0 < 4 (1− γ) + γ2,
which is always satisfied.
Computations of Proof of Proposition 4.5
Part (i) of Proposition 4.5 claims that the input supplier’s equilibrium duopoly input
price is higher if intermediary 1 is the Stackelberg leader compared to the scenario
in which he takes the role of the follower. With identical productivities for both
intermediaries with λ1 = λ2, we can be seen by
2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ1 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)
2 (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ1) + λ2 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1))
>
2λ1 (2α2 − γα1) + λ1 (4α1 − γ2α1 − 2γα2)
2 (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ1) + λ1 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1))
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⇔ 2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ1
(
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1
)
>2λ1 (2α2 − γα1) + λ1
(
4α1 − γ2α1 − 2γα2
)
⇔ 2 (2α1 − γα2) +
(
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1
)
>2 (2α2 − γα1) +
(
4α1 − γ2α1 − 2γα2
)
⇔ 4α1 − 2γα2 − 4α1 + γ2α1 + 2γα2
4α2 − 2γα1 − 4α2 + γ2α2 + 2γα1
⇔ γ2α1 > γ2α2
⇔ α1 > α2,
which is true for α1
λ1
> α2
λ2
.
Part (ii) of Proposition 4.5 yields that for a duopoly the input supplier’s equilibrium
duopoly input price is higher if intermediary 1 is the Stackelberg leader. When
comparing the input prices with identical productivities for both intermediaries
(λ1 = λ2), this can be seen by
(2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ1 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1))2
16 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ1) + λ1 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1))
>
(2λ2 (2α2 − γα1) + λ1 (4α1 − γ2α1 − 2γα2))2
16 (2− γ2) (2λ1 (2λ1 − γλ1) + λ1 (4λ1 − γ2λ1 − 2γλ1))
⇔ (2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ1 (4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1))2
>
(
2λ1 (2α2 − γα1) + λ1
(
4α1 − γ2α1 − 2γα2
))2
⇔ 2λ1 (2α1 − γα2) + λ1
(
4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1
)
>2λ1 (2α2 − γα1) + λ1
(
4α1 − γ2α1 − 2γα2
)
⇔ 4α1λ1 − 2γα2λ1 + 4α2λ1 − γ2α2λ1 − 2γα1λ1
>4α2λ1 − 2γα1λ1 + 4α1λ1 − γ2α1λ1 − 2γα2λ1
⇔ − γ2α2λ1 > −γ2α1λ1
⇔ α1 > α2,
which is true for α1
λ1
> α2
λ2
.
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Computations of Equation 4.38
piSL1 (q1, q2, c, α1, α2) =
(
pSL1 − λ1cS
)
qSL1
=
((
2− γ2
2
)
qSL1 + λ1c
S − λ1cS
)
qSL1
=
(
2− γ2
2
)(
qSL1
)2
⇒ piSL1 (q1, q2, c, α1, α2) =
(
2− γ2
2
)(
(2α1 − γα2)− (2λ1 − γλ2) c
2 (2− γ2)
)2
=
((2α1 − γα2)− (2λ1 − γλ2) c)2
8 (2− γ2)
Computations of Equation 4.39
piSF2 (q1, q2, c, α1, α2) =
(
pSF2 − λ2cS
)
qSF2
=
(
qSF2 + λ2c− λ2c
)
qSF2
=
(
qSF2
)2
⇒ piSF2 (q1, q2, c, α1, α2) =
((4α2 − γ2α2 − 2γα1)− (4λ2 − γ2λ2 − 2γλ1) c)2
16 (2− γ2)2
Computations of Proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof of Lemma 4.1.
Case 3 (small asymmetries): αiτ
SF
i < α3−i < αi
λ3−i
λi
(or α3−iτSF3−i < αi < α3−i
λi
λ3−i
).
For the Stackelberg leader we obtain
∂2piSLi (qi, q3−i, c, αi, α3−i)
∂α2i
=
∂2
[(
pSLi (αi, α3−i)− λicS (αi, α3−i)
)
qSLi (αi, α3−i)
]
∂α2i
=2
(
∂pSLi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
− λi∂c
S (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
)
∂qSLi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
.
As we know that
∂pSLi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
=
(
2− γ2
2
)
∂qi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
+ λi
∂cS (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
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we get
∂2piSLi (qi, q3−i, c, αi, α3−i)
∂α2i
=2
((2− γ2
2
)
∂qi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
+ λi
∂cS (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
− λi∂c
S (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
)
· ∂q
SL
i (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
=
(
2− γ2)(∂qi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
)2
=
(
2− γ2)( 1
2 (2− γ2)
(
2− (2λi − γλ3−i) ∂c
S (αi, α3−i)
αi
))2
=
1
4 (2− γ2)
(
2− (2λi − γλ3−i) ∂c
S (αi, α3−i)
αi
)2
=
1
4 (2− γ2)
(
2− (2λi − γλ3−i)
2
(2λi (2λi − γλ3−i) + λ3−i (4λ3−i − γ2λ3−i − 2γλi))
)2
> 0
for all αi ∈
[
αi, αi
]
for i = 1, 2.
For the Stackelberg follower within a duopoly we have
∂2piSFi (qi, q3−i, c, αi, α3−i)
∂α2i
=
∂2
[(
pSFi (αi, α3−i)− λicS (αi, α3−i)
)
qSFi (αi, α3−i)
]
∂α2i
=2
(
∂pSFi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
− λi∂c
S (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
)
∂qSFi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
.
As we know that
∂pSFi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
=
∂qSFi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
+ λi
∂cS
∂αi
we obtain
∂2piSFi (qi, q3−i, c, αi, α3−i)
∂α2i
=
(
∂qSFi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
+ λi
∂cS (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
− λi∂c
S (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
)
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· ∂q
SF
i (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
=2
(
∂qSFi (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
)2
=
1
8 (2− γ2)2
((
4− γ2)− (4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i) ∂cS (αi, α3−i)
∂αi
)2
=
1
8 (2− γ2)2
((
4− γ2)− (4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i)2
2 (2λ3−i (2λ3−i − γλi) + λi (4λi − γ2λi − 2γλ3−i))
)2
> 0
for all αi ∈
[
αi, αi
]
for i = 1, 2.
Chapter 5
Contract Design for Composed
Services
5.1 Introduction
On the worldwide market for IT services with a huge number of single services clients
often search from a solution-oriented point of view. Moreover, the evolution of the
“cloud” as an infrastructure with flexible and on demand access to applications has
the effect that “[...] the computing world is rapidly transforming towards developing
software for millions to consume as a service, rather than to run on their individual
computers.” (Buyya et al., 2009, p. 599). Our article analyzes the interaction between
providers of such single services and an intermediary. The intermediary combines
these services and sells them as a composed service on the market. We contribute to
a broader research agenda called “On-The-Fly (OTF) Computing” which investigates
the economic and technical challenges for dynamic automated service composition
in a cloud computing environment. The main goal of OTF computing is to configure
and provide individual IT services in a flexible way to overcome inefficiencies related to
traditional software solutions. On such a market an intermediary is indispensable, since
clients usually do not have the necessary knowledge and expertise to find the desired
services themselves and, moreover, to combine them flexibly. The intermediary’s task
is to create a link between clients and service providers producing single services.
He proposes composed services as solutions that combine different single services to
a new product. The vision of OTF computing is briefly presented in Happe et al.
(2013). As Sundareswaran et al. (2012) points out “Aggregating service providers
is very challenging in the Cloud due to complex relationship among Cloud service
providers that are built via subcontracting.”
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More specifically, in this article we focus on the contract design problem of one
intermediary and two service providers who strategically interact on the market. We
use a non-cooperative game-theoretic approach for our analysis. The service providers
deliver complementary services which they can choose to produce in either high or low
quality. For services in a cloud computing environment this quality decision may be
an important factor. It crucially influences the performance of the service composition
and results in additional costs or effort for the service providers. Examples are the
bandwidth provided, resources made available for the execution of a service as well
as the priority given to the inquiry of the intermediary. Besides choosing the quality,
the service providers may deliver their single services in various quantities, such as
number of licenses to use the provided service, number of instances, utilization time
available for execution, or the amount of storage space. The intermediary receives
the single services and combines them to a composed service. The quality of the
composed service depends on the inputs’ qualities and can also be either high or low.
The intermediary strategically reports the quality of the composed service to his input
suppliers and pays them accordingly. We assume that he is only able to observe the
quality of the composed service, but is not aware of the two single services’ qualities.
A typical feature of a composed service is that its quality properties are dependent on
those of the single services and their interaction when the composed service is executed.
Quality properties of the single services can only be tested to a limited extent prior
to composition. For example, in a cloud computing environment it may technically
be difficult or too costly to individually test the quality of a software service or of
a hardware service that is used for execution. On the demand side we suppose that
clients have a demand for both composed services of high and low quality (usually at
different prices).
Besides considering a one-shot game we analyze a repeated interaction between
the intermediary and his suppliers. Here, the intermediary initially offers contracts to
the sellers in which he specifies the payment he is willing to make, depending on the
reported quality of the composed service. While in the short run producing low-quality
composed services is always a Nash equilibrium (Proposition 5.1) and producing high-
quality composed services is never a Nash equilibrium (Proposition 5.2), the long run
situation is more promising. We identify conditions on the time preferences (discount
factors) under which high quality is a subgame-perfect equilibrium on the market in
the long run. The main finding is that even if selling high quality is profitable for
the intermediary, the emergence of high-quality composed services on the market still
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crucially depends on the intermediary’s discount factor (Proposition 5.3). We identify
optimal payments of the intermediary to implement high- or low-quality composed
services (Propositions 5.4 and 5.5).
5.2 Related Literature
Our model is related to the literature on principal-agent relationships as well as on
reputation and repeated interaction. We use this section to describe similarities and
differences in comparison to our approach.
The price model in the procurement situation that we study is related to the
modeling of contracts in principal-agent relationships. For example, if the agent’s
contribution to the firm’s value is not directly observable, Baker et al. (1994) addresses
how to design compensation contracts consisting of a base salary and a bonus payment
in a repeated setting. A similar procurement problem with respect to price and quality
considerations is also discussed by Asker and Cantillon (2010). They derive the optimal
procurement mechanism and compare it with alternatives such as scoring auctions
and (sequential) bargaining. The procurement situation in Laussel and Long (2011)
is related to the one we assume here, but the focus of the analysis is different. Having
several intermediate-input suppliers they study the incentives of vertical integration
in a dynamic model. In comparison to the approaches just mentioned, even if the
relationship between the intermediary and its service providers resembles a principal-
agent model, we additionally incorporate the influence of the clients’ demand on the
intermediary’s profit function. Therefore, the profit is influenced simultaneously by
two aspects: on the one hand the effort or quality choice of the service provider and
on the other hand the resulting client’s demand in dependence on the quality of the
composed service. Moreover, by considering composed services we are interested in
the right coordination of the service providers’ quality choices.
In a setting with repeated interaction, experiences that were made with a certain
product in the past have an influence on its future evaluations as well as future sales
opportunities. Dellarocas (2005) refers to this as “reputation”. Similarly, already
Shapiro (1983) argues:
“When product attributes are difficult to observe prior to purchase, con-
sumers may plausibly use the quality of products produced by the firm in
the past as an indicator of present or future quality. In such cases a firm’s
decision to produce high quality items is a dynamic one: the benefits of
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doing so accrue in the future via the effect of building up a reputation. In
this sense, reputation formation is a type of signaling activity: the quality
of items produced in previous periods serves as a signal of the quality of
those produced during the current period.”
We follow this definition of reputation for our analysis. Similar to our approach, Dana
and Fong (2011) analyzes the influence of the market structure on the incentives to
produce high quality in a repeated game setting. While they focus on the comparison
of different market structures, our analysis highlights the interaction and contract
design of an intermediary and its suppliers. In addition, we relax the assumption
that customers have a unit-demand. Tang and Cheng (2005) consider a market in
which an intermediary offers a composed service. In their setting, a user has to decide
to buy two complementary web services either from a web service intermediary or
directly from its providers. Optimal location and price choices of the web service
intermediary are analyzed in a spatial model, more precisely in a linear and circular city
model. Contrary to their approach we focus on the optimal contract design between
the intermediary and its service providers.
Reputation systems for online markets are explicitly addressed by Dellarocas (2005).
He studies the mechanism design problem of a reputation system where buyers and
sellers directly interact with each other. A monopolistic seller exerts an effort that
influences the quality of the product. After having experienced the quality of the good
the buyer reports his satisfaction of the product. These reports are summarized in the
reputation profile of the seller. A repeated game setting is used to analyze efficiency
and seller payoffs by varying the number of observations in the reputation profile
and by extending his model to multi-values including incomplete reports and multiple
competing sellers. Our analysis, however, does not include a reputation system. We
assume that the seller is always able to sell his products at the market by adapting
prices to demand. From an architectural perspective, including reputation informa-
tion in the OTF computing process has been discussed in Brangewitz et al. (2014b).
Intermediaries selling composed services are also analyzed in the literature on Cloud
Services Brokerage as for example in Sundareswaran et al. (2012), Giovanoli et al.
(2014), Jula et al. (2014). We complement previous works by considering contract
design issues from an economic perspective.
The analysis proceeds as follows: First, we present the model. Then we analyze the
different decisions considering the trade of services and the contract design. Finally,
we conclude and comment on further extensions.
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5.3 The Model
In our setting we consider three types of market participants: clients, intermediaries,
and service providers. Our focus is on modeling the strategic interaction of one in-
termediary and two service providers. The intermediary chooses a long run contract
that he offers to the service providers. Then the service providers strategically choose
the quality and quantity of the service they would like to provide. The intermedi-
ary afterwards reports (not necessarily truthful) the quality of the composed service
he produced from the service providers’ inputs. The clients are assumed to be non-
strategic.
5.3.1 Long run contracts
Before services are actually traded the intermediary makes a decision on the quality
he is willing to deliver to the market and the long run contracts he offers to the
service providers. He privately observes his clients’ demands for the composed service
which is demanded in low (L) and high quality (H). Furthermore, he is aware of
the service providers’ cost functions for producing (single) services in high or low
quality. Therefore, he is able to determine his expected profit possibilities for the
“two” markets. He compares them and afterwards chooses the quality he prefers to
deliver to his clients.
Based on this strategic quality choice, the intermediary designs contracts specifying
the way the service providers are paid. These contracts are of the following form: for
delivering a service a service provider receives a base payment independently of the
quality of his service. This payment is equivalent to the payment for a low-quality
service. Furthermore, the intermediary promises him an additional payment, if the
observed quality of the composed service, which is dependent on the quality of both
inputs, is high. For the interaction with his client the intermediary takes the client’s
demand functions as given and determines the sales prices as well as the sales quantities
that maximize his profits. Then, using the contract design and the optimal sales
quantities, he explicitly determines the transfer payments and offers them in the form
of contracts to the service providers. More precisely, the transfer payments towards a
service provider depend on the observable quantity of the single service he delivered
and the quality of the composed service reported by the intermediary.
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5.3.2 Market interaction
In the next step, the services are traded on the market. We start to describe the
procurement side. For simplicity, we suppose that the intermediary needs one unit of
each service to produce one unit of composed service. In every period, each service
provider decides on which of the demanded quantities, the optimal sales quantity for
either high or low quality, he delivers and if the service is of quality L or H. Service
provider i’s cost function is denoted by Ciθi : R+ → R+ for quality θi ∈ {H,L} and
i ∈ {1, 2}. We assume convex cost functions and higher cost to deliver high quality
services, CiH (·) > CiL (·). Convexity means that marginal costs are non-decreasing,
i.e., providing an additional instance (or unit) is at least as expensive as the previous
one. The quality of the composed service depends on the quality choices of the service
providers and is defined as follows1
θ0 : {L,H}2 → {L,H} with θ0 (θ1, θ2) =
H if (θ1, θ2) = (H,H)L otherwise. (5.1)
The intermediary is able to directly observe the delivered quantities. The suppliers’
quality choices are not directly observable and can only be uniquely determined in
certain cases by considering the quality of the composed service. The intermediary
decides whether to report this quality truthfully or not. The reported quality is defined
by θˆ0 : {L,H} → {L,H} such that θ0 7→ θˆ0 (θ0). According to the report he rewards
the service providers with a transfer payment of T iH , T
i
L : R+ → R+ for i ∈ {1, 2}
specified in the long run contract.2 We assume convex transfer payments that are
differentiable at 0 and suppose T iH (·) ≥ T iL (·) ≥ CiL (·). This reflects the idea, that
in any case the intermediary pays T iL (·) and if he reports high quality the service
providers receive T iH (·) − T iL (·) additionally as a bonus. The actions of the service
providers, i.e., choosing the quantity and quality of the delivered services, as well as
of the intermediary whether to report truthfully or not are assumed to be chosen
simultaneously.
On the demand side the intermediary is facing a client who has a certain demand for
both composed services of quality H and of quality L. The client’s demand functions
(for low and high quality) assign to any positive price P the demanded quantities
1The superscript 0 indicates that the quality of the composed service is observed by the interme-
diary, denoted in the following as player 0.
2Note that the subscript relates to the reported quality θˆ0
(
θ0
) ∈ {H,L}.
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and are given by Dθ0 : R+ → R+ with P 7→ Dθ0(P ) for quality θ0 ∈ {L,H} of the
composed service. Thus, when charging a price of P for the composed service, the
intermediary faces a demand of his client of Dθ0(P ) units of the composed service with
quality θ0. For our subsequent analysis we make some technical assumptions related
to the client’s demand functions. Suppose Dθ0(P ) is twice continuously differentiable,
non-increasing, strictly decreasing whenever Dθ0(P ) > 0 and satisfies D
′′
θ0(P )Dθ0(P )−
2
(
D′θ0(P )
)2
< 0. The inverse demand function assigning a price to a given demand is
denoted by Pθ0(D).
3 Suppose for a given price P we always have DH(P ) > DL(P ).
Moreover, demand and transfer payments are assumed to satisfy Pθ0(0) > T
′
θ0(0).
Our focus for the succeeding analysis is on the information asymmetries between
the intermediary and the service providers. We assume complete information on the
demand side, the intermediary delivers the demanded quality of the final product
truthfully to his clients.
The remainder of this section is used to explain the assumptions we made by means
of an example illustrated in Fig. 5.1. Suppose a client has an own program routine
and wants to analyze a huge data set by running simulations. As the computations are
complex and resource-intense, the client is not able to execute his program within his
own infrastructure. Therefore, he decides to make use of cloud services. He approaches
an OTF intermediary who is offering a composed service that is able to process the
client’s demand. The OTF intermediary flexibly combines a service for storage with
a service for computing that he purchases from other service providers. For a given
price per instance, the quantity demanded by the client is the number of instances he
is willing to book for the execution of his simulations. Clearly, a higher price triggers
a lower demanded quantity. Quality properties of the single services are the access
time for the storage and the time needed by the computing service. The quality of
the composed service is the overall time per instance to run the client’s simulations.
If the composed service is of high quality, e.g. the total process time is short, the
client has a high willingness to pay. Accordingly, in case of a low-quality composed
service he accepts a longer processing time while having a lower willingness to pay. A
comprehensive analytical example for specific demand and cost functions to illustrate
our results of the next sections can be found in Appendix 5.7.
3The third assumption on the demand function is related to its curvature and can be equivalently
expressed in terms of elasticities as D′′θ0(P )P/D
′
θ0(P ) > 2D
′
θ0(P )P/Dθ0(P ). This assumption ensures
that DPθ0(D) is strictly concave and is derived from DP
′′
θ0(D) + 2P
′
θ0(D) < 0, using the derivative of
the inverse demand function. The three assumptions on the demand function are also made in Dana
(2001), for example.
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Clients Intermediary Service Providers 
 
Computing        
  
 
  
  
Storage 
Figure 5.1: Composed services consisting of hardware and software services
5.4 Trading Services
5.4.1 Optimal sales prices and quantities
Given the contract T = (T iL(·), T iH(·))i=1,2 the intermediary determines the optimal
quantity DT∗θ0 he is willing to sell to his client for a fixed quality θ
0 of the com-
posed service. This is the client’s demanded quantity that maximizes the inter-
mediary’s profit. With this optimal demand the optimal sales price denoted by
P T∗θ0 := Pθ0(D
T∗
θ0 ) can be computed. Hereby, the intermediary assumes that both
service providers deliver him services of the same quality θ1 = θ2 and therefore the
resulting quality of the composed service is θ0 = θ1 = θ2. Formally, the intermediary
DT∗θ0 = argmaxD∈R+ DPθ0(D) −
∑2
i=1 T
i
θ0 (D). Note that due to our assumptions a
maximizer DT∗θ0 exists and is unique. The function DPθ0(D) is strictly concave and the
transfer payments T iθ(·) are convex. Therefore, the objective function is strictly con-
cave. Moreover, we have Pθ0(0) > T
′
θ0(0) ensuring positive profits.Using the contract
design and the optimal sales quantities the intermediary offers the following contracts
to the service providers
(
T iL
(
DT∗L
)
, T iL
(
DT∗H
)
, T iH
(
DT∗L
)
, T iH
(
DT∗H
))
i=1,2
. The service
providers decide whether to choose a quantity DT∗L or D
T∗
H as well as the quality, either
L or H, they deliver to the intermediary.
5.4.2 Trading once
We use a non-cooperative game in strategic form with three players, which we first con-
sider as a one-shot game and in the next subsection as a repeated game. We denote the
intermediary as player 0 and the two service providers as players 1 and 2. The strat-
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egy sets are {(L,DT∗L ) , (L,DT∗H ) (H,DT∗L ) , (H,DT∗H )} for the service providers and
{truthful, not truthful} for the intermediary. The intermediary’s strategy “truthful”
indicates that he reports the composed service’s quality honestly and “not truthful”
means that he always pretends to have seen low quality. He chooses the strategy to
be truthful if θˆ0(L) = L and θˆ0(H) = H. If he reports θˆ0(L) = L and θˆ0(H) = L, we
say that he is not truthful. From now on we refer to the composed service’s quality θ0
and reported quality θˆ0 for short. For a delivered quantity Di ∈ {DT∗L , DT∗H } of service
provider i ∈ {1, 2} we define Dmin := mini∈{1,2}Di. Given a strategy profile the pay-
off of service provider i ∈ {1, 2} is his profit ΠT,i
(
θˆ0, (θ1, D1) , (θ2, D2)
)
= T i
θˆ0
(Di)−
Ciθi (D
i). With the quantities the intermediary receives from the service providers he is
able to produce maximally Dmin units of the composed service. Therefore, the interme-
diary needs to reconsider his revenue maximization problem. He chooses the sales price
of the composed service such that his profits are maximized given the capacity con-
straint Dmin, that is P
T∗∗
θ0 = Pθ0
(
DT∗∗θ0
)
with DT∗∗θ0 = argmaxDT
θ0
≤Dmin Pθ0
(
DTθ0
)
DTθ0 −∑2
i=1 T
i
θˆ0
(Di) yielding a profit of ΠT,0
(
θˆ0, (θ1, D1) , (θ2, D2)
)
= P T∗∗θ0 D
T∗∗
θ0 −
∑2
i=1 T
i
θˆ0
(Di)
with P T∗∗θ0 := Pθ0
(
DT∗∗θ0
)
.4
The most well-known solution concept for non-cooperative games is the Nash equi-
librium Nash (1951). A Nash equilibrium is a collection of strategy choices of the OTF
provider and the service providers such that no one has an incentive to unilaterally
change his strategy given the others’ strategies. For the OTF market this means that
in an equilibrium the OTF provider cannot increase his profit from changing his re-
port for given quality choices of the service providers and each service provider cannot
increase his profit from unilaterally changing the produced quality or quantity. We
observe the following equilibrium result, when services are traded just once.
Proposition 5.1. Given the other service provider delivers low-quality services, then
producing the correct quantity of low quality services is a Nash equilibrium strategy
if and only if T iL
(
DT∗L
)− CiL (DT∗L ) ≥ T iL (DT∗H )− CiL (DT∗H ) for i = 1, 2.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. First, note that the intermediary is indifferent in being truth-
ful or not. The condition in Proposition 5.1 is immediately derived from comparing
the profits of the service providers in case of a deviation from
(
L,DT∗L
)
.
Proposition 5.1 demonstrates that there exists the possibility to choose the prop-
erties of the transfer payments and cost functions in such a way that producing low-
4Note that if θ0 = θ1 = θ2 and the service providers deliver DT∗θ0 , then D
T∗∗
θ0 = D
T∗
θ0 and P
T∗∗
θ0 =
PT∗θ0 .
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quality composed services is a Nash equilibrium of the static game. If we choose
T iL (·) = CiL (·) in Proposition 5.1 we obtain immediately that independently of the
transfer payments for high quality T iH (·), producing low-quality services is a Nash
equilibrium strategy.
Proposition 5.2. Producing high-quality composed services is not a Nash equilib-
rium.
Proof of Proposition 5.2. If T iH (·) > T iL (·), the intermediary has an incentive to de-
viate to not being truthful. For T iH (·) = T iL (·) service provider i has an incentive to
deviate in producing low quality as CiH (·) > CiL (·). Moreover, if the service providers
are not rewarded with a bonus for high quality, then each of them has an incentive to
deviate to produce low quality as CiH (·) > CiL (·).
In contrast to Proposition 5.1, Proposition 5.2 shows that in the static game the
intermediary has no possibility to end up with a high-quality composed service as there
are always possibilities for improvement for either the intermediary or the service
providers. In the next section we analyze if high-quality composed services can be
obtained by considering the described one-shot trading game repeatedly.
5.4.3 Trading repeatedly
The previous section showed that producing high-quality composed services is not an
equilibrium if the services are traded only once. Therefore, in this section we consider
repeated interaction between the intermediary and the service providers assuming an
infinite time horizon. Once agreed to produce either high- or low-quality composed
services in the optimal quantities, the intermediary and the service providers repeat-
edly trade services accordingly. We analyze if the right incentives can be provided
such that this agreement is sustainable in the long run even if it is supposed to be
non-binding. In our setting neither demand nor cost structures vary over time.
A refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept that fits a repeated interaction struc-
ture is the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium Selten (1965a,b). Applied to our con-
text, in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium neither the OTF provider nor the service
providers are willing to unilaterally change their long run strategies at any point in
time, while taking the others’ (equilibrium) strategies as given. We consider the long
run profits of the OTF provider and the service providers and technically apply the
“one-shot deviation principle” (Mailath and Samuelson, 2006, Proposition 2.2.1 p. 25)
to determine subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.
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A composed service with low quality may constitute a Nash equilibrium of the
trading game as shown in Proposition 5.1. If this is the case, it is also a subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated trading game. Concerning high-quality
composed services, suppose that the objective of the intermediary and the service
providers is to maximize their discounted profits by using a personal discount factor
δi ∈ (0, 1) (i = 0, 1, 2) from trading high-quality services. Suppose for the rest of
this section that the condition of Proposition 5.1 is satisfied and, therefore, producing
low-quality composed services in the correct quantities is a Nash equilibrium of the
one-shot trading game.
Within the repeated trading game we assume that the intermediary commits him-
self to report his observation of the quality of the composed service truthfully whereas
the two service providers agree to deliver him the optimal quantity of high quality
services:
(
truthful,
(
H,DT∗H
)
,
(
H,DT∗H
))
. From this agreement the intermediary can
deviate in reporting his observation not truthfully or the service providers can deviate
in delivering low-quality services or a different quantity of services. Cheating in one
period is followed by an according punishment in the periods thereafter. In case, one of
the service providers does not deliver high quality, the other service provider will also
not be rewarded for the high quality he produced. Therefore, he is no longer willing
to deliver high quality services in future. Similarly, if the intermediary does not report
his observation truthfully, the punishment of the service providers is to deliver low
quality services from now on. The punishment strategy profile is therefore denoted
by:
(
not truthful,
(
L,DT∗L
)
,
(
L,DT∗L
))
. Taking this behavior into account, we obtain
the following:
Proposition 5.3. If T iL
(
DT∗L
) − CiL (DT∗L ) ≥ T iL (DT∗H ) − CiL (DT∗H ), then produc-
ing high-quality services (in the demanded quantities) and the intermediary reporting
truthfully is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated game if and only if the
following conditions hold for the intermediary(
P T∗H D
T∗
H −
2∑
i=1
T iH
(
DT∗H
)) ≥ (1− δ0)(P T∗H DT∗H − 2∑
i=1
T iL
(
DT∗H
))
+ δ0
(
P T∗L D
T∗
L −
2∑
i=1
T iL
(
DT∗L
))
, (5.2)
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and for the service providers
T iH
(
DT∗H
)− CiH (DT∗H )
≥ (1− δi) max
{
T iL
(
DT∗L
)− CiL (DT∗L ) , T iH (DT∗L )− CiH (DT∗L ) ,
T iL
(
DT∗H − CiL
(
DT∗H
))}
+ δi
(
T iL
(
DT∗L
)− CiL (DT∗L )) . (5.3)
Proof of Proposition 5.3. The first condition implies that the punishment strategy af-
ter a deviation is a Nash equilibrium strategy if the services are traded once as shown
in Proposition 5.1. The conditions on the discount factors are derived by comparing
the discounted long run payoffs (for an infinite time horizon).
Proposition 5.3 gives us conditions on the critical discount factors needed to ensure
that high-quality composed services are produced in the long run. These depend on
the transfer payments, cost functions and implicitly on the client’s demand function.
5.5 Contract Design
The intermediary offers long run contracts which specify the way the service providers
are paid in dependence on the (reported) quality of the composed service. The optimal
contracts for the intermediary crucially depend on his strategic decision on whether to
sell high- or low-quality products to his clients. Therefore, we first analyze the optimal
contract design for both cases separately.
5.5.1 Contracts for low-quality composed services
Proposition 5.4. To produce low-quality composed services the intermediary optimally
chooses the transfer payments to be TL∗ =
(
TL∗,iL (·), TL∗,iH (·)
)
i=1,2
= (CiL(·), CiL(·))i=1,2.
Given TL∗ the service providers are always paid exactly their costs for producing
low-quality services and therefore have zero profits. They have no interest in producing
high-quality services since they are not rewarded accordingly and would thus suffer a
negative profit. In contrast to the zero profits of the service providers, the intermediary
is able to extract all the generated surplus and his profit is equal to P T
L∗∗
L D
TL∗∗
L −∑2
i=1C
i
L
(
DT
L∗∗
L
)
.
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5.5.2 Contracts for high-quality composed services
Using the conditions for the service providers from Proposition 5.3 we obtain:
Proposition 5.5. To give the appropriate incentives to the service providers in order
to produce high-quality composed services in the long run, the intermediary optimally
chooses the transfer payments to be TH∗ =
(
TH∗,iL (·), TH∗,iH (·)
)
i=1,2
= (CiL(·), CiH(·) + εi)i=1,2
with small εi > 0.
Given these transfer payments the service providers are paid exactly their costs
for producing low-quality services and strictly more than their costs for producing
high- quality services. Therefore, they have a strict interest in producing high-quality
services in the long run. The intermediary is able to extract almost all the generated
surplus and his profit is equal to P T
H∗∗
H D
TH∗∗
H −
∑2
i=1C
i
H
(
DT
H∗∗
H
)
−∑2i=1 εi. Hence,
the parameter εi is chosen to be strictly positive, but as small as possible. Using
Proposition 5.3 with TH∗,iL (·) = CiL(·) and TH∗,iH (·) = CiH(·) + εi we have:
Corollary 5.1. If the intermediary’s discount factor satisfies
δ0 >
∑2
i=1C
i
H
(
DT
H∗∗
H
)
+
∑2
i=1 ε
i −∑2i=1CiL (DTH∗∗H )(
P T
H∗∗
H D
TH∗∗
H −
∑2
i=1C
i
L
(
DT
H∗∗
H
))− (P TH∗∗L DTH∗∗L −∑2i=1CiL (DTH∗∗L )) , (D0)
then there exist transfer payments such that the intermediary is interested in producing
high-quality composed services.
Adding and subtracting the term
∑2
i=1C
i
H
(
DT
H∗∗
H
)
in the denominator on the
lower bound for δ0 in Corollary 5.1 gives the following interpretation: The evaluation of
future payoffs of the intermediary represented by his personal discount factor δ0 needs
to be strictly greater than the difference in the transfer payments the intermediary
has to make (for DT
H∗∗
H ) relative to this difference plus the advantage in his profits for
high-quality composed services.
5.5.3 Long run quality choice
Using the optimal contract design, the intermediary compares the profits on the mar-
ket of low-quality composed services with the profits on the market for high-quality
composed services. We can distinguish three different situations on the market. If the
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following condition holds
P T
H∗∗
H D
TH∗∗
H −
2∑
i=1
CiH
(
DT
H∗∗
H
)
−
2∑
i=1
εi > P T
L∗∗
L D
TL∗∗
L −
2∑
i=1
CiL
(
DT
L∗∗
L
)
(HIGH)
and the intermediary’s discount factor δ0 is sufficiently large, he prefers to deliver
high-quality composed services to his clients and the service providers have the right
incentives to produce high quality. In contrast, if condition (HIGH) holds but the
intermediary’s personal discount factor is not high enough, he intends to be willing
to reward the delivery of high-quality services, but as soon as the service providers
deliver high-quality services the intermediary does not pay the bonus as promised.
This is anticipated by the service providers. Consequently, only low-quality composed
services are produced. If the following condition holds
P T
H∗∗
H D
TH∗∗
H −
2∑
i=1
CiH
(
DT
H∗∗
H
)
−
2∑
i=1
εi < P T
L∗∗
L D
TL∗∗
L −
2∑
i=1
CiL
(
DT
L∗∗
L
)
(LOW)
the intermediary prefers to deliver low-quality composed services.
5.6 Concluding Comments
With our model we analyzed the incentives for high and low quality to be an equilib-
rium outcome of the market for composed services in a cloud computing environment.
Hereby, the intermediary’s discount factor is crucial even if the market for high-quality
composed services is advantageous in terms of expected profits. Therefore, as a first
implication for the OTF market, not only the profitability of composed services is
important but also the evaluation of future profits. Hence, we have shown that if
the intermediary’s discount factor is lower than the payments for the single services
relative to the advantage of high-quality composed services, only composed services of
low quality may appear on the market.
However, we made several simplifying assumptions and therefore our model can
be extended in various directions. For our theoretical analysis we suppose that the
quality of the composed service and the single services is either high or low. An obvious
extension is to introduce a finite or infinite number of different quality levels. Such
a modification enlarges the set of possible strategic choices of the services providers,
has the effect that the composed services may be available in these numerous quality
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levels and requires that the client’s demand is defined to take this into account. A
different direction for future research is the extension of asymmetric information issues
to the client-intermediary relation. So far each client had a demand for high- and low-
quality composed services. Differently, we may assume that there are several types
of clients and the intermediary faces a client type who either demands high- or low-
quality composed services. Moreover, a different reasonable assumption, especially for
cloud services, is that demand and cost structures vary over time. In this case the
intermediary might have to renew his contracts from time to time or the contracts
might have a specific durability during which services can be flexibly demanded and
delivered at a certain price. Up to now the services we considered were complementary
and the intermediary needed exactly one service of each type. Adding substitute
services and along with this competition is another direction to extend the current
model.
5.7 Appendix: Analytical Example
The client’s demand typically decreases if the price of the composed service increases.
As composed services of high quality are more valuable we suppose that for a given
price they are demanded in greater quantities than composed services of low quality.
The demand functions Dθ0(P ) =
1
β2
θ0
1
P 2
for θ0 ∈ {L,H} with βL > βH > 0 have these
properties. The service providers’ costs are typically increasing in the quality they
provide. Linear cost functions Ciθi (D
i) = γθiD
i for θi ∈ {L,H} with γH > γL > 0
for i = 1, 2 describe the service providers’ costs. The profit from producing composed
services of quality θ0 from the optimal contracts of Proposition 5.4 and 5.5 is given by
PDθ0(P )− (1 + ε˜θ0)
2∑
i=1
Ciθ0 (Dθ0(P )) =
P − 2γθ0 (1 + ε˜θ0)
β2θ0P
2
(5.4)
with ε˜L = 0 and ε˜H > 0. To simplify the calculations we use ε˜H as a multiplicative
and not as an additive term (Proposition 5.5). Profit maximization yields
P T
L∗∗
L∗ = P
TL∗∗
H∗ = P
TH∗∗
L∗ = 4γL and D
TL∗∗
L = D
TL∗∗
H = D
TH∗∗
L =
1
16γ2Lβ
2
L
and for high-quality composed services
P T
H∗∗
H = 4 (1 + ε˜H) γH and D
TH∗∗
H =
1
16 (1 + ε˜H)
2 γ2Hβ
2
H
.
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By the choice of the parameter γL < γH we observe immediately that the price the
intermediary charges for high quality is strictly greater than the price he charges for
low quality, whereas the effect on the quantity remains ambiguous. Figure 5.2(a)
illustrates the client’s demand functions and Fig. 5.2(b) the short run profits of the
OTF provider for low- and high-quality composed services.
Dθ0 (P )
DL (P )
DH (P )
P
P¯
DL
(
P¯
)
DH
(
P¯
)
(a) Demand functions
Profits
P
1
8(1+ε˜H)γHβ
2
H
4 (1 + ε˜H) γH
1
8γLβ
2
L
4γL
P−2γH(1+ε˜H)
β2HP
2
P−2γL
β2LP
2
(b) Short run profits
Figure 5.2: Example for βH =
1
2
, βL = 1, γH =
1
3
, γL =
1
8
, ε˜H =
1
100
Consider the long run quality choice of the intermediary. The conditions derived
in Section 5.5.3 and Corollary 5.1 are for our example
1
(1 + ε˜H) γHβ2H
>
1
γLβ2L
, (Ex-HIGH)
1
(1 + ε˜H) γHβ2H
<
1
γLβ2L
, (Ex-LOW)
δ0 ≥ (1 + ε˜H) γH − γL
(1 + ε˜H) γH − γL + (1 + ε˜H)2 γ2Hβ2H
(
1
(1+ε˜H)γHβ
2
H
− 1
γLβ
2
L
) . (Ex-D0)
The three possible market situations are as follows: If (Ex-HIGH) and (Ex-D0) hold,
high-quality composed services are produced. If (Ex-HIGH) holds and (Ex-D0) does
not hold, low-quality composed services are produced even if high-quality composed
services yield a higher profit for the intermediary if the services are traded once. If (Ex-
LOW) holds, low-quality composed services are produced. Inserting the values from
Fig. 5.2 yields that high-quality composed services are produced if δ0 ≥ 0.66. This
means as soon as future profits are considered to be sufficient attractive high-quality
composed service will the the equilibrium outcome of the market.
Chapter 6
Outlook
Getting a broad understanding of intermediate goods markets and analyzing its struc-
ture’s impact on the participants’ economic behavior and interactions was the main
objective of this thesis. In the previous chapters, it was shown that various challenges
arise due to its two-sided structure and the accompanied interdependencies, its dy-
namic nature and the presence of asymmetric information with respect to inputs’ and
final products’ quality. Furthermore, as intermediaries must not necessarily be sym-
metric in terms of productivity and offered product quality, the resulting competitive
advantages/disadvantages have indeed an impact on all participants’ decisions taken
in equilibrium. All of the mentioned challenges not covered in this thesis are left for
future research.
Within the analysis, methods of non-cooperative game theory were primarily ap-
plied, i.e., Nash equilibrium outcomes in static as well as repeated games determined
and analyzed, optimal contracts derived and much more.
After introducing the market structure, clarifying the necessity of intermediaries
and giving an extensive literature overview with respect to oligopoly theory in Chap-
ter 1 and Chapter 2, within Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 a differentiated duopoly model
was considered. We analyzed a setting in which two intermediaries procured inputs
from a monopolistic supplier refined them and offered a final product to a repre-
sentative customer. Differentiation in our context referred to horizontal and vertical
differentiation. Thus, final products could on the one hand be substitutes, comple-
ments or mutually independent (horizontal differentiation) and on the other hand have
different product qualities (vertical differentiation). Intermediaries were allowed to be
asymmetric in terms of their productivity as well as their products’ quality. Each of
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the intermediaries had the chance to foster product quality by investing in product
innovation whereas productivity was exogenously given. The focus of our analysis
within both chapters was put on the intermediaries’ simultaneous competition for the
customer’s demand on the sales side and for resources on the procurement side of the
market.
In contrast to Chapter 4, within Chapter 3 we assumed that intermediaries’ com-
petition for the customer’s demand was conducted by either simultaneously choosing
production quantities (Cournot competition) or sales prices (Bertrand competition).
Our analysis considered two stages: a stage of innovation and a stage of competition.
Within the first stage of innovation we analyzed the intermediaries’ incentives to
take an investment that fosters their product’s quality. For linear costs of investment,
we found that intermediaries always choose an investment which results in either a
minimum or a maximum level of product quality. For intermediaries with symmetric
productivities we derived equilibrium conditions for product quality investments on the
investment costs and compared the results for Cournot and Bertrand competition as
well as for complements and substitutes. In this context we have seen that there exist
product qualities such that for complements only symmetric equilibria are present,
while the existence of asymmetric equilibria can be guaranteed for close substitutes.
Thus, according to our intuition, within an environment of complementary products
and less severe competition, intermediaries rather tend to coordinate their investments.
However, in an environment of fierce competition with substitute products equilibria
of non-coordination may also be present.
Regarding the second stage which considered competition, our focus was put on
analyzing the impact of intermediaries’ asymmetries on the market outcome. It turned
out that the presence of a strategic input supplier may lead to an exclusion of one or
both intermediaries resulting in a monopoly intermediate goods market or no trade.
Our main finding in this context showed that there exist asymmetries between inter-
mediaries such that a monopoly market is obtained if quantities are chosen where a
duopoly market is present if prices are selected. This observation is due to the fact that
given intermediaries compete a` la Bertrand the input supplier’s profit is always higher
than if intermediaries face Cournot competition. Additionally, it turned out that there
exist asymmetries between intermediaries such that for non-substitute products, under
quantity competition equilibrium prices and profits are lower and equilibrium quan-
tities are higher than under price competition. Thus, in a setting in which the input
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market is explicitly modeled and asymmetries between intermediaries are present, the
results of Singh and Vives (1984) do not necessarily hold.
Differently, within Chapter 4 intermediaries competed by choosing their production
quantities sequentially (Stackelberg competition). In the first stage we gave a first
overview of the analysis considering intermediaries’ incentives to invest in product
quality. Similarly to the previous chapter, first results showed that given costs of
investment are linear, in equilibrium intermediaries always choose an investment that
either results in a minimum or maximum level of product quality.
In the second stage focus was put on the intermediaries’ competition for the cus-
tomer’s demand. In this context we compared the equilibrium decisions of an inter-
mediary when being the Stackelberg leader with his equilibrium decisions when being
the Stackelberg follower. In general and analogously to the results of Chapter 3 it
turned out that the presence of a strategic input supplier may lead to an exclusion of
one or both intermediaries. We have shown that there exist asymmetries between in-
termediaries such that a less competitive Stackelberg leader is excluded whereas a less
competitive Stackelberg leader is accepted in the market, ceteris paribus. Thus, being
the Stackelberg follower must not necessarily be a disadvantage. Furthermore, we ob-
served that a more competitive intermediary always offers higher quantities when being
the Stackelberg leader than when being the Stackelberg follower. However, for comple-
mentary products there exist asymmetries such that a less competitive follower offers
higher equilibrium quantities than a less competitive leader, showing that the classical
results of Von Stackelberg (1934) do not necessarily hold in our setting. Additionally,
we examined and compared equilibrium input prices for different role distributions.
In this context it turned out that for equal productivities of intermediaries the input
supplier demands higher equilibrium input prices and achieves higher profits if the
more competitive player is the Stackelberg leader compared to the case in which he is
the Stackelberg follower.
Beyond the scope of the current analysis, further investigations and extensions
of the discussed settings are left for future research. For instance, within Chapter 4
the innovation stage gave a first outlook for investigating the intermediaries’ optimal
investment in product innovation. In a further contribution, this section may be ex-
tended by a detailed examination of Nash equilibrium investments. One focal point
can be a comparison of the Stackelberg leader’s and the Stackelberg follower’s incentive
Chapter 6. Outlook 218
to invest in product innovation. Furthermore, the equilibrium conditions for product
quality investments on the investment costs are quite interesting and should be com-
pared for the Stackelberg leader and Stackelberg follower as well as for complements
and substitutes. Besides this, a connection to the outcome of Chapter 3 may be drawn.
From previous contributions we know that competition in which decisions are taken
sequentially is not restricted to choosing production quantities, but can also be carried
out by choosing sales prices. Hence, within future work Chapter 4 could be extended
by sequential price competition and the resulting equilibrium outcomes be analyzed.
The first- and second-mover advantages should be determined and a comparison to
the already existing results established in Chapter 4 be drawn.
Our analysis within Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 was limited to discussing a monop-
olistic and strategically acting input supplier who was only able to charge a unique
price to both of the intermediaries. In a further extension of our models, one can think
of the supplier being able to discriminate in prices, i.e., charge different input prices to
the intermediaries. In this context the impact of intermediaries’ asymmetries on the
input supplier’s price choice needs to be analyzed. Moreover, the supplier’s incentives
to exclude one of the intermediaries when being able to discriminate in prices could be
a main focus. In a further step a comparison of the results with the outcome already
determined within this work may be conducted.
As a previously identified challenge but not discussed within this work, the dy-
namic aspect of intermediate goods markets is another interesting field and left for
future research. Specifically, on the procurement side of the market it can be allowed
for a large number of input suppliers providing complementary, substitute as well as
mutually independent products. In such a setting suppliers may compete by either
simultaneously or sequentially choosing prices or production quantities. The dynamic
aspect could be considered by modeling a repeated trade game in which new input
suppliers may enter while established suppliers may leave the market. Thus, when
selecting the input supplies for combining a final product, an intermediary always
needs to reconsider his profit maximization problem period for period. Similarly, the
dynamic nature may also play a key role on the market of intermediaries, where a
high fluctuation of market participants is conceivable. Hence, when determining the
equilibrium production quantities intermediaries must always be aware of a constantly
changing competitive environment. Furthermore a customer demanding final prod-
ucts in multiple time periods always needs to reconsider his problem of choosing the
intermediary such that overall utility is maximized.
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An intermediate goods market, slightly different than the previously discussed mod-
els was considered in the final Chapter 5. The focus was put on the contract design
problem of one intermediary and two strategically interacting service providers. Specif-
ically, we analyzed a market in which one intermediary procured two complementary
goods from two input suppliers, combined them and offered the resulting final prod-
uct to a representative customer. Both service providers were able to provide their
products in either high or low quality. A key issue was given by the fact that the inter-
mediary was not able to directly observe the input goods’, but only the final products’
quality which resulted in a problem of moral hazard. We found that in a one shot as
well as a repeated game a low-quality final product can be obtained in equilibrium. A
high-quality final product, however, can only be achieved in the long run. Moreover
it turned out that even if providing a high-quality final product is desirable for the
intermediary, the existence of high-quality products crucially depends on the inter-
mediary’s time preferences. Besides the analysis of equilibrium outcomes, we derived
optimal contracts for implementing high- or low-quality composed services.
Within our model we conducted several simplifying assumptions that suggest fur-
ther prospective extensions. For instance, for our theoretical analysis we supposed the
quality level of composed as well as single services to either be high or low. Intro-
ducing a finite or infinite number of different product quality levels is thus an obvious
modification. This kind of extension enlarges the set of possible strategic choices of the
service providers and has the effect of composed services being available in more than
two quality levels. In addition, a higher range of quality levels requires a consideration
when defining the customer’s demand.
Another branch of future research goes in the direction of assigning a higher impact
to the customer’s role. The customer in our model did rather take a passive role, i.e.,
was only considered as the source of market demand for high- and low-quality prod-
ucts. We assumed the customer being able to perfectly observe the final product’s
quality and having a demand accordingly. In a next step it can be supposed that
the final product’s quality is not directly observable to the customer. Instead, one
can assume his evaluation to be depending on the quality which is reported by the
intermediary to the input suppliers. Thus, when choosing a quality level to report,
the intermediary needs to consider the procurement as well as the sales side. In this
context a determination of Nash equilibria and comparing results with the outcomes
of our recent model is a consequent next step.
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Within the current work we have seen that although examining a uniform market
structure, models’ focal points and specifications can go in various directions. In Chap-
ter 3 and Chapter 4 we focused on the intermediaries’ competition and determined and
analyzed the according Nash equilibrium outcomes. We assumed that intermediaries
only needed to procure one input product which was refined and afterwards offered to
a customer. However, we did not consider a key aspect of Chapter 5, i.e., the fact that
a number of input goods needed to be combined to establish a final product. Hence,
in a further step combining the central ideas of both models should be strived for.
Within such a setting intermediaries procure goods from a number of input suppliers,
combine them and offer the resulting final product to their clients. Competition be-
tween intermediaries and suppliers may be taken out simultaneously or sequentially
where either prices or quantities are chosen. Final products can again be horizontally
as well as vertically differentiated.
In conclusion, this thesis focused on two-sided markets in which intermediaries
built a link between input suppliers and customers. We covered various challenges
including simultaneous competition for clients and resources, asymmetries between
intermediaries, asymmetric information with respect to product quality and so forth.
Within our analyses we established results that gave us a broad understanding of two-
sided markets and build a solid basis for further research. Extensions of the above
models as well as challenges that were not in scope of this work should be considered
in future literature.
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